On 25 Sep 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Pain is anything but epiphenomenal.  The fact that someone is able
>> to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon.
>
> The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely
> as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying
> qualia.

With comp a physical events is explained in term of measure and
machine/number relative consciousness selection (à la WM-duplication
way).
Physics is phenomenal. It is an internal consciousness selection made
on coherent computations (arithmetical relations).
We can't explain physics without a theory of quanta, which, in comp,
is a sub-theory of a theory of consciousness/qualia.

Consciousness is not epiphenomenal: it is the "extractor" of the
physical realities in arithmetic. We could say that consciousness is
the universal self-accelerating property of the universal number which
makes possible the differentiation of the experience, and then the
physical reality is a projection. I could consider consciousness as
the main "force" in the universe, even if it is also a phenomenal
reality (the ontology being only arithmetic, or finite combinatorial
relations).

We are on the same page here then. My only question is, if consciousness is the main "force" in the universe, doesn't it make more sense to see arithmetic as the "condenser" of experiences into physical realism?

It makes sense once we assume comp, as we attach consciousness to computations, whose existence is guarantied by arithmetic.


I can easily see why experience would need semiotic compressions to organize itself, but I can see no reason that arithmetic or physical realities would possibly need to be 'extracted', or even what that would mean.

This is what the Universal Dovetailer Argument explains.


Why execute a program if all possible outcomes are already computable?

To be computable is not enough, if the computations are not done, relatively to the situation you are in. Your question is like "why should I pay this beer if I can show that I can pay it?".

Bruno




Craig


If you associate consciousness with the unconscious (automated)
inference in self-consistency, you can explain formally that self-
accelerating relative processes. It makes consciousness the "cause" of
all motions in the physical universe, even if the "cause" are given by
infinities of arithmetical relations + the (apparently plural
personal) self-selection.

Bruno



> By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball
> entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has qualia or
> some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this
> property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal, without
> causal efficacy of its own.
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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