On 10/7/2012 5:46 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

I'm not sure that there is any real disagreement between your view and Bruno's. It seems more to be a language thing, if anything. When Bruno refers to a physics, he means the appearance of a physical world from the perspective of observers. But observers never see a single "physical world", they exist in and see an infinite number of interfering (physical worlds / dreams of numbers).

Hi Jason,

I agree with you! I am trying to go further than Bruno. To do this I need to carefully examine many of the ideas that we just assume to be true. One of those is the Church-Turing thesis <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/church-turing/>.

I sympathize with your view that many (most?) observers exist in larger mathematical structures that contain multiple observers, but I don't see that this invalidates step 8.

My argument is that step 8 goes too far in that it completely severs the connection between the physical world that we experience and the Platonic Realm. I am interested in building a ladder that can take us up to (and down from) the beautiful castle that Bruno has discovered that is floating in the rarefied aether of Platonia, metaphorically speaking of course. ;-) In my opinion *all* observers must have a representation within Platonia or else Platonia is not Complete! What about the "interactions between observers"? It seems to me that "physical worlds" can be defined in terms of interactions between observers. This is not a nontrivial derivation!

You say "one that is not ontologically primitive, but to demand this is to also demand that arithmetics and numbers are not ontologically primitive as well."

Do you agree that at least something has to be ontologically primitive?


If so, what do you think that something is? You referred to something that has no innate properties, but I don't find much explanatory power in that.

Existence itself is that "something", but what ever it is it must be *neutral* with respect to properties. If we claim that it is "number" then we have to explain why numbers and not, say, polytopes or something else. We cannot think of it as having some property to the exclusion of other properties.

I come to this conclusion from my study of the problem of "substance" as discussed here: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/ Descartes theory of dualism failed because it assumed that "substance" is ontologically primitive. Pratt alludes to this in his infamous paper. I agree with you that there is not much explanatory power in considering an ontological primitive that "has no innate properties" but this is not quite the case. The ontological primitive that I am considered has *all possible* properties, but as Russell Standish explains in his book, it has zero information content. The totality of all that exists is null and void and from it all emerges. :-)



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