On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> You can approximate consciousness by "belief in self-consistency". This has
> already a "causal efficacy", notably a relative self-speeding ability (by
> Gödel "length of proof" theorem). But "belief in self-consistency" is pure
> 3p, and is not consciousness, you get consciousness because the machine will
> confuse the belief in self-consistency with the truth of its
> self-consistency, and this will introduce a quale. The machine can be aware
> of it, and (with enough cognitive ability) the machine will be aware of its
> non communicability, making it into a personal quale.
> I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real, and
> consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago you did
> understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of brain and
> matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives another role for
> consciousness: the bringing of physical realities through number relations
> being selected (non causally, here). Consciousness is what makes notions of
> causal efficacy meaningful to start with.
I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other
machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws.
Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is
possible but it is contrary to all science. This applies even if the
whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is
at the level of the simulation.
> I think it is the same error as using determinacy to refute free-will. This
> would be correct if we were living at the determinist base level, but we are
> not. Consciousness and free-will are real at the level where we live, and
> unreal, in the big 3p picture, but this concerns only the "outer god", not
> the "inner one" which can *know* a part of its local self-consistency, and
> cannot know its local future.
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