On 9/5/2012 11:50 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 6:38:07 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

    Hi Stephen P. King
    No, the stuff in our skulls  is alive, has intelligence, and a 1p.
    Computers don't and can't. Big sdifference.

    Hi Roger,

    锟斤拷� Please leave magic out of this, as "any sufficiently
    advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic
    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clarke%27s_three_laws>". The trouble
    is that the stuff in our skulls does not appear to be that much
    different from a bunch of diodes and transistors.

    锟斤拷� Our brains obey the very same physical laws! What makes
    the brain special? I suspect that the brain uses quantum
    entanglement effects to both synchronize and update sense content
    in ways that cannot obtain from purely classical physical methods.
    Our mechanical machines lack the ability to report on their 1p
    content thus we are using their disability to argue against their
    possible abilities. A computer that could both generate an
    internal self-model and report on it would lead us to very
    different conclusions!

I think you are both right. Computers qua computers don't feel anything because they aren't anything. The physical material that you are using to execute computations on does however have experiences - just not experiences that we associated with our own. There is a concrete experience associated with the production of these pixels on your screen - many experiences on many levels, of molecules that make up the wires etc., but those experiences don't seem to lead to anything we would consider significant. It's pretty straightforward to me. A stuffed animal that looks like a bear is not a bear. A picture of a person is not a person, even if it is a fancy interactive picture.


Hi Craig,

I think that the difference that makes a difference here is the identity that emerges between matching of the experience *of* object and experience *by* object. Ranulph Glanville has, with others in the Cybernetics community, written masterfully on this in his "Same is Different" paper.




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