On 21 Oct 2012, at 19:46, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>> I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new
type of indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in
error, so there was no point in reading about things built on top of
that
> From your "error" you have been obliged to say that in the WM
duplication, you will live both at W and at W
Yes.
yet your agree that both copy will feel to live in only one place
Yes.
> so the error you have seen was dues to a confusion between first
person and third person.
Somebody is certainly confused but it's not me. The fact is that if
we are identical then my first person experience of looking at you
is identical to your first person experience of looking at me, and
both our actions are identical for a third person looking at both of
us. As long as we're identical it's meaningless to talk about 2
conscious beings regardless of how many bodies or brains have been
duplicated.
Your confusion stems from saying "you have been duplicated" but then
not thinking about what that really means, you haven't realized that
a noun (like a brain) has been duplicated but a adjective (like
Bruno Marchal) has not been as long as they are identical; you are
treating adjectives as if they were nouns and that's bound to cause
confusion. You are also confused by the fact that if 2 identical
things change in nonidentical ways, such as by forming different
memories, then they are no longer identical.
The uncertainty question bears on the personal memories. You attribute
me imaginary identifications.
And finally you are confused by the fact that although they are not
each other any more after those changes both still have a equal
right to call themselves Bruno Marchal. After reading these multiple
confusions in one step of your proof I saw no point in reading more,
and I still don't.
That is stopping thinking.
> By the way, it is irrational to stop in the middle of a proof.
If one of the steps in a proof contains a blunder then it would be
irrational to keep reading it.
I say, with all the definition and the protocol, that P(W) = 1/2. What
do you say?
You told me W and M. But when I interview the two John Clarck, none of
them has written in his personal diary; I feel to be in W and in M.
> By assuming a physical reality at the start
That seems like a pretty damn good place to make an assumption.
If front of deep conceptual problem, like the mind body problem, it is
better to remain neutral on the different possible rational ways to
conceive reality.
> But the physical reality can emerge or appear without a physical
reality at the start
Maybe maybe not, but even if you're right that wouldn't make it any
less real; and maybe physical reality didn't even need to emerge
because there was no start.
>> If you change your conscious state then your brain changes, and
if I make a change in your brain then your conscious state changes
too, so I'd say that it's a good assumption that consciousness is
interlinked with a physical object, in fact it's a downright superb
assumption.
> But this is easily shown to be false when we assume comp.
It's not false and I don't need to assume it and I haven't theorized
it from armchair philosophy either, I can show it's true
experimentally.
Nothing can be shown true experimentally. Things can be disprove
experimentally, but in science we cannot do any assertative statement
on reality, except negative one.
Even if someone survive with an artificial digital brain, that will
still not be a public proof of comp.
And when theory and experiment come into conflict it is the theory
that must submit not the experiment.
Of course.
If I insert drugs into your bloodstream it will change the chemistry
of your brain, and when that happens your conscious state will also
change. Depending on the drug I can make you happy-sad, friendly-
angry, frightened-clam, alert-sleepy, dead-alive, you name it.
> If your state appears in a far away galaxies [...]
Then he will be me and he will remain me until differences between
that far away galaxy and this one cause us to change in some way,
such as by forming different memories; after that he will no longer
be me, although we will still both be John K Clark because John K
Clark has been duplicated, the machine duplicated the body of him
and the environmental differences caused his consciousness to
diverge. As I've said before this is a odd situation but in no way
paradoxical.
You are the one talking about confusion and seeing paradox.
but don't you think that this other John Clark, in the galaxy far
away, will not think "oh, that marchal was right, my future was
indeterminate as I have been unable to predict what just happened.
You just stop doing the thought experiences. yes, there is no paradox,
just an indeterminacy from the first person point of view.
> You keep defending comp, in your dialog with Craig,
I keep defending my ideas, "comp" is your homemade term not mine, I
have no use for it.
> You can attach consciousness to the owner of a brain,
Yes, consciousness is what the brain does.
> but the owner itself must attach his consciousness to all states
existing in arithmetic
Then I must remember events that happened in the Precambrian because
arithmetic existed even back then, but I don't, I don't remember
existing then at all. Now that is a paradox! Therefore one of the
assumptions must be wrong, namely that the owner of a brain "must
attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic".
Well, sorry but you clearly misunderstand. Then it is normal because
you need to go at least to the step seven to get the understanding of
why consciousness is attach, not to all states in arithmetic (of
course), but to all equivalent computational state belonging to a
different computations going through those computations.
You know, when I say P(M) = 1/2, the question is not if that is true
or false, but of understanding what is meant by that. And what is
meant by that can be given by the frequency interpretation of
probability for iterated self-duplication. the many copies knows very
well that the number of themselves having gone to W or M, will be
*exactly* given by the coefficient of the binome of Newton.
I really failed to see why you stop, or seem to stop, thinking,
especially for someone talking in list open on Everett and observers
multiplications.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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