On 07 Oct 2012, at 21:39, Stephen P. King wrote:

In my thinking, a physical world = a reality = that which isincontrovertible (free of contradictions = Boolean Satisfiable)

Many logic are consistent without being boolean.

for some finite collection of observers, where observers are definedas "bundles of computations".

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Physical worlds are not actual in the absence of observers. I alsostipulate that there are an infinite (uncountable) number ofphysical worlds.

What are all your stipulation? A listing would help.

This demands that there exists an uncountable infinity of observers<=> an infinite number of bundles of computations. Please recall howI define "exist"; it is *necessary possibility*.

`For all logicians "necessity" and "possibility" is much more vague`

`than "exists". Kripkean modal logic exist for each possible notion of`

`accessibility. You define something which is precise and standard by`

`what is complex and extremely variate. between S4 and S4Grz there are`

`uncountably many different modal logics (and thus different notion of`

`possibility and necessity).`

`Comp and classical theory of knowledge fix the choice of the modal`

`logic? Why not use them?`

You like the modal logical explanatory model,This is not correct. I just model "belief" by the "instantional"manner, à-la Dennet.One day I might be able to recall your terminology exactly. ;-)

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A machine believes p if the machine assert p, which makes sense asI limit myself to machine talking first order language, ideallyarithmetically sound, and being able to believe the logicalconsequences of its beliefs in arithmetic. Then modal logic justhappens to describe completely, at the propositional level, thelogic of provability of such machine, thanks to the work of Gödel,Löb and Solovay (and others).I have never choose to use modal logic, I use only machine self-reference, where a very special modality imposes itself (G).Sure, you use that is necessitated by non-contradictionprinciple. ;-)so there we might think of observers as bundles of computations.OK. That's nice, but what is a computation?A computation is *any transformation of information*.

`Thanks to the CT thesis, computation is one, and the unique, epistemic`

`notion having a precise and absolute definition. Information is fuzzy`

`and admit many different and confusing interpretation.`

Information = any difference between two that makes a difference toa third. It is interesting that this definition demand that thereexists at least three entities or processes or whatever forinformation and thus computation to exist. I have not considered thefurther consequences of this idea so far. It might be completelyfallacious.

`It is not quite clear to say the least. I home you have no propblem`

`with my francness. (Very buzy days so I don't try diplomacy, which`

`actually never really work in science).`

Your preceding post were using a notion of physical computation,which would not cut the regress.I disagree. I am arguing that only if we retain a connectionbetween computation as a platonic abstraction and the requirement ofphysical resources

We are back to my early question. What do you mean by physical.

we will have a viable cut off for the regress. A computer that canonly process a finite number of recursions or iterations of self-modeling will not have an infinite regress for obvious reasons. WhatI am trying to do to make this a more formal statement is to tietogether the Kolmogorov complexity of a description a system,abstract or physical, with the physical degrees of freedom of aphysical system (for example the dimensions of its Hilbert space orHamiltonian).

That might be interesting.

In this way we have a way to define a physical system as a boundedbundle of computations. This would be a lower bound on the necessaryphysical resources required to implement an arbitrary computations.Following this idea we can see that it implies that physicalsystems that require infinite computations to be exactly simulatedonly can exist is very special circumstances!

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But as I answered you can take the original definition ofcomputation (by Post, Turing & Co.), in which case you can assumeonly arithmetic, and the regression is cut, by defining the "bundleof computations" with the first person indeterminacy. Then you areback to sane04, and you describe the comp theory.This is where I agree with comp. I only disagree with your step 8:

But where in step 8 do you disagree. Search MGA on this list.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf"what if we don’t grant a concrete robust physical universe? Up tothis stage,we can still escape the conclusion of the seven preceding reasoningsteps, bypostulating that a ‘‘physical universe’’ really ‘‘exists’’ and istoo little in the sense of not beingable to generate the entire UD*, nor any reasonable portions of it,so that our usual physicalpredictions would be safe from any interference with its UD-generated ‘‘little’’ computationalhistories."Here you seem to only consider a "physical universe" to be anentity that "exists" with no observers associated with it and reasonthat such is an irrelevant concept that can and should be dismissedfrom consideration. I am OK with that! I define a "physicaluniverse" differently! (see above) I am only asking for a weakerversion of a "physical universe" to exist; one that is notontologically primitive, but to demand this is to also demand thatarithmetics and numbers are not ontologically primitive as well.

`This is logically impossible, unless you adopt an ultrafinitism non`

`comp theory.`

Both abstractions, such as numbers and their truths, and physicalworlds must emerge together from a primitive ground which is neutralin that it has no innate properties at all other that necessarypossibility. It merely exists.

I can't make sense of this.

from your paper:"It will follow that a much weaker and usual form of Ockham’srazor can be used to conclude that not only physics hasbeen epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that‘‘matter’’ has beenontologically reduced to ‘‘mind’’ where mind is defined as theobject study of fundamentalmachine psychology."But "physics" =/= "physical world". Here is where we diverge inour agreement! Physics is behavior not "being". Matter =/= "physicalworld". Matter is the spatial aspect of sets, once we remove all ofthe contingencies of physics explanations. You are claiming to"reduce" matter (Aristotelian "substance") to "mind" (that whichfundamental machine psychology presupposes) and thus eliminate"matter". But this seems to be possible only if fundamental machinepsychology allows the existence of a single machine and thus asingular mind.

