On 8/12/2012 10:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Aug 2012, at 16:29, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 12.08.2012 16:24 Bruno Marchal said the following:

On 12 Aug 2012, at 11:45, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Aug 12, 2012 at 11:01:09AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Aug 2012, at 09:45, Russell Standish wrote:

Nevertheless, randomness is a key component of free will.

So comp is false? I mean comp can only defend a compatibilist (or
mechanist, deterministic) theory of free-will, like with the self-
indetermination based on diagonalization.
I have never seen how we can use randomness to justify free-will.
May be you can elaborate?


If there are several actions an agent may perform, and one optimal in
terms of the agent's utility, but the utility is computationally
unfeasible, then an agent can choose one of the actions by random choice.


I don't see why this would entail comp is false though. Perhaps you
could elaborate?

Because comp implies that there is no randomness at the ontological
level. I guess you are alluding to the self-indeterminacy (à-la Turing,
not to be confused with the first person indeterminacy) which can make a
decision looking random for the one who does it, but which is not the
non-compatibilist kind of randomness that some defender of free-will
want to introduce.


Is it possible to say that compatibilism is equivalent to Leibniz' pre-established harmony?

Thiscan be *one* interpretation of Leibniz' pre-established harmony, but I doubt it is necessarily the only one. With comp you can interpret the pre-established harmony by the arithmetical truth, but to be honest, the harmony break down. The arithmetical truth can be considered as pre-established, but it is messy, infinitely complex, and beyond *all* theories, even theories of everything, provably so if comp is postulated.


Dear Bruno,

Given this remark about the PEH, do you agree with me that even though arithmetic truth is prior, that it is not accessible without physical actions?



"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon

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