Hi Bruno Marchal 

You might think of intelligence or the self or life as a striving toward a goal.
Purposeful.


Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/18/2012 
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function."
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-18, 06:38:30
Subject: Re: Homunculi


Hi Roger,


On 17 Aug 2012, at 21:35, Roger wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal 

More simply, materialism contains no concept of a singular focussed agent, the 
self.


That is true but not obvious to prove. The problem is that a priori materialism 
is compatible with mechanism. It looks like we can implement a computer notion 
of self in a material world. But once we attribute consciousness to it, it is 
the notion of matter which eventually makes no sense, unless we take it as 
emerging from the number's experiences.








So it cannot explain very much, for the self perceives, feels, and does. It is 
"me",
although in the living flesh, something radically different. 


Radically different, yes. And even not existing primitively. I know that this 
is counter-intuitive. 


Bruno






Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/17/2012 
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function."
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-16, 05:02:41
Subject: Re: Homunculi




On 15 Aug 2012, at 14:16, Roger wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal 

The materialists don't seem to have a very specific idea of what governs us 
(the self)
and its actual (live) governing. The self is something like a homunculus, which 
as
Dennet correctly remarks, leads to an infinite regress in materialism.  


He is wrong. here materialism can work, in a first approximation, by the use of 
the Dx = xx idea that I just briefly explain.


I use "materialism" in the weak sense: doctrine according to which matter 
exists primitively or ontologically. It is that weak hypothesis which is 
contradict by the mechanist hypothesis. If we are machine, matter is *only* a 
derivative of the mind of the numbers (in the general sense, or not).








But there's no such
problem with the monad, which is nonmaterial, nonphysical. 


Non materiality helps, but does not solve all problem per se. The word monad is 
not very precise. How would you explain it to a fourteen years old?


Bruno








Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/15/2012 
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything 
could function."
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-14, 11:01:03
Subject: Re: Peirce on subjectivity




On 14 Aug 2012, at 14:00, Roger wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal 

I'm way out of touch here. What is comp ?


Roughly speaking comp is the idea that we can survive with a computer for a 
brain, like we already believe that we can survive with a pump in place of a 
heart.


This is the position of the materialist, but comp actally contradicts the very 
notion of matter, or primitive ontological matter. That is not entirely 
obvious. 









I don't think you can have a symbolic theory of subjectivity, for theories  are 
contructed
in symbols, and subjectivity is awareness of the symbols  and hopefully what 
they mean.


We can use symbols to refer to existing non symbolic object. We don't confuse 
them.







CS Peirce differentiates the triadic connections between symbol and object and 
awareness
in his theory of categories:

FIRSTNESS (perceiving an object privately) -- raw experience of an apple

SECONDNESS (comparing inner and outer worlds)  - looking up the proper word 
symbol for the image in your memory
                            [Comparing is the basis of thinking.]

THIRDNESS: (doing or expressing publicly in words) - saying "That's an apple."  


No problem.




Bruno





Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012 
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-13, 11:53:51
Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible


Hi Jason, 


On 13 Aug 2012, at 17:04, Jason Resch wrote:





On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

William, 


On 12 Aug 2012, at 18:01, William R. Buckley wrote:


The physical universe is purely subjective.


That follows from comp in a constructive way, that is, by giving the means to 
derive physics from a theory of subejectivity. With comp any first order 
logical theory of a universal system will do, and the laws of physics and the 
laws of mind are not dependent of the choice of the initial universal system.






Bruno,


Does the universal system change the measure of different programs and 
observers, or do programs that implement programs (such as the UDA) end up 
making the initial choice of system of no consequence?


The choice of the initial universal system does not matter. Of course it does 
matter epistemologically. If you choose a quantum computing system as initial 
system, the derivation of the physical laws will be confusing, and you will 
have an hard time to convince people that you have derived the quantum from 
comp, as you will have seemed to introduce it at the start. So it is better to 
start with the less "looking physical" initial system, and it is preferable to 
start from one very well know, like number + addition and multiplication.


So, let us take it to fix the thing. The theory of everything is then given by 
the minimal number of axioms we need to recover Turing universality.


Amazingly enough the two following axioms are already enough, where the 
variable are quantified universally. I assume also some equality rules, but not 
logic!


x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)


x * 0 = 0
x*s(y) = (x *y) + x


This define already a realm in which all universal number exists, and all their 
behavior is accessible from that simple theory: it is sigma_1 complete, that is 
the arithmetical version of Turing-complete. Note that such a theory is very 
weak, it has no negation, and cannot prove that 0 ? 1, for example. Of course, 
it is consistent and can't prove that 0 = 1 either. yet it emulates a UD 
through the fact that all the numbers representing proofs can be proved to 
exist in that theory.


Now, in that realm, due to the first person indeterminacy, you are multiplied 
into infinity. More precisely, your actual relative computational state appears 
to be proved to exist relatively to basically all universal numbers (and some 
non universal numbers too), and this infinitely often.


So when you decide to do an experience of physics, dropping an apple, for 
example, the first person indeterminacy dictates that what you will  feel to be 
experienced is given by a statistic on all computations (provably existing in 
the theory above) defined with respect to all universal numbers. 


So if comp is correct, and if some physical law is correct (like 'dropped 
apples fall'), it can only mean that the vast majority of computation going in 
your actual comp state compute a state of affair where you see the apple 
falling. If you want, the reason why apple fall is that it happens in the 
majority of your computational extensions, and this has to be verified in the 
space of all computations. Everett confirms this very weird self-multiplication 
(weird with respect to the idea that we are unique and are living in a unique 
reality). This translated the problem of "why physical laws" into a problem of 
statistics in computer science, or in number theory.


Now, instead of using the four axioms above, I could have started with the 
combinators, and use the two combinator axioms:


((K x) y) = x
(((S x) y) z) = ((x z) (y z))


This define exactly the same set of "all computations", and the same 
statistical measure problem, and that is what I mean by saying that the initial 
axioms choice is indifferent as long as you start from something which define a 
UD, or all computations (that is: is Turing or sigma_1 complete).


Now, clearly, from the first person points of view, it does look like many 
universal system get relatively more important role. Some can be geographical, 
like the local chemical situation on earth (a very special universal system), 
or your parents, but the point is that their stability must be justified by the 
"winning universal system" emerging from the competition of all universal 
numbers going through your actual state. The apparent winner seems to be the 
quantum one, and it has already the shape of a universal system which manage to 
eliminate abnormal computations by a process of destructive interferences. But 
to solve the mind body problem we have to justify this destructive interference 
processes through the solution of the arithmetical or combinatorial measure 
problem.


Bruno






http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/








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