On Thursday, September 6, 2012 7:37:38 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > On 9/5/2012 11:50 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 6:38:07 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: >> >> Hi Stephen P. King >> >> No, the stuff in our skulls is alive, has intelligence, and a 1p. >> Computers don't and can't. Big sdifference. >> > > >> Hi Roger, >> >> 锟斤拷� Please leave magic out of this, as "any sufficiently advanced >> technology is indistinguishable from >> magic<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clarke%27s_three_laws>". >> The trouble is that the stuff in our skulls does not appear to be that much >> different from a bunch of diodes and transistors. >> >> 锟斤拷� Our brains obey the very same physical laws! What makes the brain >> special? I suspect that the brain uses quantum entanglement effects to both >> synchronize and update sense content in ways that cannot obtain from purely >> classical physical methods. Our mechanical machines lack the ability to >> report on their 1p content thus we are using their disability to argue >> against their possible abilities. A computer that could both generate an >> internal self-model and report on it would lead us to very different >> conclusions! >> > > I think you are both right. Computers qua computers don't feel anything > because they aren't anything. The physical material that you are using to > execute computations on does however have experiences - just not > experiences that we associated with our own. There is a concrete experience > associated with the production of these pixels on your screen - many > experiences on many levels, of molecules that make up the wires etc., but > those experiences don't seem to lead to anything we would consider > significant. It's pretty straightforward to me. A stuffed animal that looks > like a bear is not a bear. A picture of a person is not a person, even if > it is a fancy interactive picture. > > Craig > -- > > Hi Craig, > > I think that the difference that makes a difference here is the > identity that emerges between matching of the experience *of* object and > experience *by* object. Ranulph Glanville has, with others in the > Cybernetics community, written masterfully on this in his "Same is > Different" paper. > > Hi Stephen,
How does the of/by distinction compare with map-territory and use-mention distinctions? Craig > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/LAHBiforecoJ. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.