On 25 Aug 2012, at 22:56, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/25/2012 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:19, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/24/2012 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But normally the holographic principle should be extracted from
comp before this can be used as an argument here.
"Normally"?? The holographic principle was extracted from general
relativity and the Bekenstein bound. I don't know in what sense
it "should be extracted" from something else, but if you can do
so, please do. It would certainly impress me.
UDA explains why it should be. That such an extraction might take
1000^^^^1000 centuries is not relevant.
Oh, OK, you mean assuming the world is generated by the UDA then it
follows that the holographic principle (assuming it's true) is also
generated by the UDA (along with everything else).
I guess you mean "generated by the UD" (the UD is a program, UDA is
just an argument).
More or less OK, but it is not clear if you are not forgetting the
first person indeterminacy. The "real" physical world is never
generated by the UD, it is only recovered by the machines/programs,
from their first person points of view based on the entire (infinite,
non computable) domain of indeterminacy.
And this can help to see a sort of hologram at play, as that UD*
border has to be a fractal structure with itself embedded
"everywhere". But I have never to much dig on that aspect, to be sure.
Unlike Schmidhuber and Tegmark seems to think, comp does not allow to
believe that the physical universe is a program among others, at least
a priori. It is a richer epistemological invariant, not computable a
priori, pertaining to a sum on all computations. Schmidhuber and
Tegmark just abstract themselves from the first person indeterminacy,
and thus are not really assuming comp, or taking into account the
existence of consciousness.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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