I think of number as the conceptual continuity between the behaviors of
physical things - whether it is the interior view of things as experiences
through time or the exterior view of experiences as things. Numbers don't
fly by in a computation, that's a cartoon. All that happens is that
something which is much smaller and faster than we are, like a
semiconductor or neuron, is doing some repetitive, sensorimotive behavior
which tickles our own sense and motive in a way that we can understand and
control. Computation doesn't exist independently as an operation in space,
it is a common sense of matter, just as we are - but one does not reduce to
the other. Feeling, emotion, and thought does not have to be made of
computations, they can be other forms of sensible expression. Counting is
one of the things that we, and most everything can do in one way or
another, but nothing can turn numbers into anything other than more numbers
except non-numerical sense.
On Monday, September 3, 2012 9:53:21 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
> Hi Craig Weinberg
> Sorry. I guess I should call them monadic numbers. Not numbers as monads,
> but monads as numbers.
> The numbers I am thinking of as monads are those flying by in a particular
> computation. Monads are under constant change. As to history,
> appetites, those would be some king of context as in a subprogram
> which coud be stored in files.
> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
> so that everything could function."
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *Time:* 2012-09-02, 08:28:10
> *Subject:* Re: Toward emulating life with a monadic computer
> On Sunday, September 2, 2012 2:20:49 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
>> *Toward emulating life with a monadic computer*
>> In a previous discussion we showed that the natural numbers qualify as
>> Leibnizian monads, suggesting the possibility that other mathematical
>> forms might similarly be treated as monadic structures.
>> At the same time, Leibniz's monadology describes a computational
>> architecture that is capable of emulating not only the dynamic physical
>> universe, but a biological universe as well.
>> In either case, the entire universe might be envisioned as a gigantic
>> digital golem, a living figure whose body consists of a categorical
>> nonliving substructure and whose mind/brain is the what Leibniz called
>> the "supreme
>> monad". The supreme monad might be thought of as a monarch,
>> since it governs the operation of its passive monadic substructures
>> according to a "preestablished harmony." In addition, each monad in the
>> would possess typical monadic substructures, and possibly further monadic
>> substructures wuithin this, depending spending on the level of complexity
>> Without going into much detail at this point, Leibniz's monadology might
>> be considered
>> as the operating system of such a computer, with the central processing
>> as its supreme monad. This CPU continually updates all of the monads
>> in the system according the following scheme. Only the CPU is active,
>> while all of the sub-structure monads (I think in a logical, tree-like
>> structure) are passive.
>> Each monad contains a dynamically changing image (a "reflection") of all
>> of the
>> other monads, taken from its particular point of view. These are
>> called its perceptions,
>> which might be thought of as records of the state of any given monad at
>> given time. This state comprising an image of the entire universe of
>> constantly being updated by the Supreme monad or CPU. In addition to
>> the perceptions, each monad also has a constantly changing set of
>> And all of these are coorddinated to fit a pre-established harmony.
>> It might be that the pre-established harmony is simply what is happening
>> in the world outside the computer.
>> Other details of this computer should be forthcoming.
> First I would say that numbers are not monads because numbers have no
> experience. They have no interior or exterior realism, but rather are the
> interstitial shadows of interior-exterior events. Numbers are a form of
> common sense, but they are not universal sense and they are limited to a
> narrow channel of sense which is dependent upon solid physicality to
> propagate. You can't count with fog.
> Secondly I think that the monadology makes more sense as the world outside
> the computer. Time and space are computational constructs generated by the
> meta-juxtaposition of sense*(matter+entropy) and (matter/matter)-sense.
> Matter is the experience of objecthood. Numbers are the subjective-ized
> essence of objects
>> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
>> so that everything could function."
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