Hi Stephen P. King
I think of the brain as a running sensor of the static platonic world.
Sort of like looking out of the car window as you speed along.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Stephen P. King
Time: 2012-09-06, 20:25:27
Subject: Re: Why a bacterium has more intelligence than a computer
On 9/6/2012 7:59 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, September 6, 2012 7:37:38 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:
On 9/5/2012 11:50 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 6:38:07 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
No, the stuff in our skulls is alive, has intelligence, and a 1p.
Computers don't and can't. Big sdifference.
??? Please leave magic out of this, as "any sufficiently advanced technology is
indistinguishable from magic". The trouble is that the stuff in our skulls does
not appear to be that much different from a bunch of diodes and transistors.
??? Our brains obey the very same physical laws! What makes the brain special?
I suspect that the brain uses quantum entanglement effects to both synchronize
and update sense content in ways that cannot obtain from purely classical
physical methods. Our mechanical machines lack the ability to report on their
1p content thus we are using their disability to argue against their possible
abilities. A computer that could both generate an internal self-model and
report on it would lead us to very different conclusions!
I think you are both right. Computers qua computers don't feel anything because
they aren't anything. The physical material that you are using to execute
computations on does however have experiences - just not experiences that we
associated with our own. There is a concrete experience associated with the
production of these pixels on your screen - many experiences on many levels, of
molecules that make up the wires etc., but those experiences don't seem to lead
to anything we would consider significant. It's pretty straightforward to me. A
stuffed animal that looks like a bear is not a bear. A picture of a person is
not a person, even if it is a fancy interactive picture.
I think that the difference that makes a difference here is the identity
that emerges between matching of the experience *of* object and experience *by*
object. Ranulph Glanville has, with others in the Cybernetics community,
written masterfully on this in his "Same is Different" paper.
How does the of/by distinction compare with map-territory and use-mention
Consider the difference/similarity of "self-observation" and
"other-observation". I will try to post more on this soon.
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