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I have tried to point out that this is exactly consistent withTennenbaum's Theorem and tried to argue that this is a huge problemas it makes comp (or UDA) into a description of the psychology of aconsistent solipsistic machine.

? (you lost me completely).

One possibility requires that we "relativize" countable modelsof PA using the non-standand arithmetics but in a way thatperpetually "hides" the non-standard component, the constant, of themodel from the machine itself.

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The inability for a computable model of consciousness to "know"which computations "it is", is an expression of this property, IMHO.

Yes, that is what I exploit.

It might be helpful for you to examine the Zuckerman and Mirankerpaper and discuss it with the members of the list. I will defendit against your critique, as I see the paper as a nicerepresentation of part of the dual aspect monism (or "processdualism") idea that I have been advocating.That's a technical implementation, which assumes too much from thepoint of view of foundational studies. It is OK, and rather clichéin my opinion, and is the kind of thing I let the Löbian machinetoo choose. It is not really relevant, given the results in thecomp theory, as the regression cut are based, through comp, to theKleene second recursion theorem (the double intensionaldiagonalization, or Dx = "xx").Are you interested in solving the arithmetic body problem ornot? I am interested in solutions!

The formal solution are given by the S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*.

BTW, the regression cut that you are implementing is not flexible.

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My work requires a flexible regression cut to deal the "Heisenbergcut" problem of QM

QM is not an admissible assumption with comp (that is the result).

so we can consider observers in non-statistical ways (in contrastwith the way that decoherence arguments treat observers). Myproposal is to add some fine detail to Zuckerman''s model,specifically to the definition of "observation" in his model, in away that is consistent with Pratt's model. Pratt's model has someopen problems of its own, but these are solved by the requirement ofphysical resources for the bound on bundles of computations (akaobservers). But this latter idea demands a weaker version ofcomputational universality... We fight over that!I am just trying to understand if your theory contradicts anythingin what has already been done in comp, or if it contradict or is inopposition as you seem to believe or assert from time to time.Paper like Pratt, and now Zuckerman are just unaware of the compreversal between physics and arithmetic, and completely ignore themind body problem.Why do Pratt and Zuckerman need to be aware of the compreversal? Could it be that you are merely complaining that they areignoring your work?

`It is sad, but I guess it is not their fault. Of course the reversal`

`cannot be ignored if we want to progress.`

They use the term consciousness without motivating its use, ormaking clear what axioms they take for consciousness, and seems tobuild on the usual Aristotelian paradigm. They are simply unawareof the first person indeterminacy and its consequences. They arenot alone, of course."...without motivating its use"? What is a more basic questionthat human ask than "what is the nature of my existence?"? Whycomplain that they are not stating the obvious?

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You seem to accept the first person indeterminacy, and the sevenfirst steps of UDA, so an interesting work would be to adapt theirwork (of Pratt, Zuckerman) to the comp reality, but this does notnecessitate to change the limited arithmetical ontology, as settheory, with or without foundation, belongs to the number's manypossible epistemologies. If not, it means they are implicitlyassuming a non-comp theory, as it is necessitated by theAristotelian frame.Let us see that first and not prejudge the possibilities. Mostpeople have never questioned the Aristotelian framework as you have;I appreciate that fact, but we can be OK with that fact. It need notstop our work.

As long as that fact is taken into account.

What Zucker did is a modeling of some aspect of self-reference,partially coherent locally with comp.I argue that local coherence is all that is necessary for therequirements of deriving physics!! In other words, local solutionsof the arithmetic body problem are sufficient.

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We do not need a global solution. In fact, I argue that a globalsolution is impossible as such would contradict the finding of theWheeler-DeWitt equation!

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What I am arguing for (within physics) is consistent with papers byPeres, Kitada and Dugic.He seems to ignore the arithmetical self-reference which has to beused when postulating comp. But what is more annoying is that theyuse implicitly a physical supervenience thesis, or are just unclearon this, and so some correction and adaptation needs to be added.Maybe Zuckerman is unfamiliar with Lob's work?Such adaptation is very technical, and I hope you are not usingthis to escape the question I am asking you, due to your negativeunclear remark on the step 8.I am trying to be precise, but I have constraints on myabilities. ;-)That would be the case if you think that Zucker work contradictsthe arithmetical or Turing universal restricted ontology, which isshown necessary and sufficient for the derivation of bothconsciousness and the matter collective hallucination brought bycomp.But you cannot ignore the open "arithmetical body" problem! Weall have "motes" in our eyes!By the way, are you sure that Pratt's approach work in set theorieswith non-foundation?Yes. I confirmed this in conversations with Peter Wegner. It washe that pointed me to the work of Jon Barwise in 1998.That does not seem entirely obvious to me, and should be justified.In this case you can point on some references if this has beenalready studied. It is not obvious because in the set/booleanalgebra duality, the duality is working, as Boolean algebra arewell founded structures.One thing that I need to point out is that non-foundation theoryworks with normal sets. As you might see in the Youtube video ofZuckerman, the Aczel Universe is an extension of the ZF universe.

`To be an extension does not mean that the set remains normal. Can you`

`re-explain Pratt duality with the non-foundations axioms? It asks some`

`work, or is it trivial. If it is trivial this should be explaianable`

`in few lines. I don't see this.`

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