On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:

Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someone is able to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon.

The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely
as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying
qualia.

With comp a physical events is explained in term of measure and machine/number relative consciousness selection (à la WM-duplication way). Physics is phenomenal. It is an internal consciousness selection made on coherent computations (arithmetical relations). We can't explain physics without a theory of quanta, which, in comp, is a sub-theory of a theory of consciousness/qualia.

Consciousness is not epiphenomenal: it is the "extractor" of the physical realities in arithmetic. We could say that consciousness is the universal self-accelerating property of the universal number which makes possible the differentiation of the experience, and then the physical reality is a projection. I could consider consciousness as the main "force" in the universe, even if it is also a phenomenal reality (the ontology being only arithmetic, or finite combinatorial relations).

If you associate consciousness with the unconscious (automated) inference in self-consistency, you can explain formally that self- accelerating relative processes. It makes consciousness the "cause" of all motions in the physical universe, even if the "cause" are given by infinities of arithmetical relations + the (apparently plural personal) self-selection.

Bruno



By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball
entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has qualia or
some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this
property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal, without
causal efficacy of its own.


--
Stathis Papaioannou

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