Hi Roger, On 17 Aug 2012, at 21:35, Roger wrote:

Hi Bruno MarchalMore simply, materialism contains no concept of a singular focussedagent, the self.

`That is true but not obvious to prove. The problem is that a priori`

`materialism is compatible with mechanism. It looks like we can`

`implement a computer notion of self in a material world. But once we`

`attribute consciousness to it, it is the notion of matter which`

`eventually makes no sense, unless we take it as emerging from the`

`number's experiences.`

So it cannot explain very much, for the self perceives, feels, anddoes. It is "me",although in the living flesh, something radically different.

`Radically different, yes. And even not existing primitively. I know`

`that this is counter-intuitive.`

Bruno

Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him soeverything could function."----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-16, 05:02:41 Subject: Re: Homunculi On 15 Aug 2012, at 14:16, Roger wrote:Hi Bruno MarchalThe materialists don't seem to have a very specific idea of whatgoverns us (the self)and its actual (live) governing. The self is something like ahomunculus, which asDennet correctly remarks, leads to an infinite regress inmaterialism.He is wrong. here materialism can work, in a first approximation, bythe use of the Dx = xx idea that I just briefly explain.I use "materialism" in the weak sense: doctrine according to whichmatter exists primitively or ontologically. It is that weakhypothesis which is contradict by the mechanist hypothesis. If weare machine, matter is *only* a derivative of the mind of thenumbers (in the general sense, or not).But there's no such problem with the monad, which is nonmaterial, nonphysical.Non materiality helps, but does not solve all problem per se. Theword monad is not very precise. How would you explain it to afourteen years old?BrunoRoger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/15/2012Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him soeverything could function."----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 11:01:03 Subject: Re: Peirce on subjectivity On 14 Aug 2012, at 14:00, Roger wrote:Hi Bruno Marchal I'm way out of touch here. What is comp ?Roughly speaking comp is the idea that we can survive with acomputer for a brain, like we already believe that we can survivewith a pump in place of a heart.This is the position of the materialist, but comp actallycontradicts the very notion of matter, or primitive ontologicalmatter. That is not entirely obvious.I don't think you can have a symbolic theory of subjectivity, fortheories are contructedin symbols, and subjectivity is awareness of the symbols andhopefully what they mean.We can use symbols to refer to existing non symbolic object. Wedon't confuse them.CS Peirce differentiates the triadic connections between symboland object and awarenessin his theory of categories:FIRSTNESS (perceiving an object privately) -- raw experience of anappleSECONDNESS (comparing inner and outer worlds) - looking up theproper word symbol for the image in your memory[Comparing is the basis of thinking.]THIRDNESS: (doing or expressing publicly in words) - saying"That's an apple."No problem. BrunoRoger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-13, 11:53:51 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible Hi Jason, On 13 Aug 2012, at 17:04, Jason Resch wrote:On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:William, On 12 Aug 2012, at 18:01, William R. Buckley wrote:The physical universe is purely subjective.That follows from comp in a constructive way, that is, by givingthe means to derive physics from a theory of subejectivity. Withcomp any first order logical theory of a universal system willdo, and the laws of physics and the laws of mind are notdependent of the choice of the initial universal system.Bruno,Does the universal system change the measure of differentprograms and observers, or do programs that implement programs(such as the UDA) end up making the initial choice of system ofno consequence?The choice of the initial universal system does not matter. Ofcourse it does matter epistemologically. If you choose a quantumcomputing system as initial system, the derivation of the physicallaws will be confusing, and you will have an hard time to convincepeople that you have derived the quantum from comp, as you willhave seemed to introduce it at the start. So it is better to startwith the less "looking physical" initial system, and it ispreferable to start from one very well know, like number +addition and multiplication.So, let us take it to fix the thing. The theory of everything isthen given by the minimal number of axioms we need to recoverTuring universality.Amazingly enough the two following axioms are already enough,where the variable are quantified universally. I assume also someequality rules, but not logic!x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x * 0 = 0 x*s(y) = (x *y) + xThis define already a realm in which all universal number exists,and all their behavior is accessible from that simple theory: itis sigma_1 complete, that is the arithmetical version of Turing-complete. Note that such a theory is very weak, it has nonegation, and cannot prove that 0 ≠ 1, for example. Of course, itis consistent and can't prove that 0 = 1 either. yet it emulates aUD through the fact that all the numbers representing proofs canbe proved to exist in that theory.Now, in that realm, due to the first person indeterminacy, you aremultiplied into infinity. More precisely, your actual relativecomputational state appears to be proved to exist relatively tobasically all universal numbers (and some non universal numberstoo), and this infinitely often.So when you decide to do an experience of physics, dropping anapple, for example, the first person indeterminacy dictates thatwhat you will feel to be experienced is given by a statistic onall computations (provably existing in the theory above) definedwith respect to all universal numbers.So if comp is correct, and if some physical law is correct (like'dropped apples fall'), it can only mean that the vast majority ofcomputation going in your actual comp state compute a state ofaffair where you see the apple falling. If you want, the reasonwhy apple fall is that it happens in the majority of yourcomputational extensions, and this has to be verified in the spaceof all computations. Everett confirms this very weird self-multiplication (weird with respect to the idea that we are uniqueand are living in a unique reality). This translated the problemof "why physical laws" into a problem of statistics in computerscience, or in number theory.Now, instead of using the four axioms above, I could have startedwith the combinators, and use the two combinator axioms:((K x) y) = x (((S x) y) z) = ((x z) (y z))This define exactly the same set of "all computations", and thesame statistical measure problem, and that is what I mean bysaying that the initial axioms choice is indifferent as long asyou start from something which define a UD, or all computations(that is: is Turing or sigma_1 complete).Now, clearly, from the first person points of view, it does looklike many universal system get relatively more important role.Some can be geographical, like the local chemical situation onearth (a very special universal system), or your parents, but thepoint is that their stability must be justified by the "winninguniversal system" emerging from the competition of all universalnumbers going through your actual state. The apparent winner seemsto be the quantum one, and it has already the shape of a universalsystem which manage to eliminate abnormal computations by aprocess of destructive interferences. But to solve the mind bodyproblem we have to justify this destructive interference processesthrough the solution of the arithmetical or combinatorial measureproblem.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.