What you are all missing is this:
A particular kind of pattern (in sand or salt) can be generated by
generating a specific sound (cymatics).
The same pattern would be generated whether or not any human ear was
present to hear the 'sound' as an audible experience.
The same pattern could be manually generated by other means - sweeping the
salt into the desired shapes by hand or tiny magnetic robots, etc.
This process would generate no audible experience to anyone.
While we have grown accustomed to thinking of sound waves as something that
literally exists and causes physical changes, if we pay attention to the
process of generating sound, we can realize that it can only be generated
by mechanically vibrating a physical object to begin with. Indeed, without
a molecule-filled plenum to vibrate, there is no way for sound to propagate
between solid objects which are separated by space.
This illustrates that the wave itself - the computation, does not exist
independently of the objects which are participating in the event. The
event has computable aspects - its predictable effects on objects of
particular forms and densities, etc, but the sound that is associated with
the wave in a human mind is not computable. There is no reason to assume
that the vibratory behaviors which we observe with some (but not all) of
our other human senses, visual and tactile, is any more of an objective
definition than the quality of the sound to our ears.
Computation is always only something that material stuff is doing - and
material stuff is only a tactile-visual presentation.
So why would any kind of oracle requirement of a computation conjure up any
quality or possibility of an 'experience'? This assumes that scooping salt
in fancy circles makes sound magically appear in the universe. Computation
does not need awareness, but awareness needs computation as a way of
externalizing experience. Computation cannot be primitive because we would
never know about it - nothing would know about it. Computation is an
abstract skeleton of relation between objects, but it can never explain
imagination or sense itself.
On Sunday, August 26, 2012 2:56:29 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
> On 8/26/2012 10:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > On 25 Aug 2012, at 12:35, Jason Resch wrote:
> >> I agree different implementations of intelligence have different
> capabilities and
> >> roles, but I think computers are general enough to replicate any
> intelligence (so long
> >> as infinities or true randomness are not required).
> > And now a subtle point. Perhaps.
> > The point is that computers are general enough to replicate intelligence
> EVEN if
> > infinities and true randomness are required for it.
> > Imagine that our consciousness require some ORACLE. For example under
> the form of a some
> > non compressible sequence 11101000011101100011111101010110100001...
> > Being incompressible, that sequence cannot be part of my brain at my
> substitution level,
> > because this would make it impossible for the doctor to copy my brain
> into a finite
> > string. So such sequence operates "outside my brain", and if the doctor
> copy me at the
> > right comp level, he will reconstitute me with the right "interface" to
> the oracle, so I
> > will survive and stay conscious, despite my consciousness depends on
> that oracle.
> > Will the UD, just alone, or in arithmetic, be able to copy me in front
> of that oracle?
> > Yes, as the UD dovetails on all programs, but also on all inputs, and in
> this case, he
> > will generate me successively (with large delays in between) in front of
> all finite
> > approximation of the oracle, and (key point), the first person
> indeterminacy will have
> > as domain, by definition of first person, all the UD computation where
> my virtual brain
> > use the relevant (for my consciousness) part of the oracle.
> > A machine can only access to finite parts of an oracle, in course of a
> > requiring oracle, and so everything is fine.
> That's how I imagine COMP instantiates the relation between the physical
> world and
> consciousness; that the physical world acts like the oracle and provides
> interactions with consciousness as a computational process. Of course
> that doesn't
> require that the physical world be an oracle - it may be computable too.
> > Of course, if we need the whole oracular sequence, in one step, then
> comp would be just
> > false, and the brain need an infinite interface.
> > The UD dovetails really on all programs, with all possible input, even
> infinite non
> > computable one.
> > Bruno
> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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