On 26 Sep 2012, at 19:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, September 26, 2012 3:45:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 25 Sep 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someone is able
>> to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon.
>
> The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained
entirely
> as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying
> qualia.
With comp a physical events is explained in term of measure and
machine/number relative consciousness selection (à la WM-duplication
way).
Physics is phenomenal. It is an internal consciousness selection made
on coherent computations (arithmetical relations).
We can't explain physics without a theory of quanta, which, in comp,
is a sub-theory of a theory of consciousness/qualia.
Consciousness is not epiphenomenal: it is the "extractor" of the
physical realities in arithmetic. We could say that consciousness is
the universal self-accelerating property of the universal number
which
makes possible the differentiation of the experience, and then the
physical reality is a projection. I could consider consciousness as
the main "force" in the universe, even if it is also a phenomenal
reality (the ontology being only arithmetic, or finite combinatorial
relations).
We are on the same page here then. My only question is, if
consciousness is the main "force" in the universe, doesn't it make
more sense to see arithmetic as the "condenser" of experiences into
physical realism?
It makes sense once we assume comp, as we attach consciousness to
computations, whose existence is guarantied by arithmetic.
Are you saying that arithmetic guarantees consciousness because it
obviously supervenes on awareness, or do you say that consciousness
is specifically inevitable from arithmetic truth.
Consciousness is specifically inevitable from arithmetic truth, "seen
from inside".
If the latter, then it sounds like you are saying that some
arithmetic functions can only be expressed as pain or blue...
No. You confuse "Turing emulable", and "first person indeterminacy
recoverable". Pain and blue have no arithmetical representations.
in which case, how are they really arithmetic.
They are not. Arithmetical truth is already not arithmetical.
Arithmetic seen from inside is *vastly* bigger than arithmetic. This
needs a bit of "model theory" to be explained formally.
Besides, we have never seen a computation turn blue or create
blueness.
It would not lake sense to "see" that. Brain and electromagnetic
fields or any 3p notion cannot turn blue. "Blue" is a singular
informative global experienced by first person.
I can easily see why experience would need semiotic compressions to
organize itself, but I can see no reason that arithmetic or
physical realities would possibly need to be 'extracted', or even
what that would mean.
This is what the Universal Dovetailer Argument explains.
If it does, then I don't understand it. If you can explain it with a
common sense example as a metaphor, then I might be able to get more
of it.
Did you understand the first person indeterminacy? Tell me if you
understand the seven first steps of the UDA, in
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
Why execute a program if all possible outcomes are already
computable?
To be computable is not enough, if the computations are not done,
relatively to the situation you are in.
Your question is like "why should I pay this beer if I can show that
I can pay it?".
Yes, why should I pay for the beer if it's arithmetically inevitable
that I have paid for the beer in the future?
It is not arithmetically inevitable. In some stories you don't pay.
Comp, like QM, leads to a continuum of futures, and your decisions and
acts "here-and-now" determine the general features of your normal
(majority) futures. That is why life and discussion forums have some
sense.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
