On 14 Aug 2012, at 14:00, Roger wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal I'm way out of touch here. What is comp ?

`Roughly speaking comp is the idea that we can survive with a computer`

`for a brain, like we already believe that we can survive with a pump`

`in place of a heart.`

`This is the position of the materialist, but comp actally contradicts`

`the very notion of matter, or primitive ontological matter. That is`

`not entirely obvious.`

I don't think you can have a symbolic theory of subjectivity, fortheories are contructedin symbols, and subjectivity is awareness of the symbols andhopefully what they mean.

`We can use symbols to refer to existing non symbolic object. We don't`

`confuse them.`

CS Peirce differentiates the triadic connections between symbol andobject and awarenessin his theory of categories:FIRSTNESS (perceiving an object privately) -- raw experience of anappleSECONDNESS (comparing inner and outer worlds) - looking up theproper word symbol for the image in your memory[Comparing is the basis of thinking.]THIRDNESS: (doing or expressing publicly in words) - saying "That'san apple."

No problem. Bruno

Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-13, 11:53:51 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible Hi Jason, On 13 Aug 2012, at 17:04, Jason Resch wrote:On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:William, On 12 Aug 2012, at 18:01, William R. Buckley wrote:The physical universe is purely subjective.That follows from comp in a constructive way, that is, by givingthe means to derive physics from a theory of subejectivity. Withcomp any first order logical theory of a universal system will do,and the laws of physics and the laws of mind are not dependent ofthe choice of the initial universal system.Bruno,Does the universal system change the measure of different programsand observers, or do programs that implement programs (such as theUDA) end up making the initial choice of system of no consequence?The choice of the initial universal system does not matter. Ofcourse it does matter epistemologically. If you choose a quantumcomputing system as initial system, the derivation of the physicallaws will be confusing, and you will have an hard time to convincepeople that you have derived the quantum from comp, as you will haveseemed to introduce it at the start. So it is better to start withthe less "looking physical" initial system, and it is preferable tostart from one very well know, like number + addition andmultiplication.So, let us take it to fix the thing. The theory of everything isthen given by the minimal number of axioms we need to recover Turinguniversality.Amazingly enough the two following axioms are already enough, wherethe variable are quantified universally. I assume also some equalityrules, but not logic!x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x * 0 = 0 x*s(y) = (x *y) + xThis define already a realm in which all universal number exists,and all their behavior is accessible from that simple theory: it issigma_1 complete, that is the arithmetical version of Turing-complete. Note that such a theory is very weak, it has no negation,and cannot prove that 0 ≠ 1, for example. Of course, it isconsistent and can't prove that 0 = 1 either. yet it emulates a UDthrough the fact that all the numbers representing proofs can beproved to exist in that theory.Now, in that realm, due to the first person indeterminacy, you aremultiplied into infinity. More precisely, your actual relativecomputational state appears to be proved to exist relatively tobasically all universal numbers (and some non universal numberstoo), and this infinitely often.So when you decide to do an experience of physics, dropping anapple, for example, the first person indeterminacy dictates thatwhat you will feel to be experienced is given by a statistic on allcomputations (provably existing in the theory above) defined withrespect to all universal numbers.So if comp is correct, and if some physical law is correct (like'dropped apples fall'), it can only mean that the vast majority ofcomputation going in your actual comp state compute a state ofaffair where you see the apple falling. If you want, the reason whyapple fall is that it happens in the majority of your computationalextensions, and this has to be verified in the space of allcomputations. Everett confirms this very weird self-multiplication(weird with respect to the idea that we are unique and are living ina unique reality). This translated the problem of "why physicallaws" into a problem of statistics in computer science, or in numbertheory.Now, instead of using the four axioms above, I could have startedwith the combinators, and use the two combinator axioms:((K x) y) = x (((S x) y) z) = ((x z) (y z))This define exactly the same set of "all computations", and the samestatistical measure problem, and that is what I mean by saying thatthe initial axioms choice is indifferent as long as you start fromsomething which define a UD, or all computations (that is: is Turingor sigma_1 complete).Now, clearly, from the first person points of view, it does looklike many universal system get relatively more important role. Somecan be geographical, like the local chemical situation on earth (avery special universal system), or your parents, but the point isthat their stability must be justified by the "winning universalsystem" emerging from the competition of all universal numbers goingthrough your actual state. The apparent winner seems to be thequantum one, and it has already the shape of a universal systemwhich manage to eliminate abnormal computations by a process ofdestructive interferences. But to solve the mind body problem wehave to justify this destructive interference processes through thesolution of the arithmetical or combinatorial measure problem.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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