On 9/6/2012 7:59 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Thursday, September 6, 2012 7:37:38 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

    On 9/5/2012 11:50 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

    On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 6:38:07 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

        Hi Stephen P. King
        No, the stuff in our skulls  is alive, has intelligence, and
        a 1p.
        Computers don't and can't. Big sdifference.

        Hi Roger,

        锟斤拷� Please leave magic out of this, as "any sufficiently
        advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic
        <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clarke%27s_three_laws>". The
        trouble is that the stuff in our skulls does not appear to be
        that much different from a bunch of diodes and transistors.

        锟斤拷� Our brains obey the very same physical laws! What
        makes the brain special? I suspect that the brain uses
        quantum entanglement effects to both synchronize and update
        sense content in ways that cannot obtain from purely
        classical physical methods. Our mechanical machines lack the
        ability to report on their 1p content thus we are using their
        disability to argue against their possible abilities. A
        computer that could both generate an internal self-model and
        report on it would lead us to very different conclusions!

    I think you are both right. Computers qua computers don't feel
    anything because they aren't anything. The physical material that
    you are using to execute computations on does however have
    experiences - just not experiences that we associated with our
    own. There is a concrete experience associated with the
    production of these pixels on your screen - many experiences on
    many levels, of molecules that make up the wires etc., but those
    experiences don't seem to lead to anything we would consider
    significant. It's pretty straightforward to me. A stuffed animal
    that looks like a bear is not a bear. A picture of a person is
    not a person, even if it is a fancy interactive picture.

    Hi Craig,

        I think that the difference that makes a difference here is
    the identity that emerges between matching of the experience *of*
    object and experience *by* object. Ranulph Glanville has, with
    others in the Cybernetics community, written masterfully on this
    in his "Same is Different" paper.

Hi Stephen,

How does the of/by distinction compare with map-territory and use-mention distinctions?

Hi Craig,

Consider the difference/similarity of "self-observation" and "other-observation". I will try to post more on this soon.




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