On 21 Oct 2012, at 19:46, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Oct 21, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>> I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new type of indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in error, so there was no point in reading about things built on top of that

> From your "error" you have been obliged to say that in the WM duplication, you will live both at W and at W


yet your agree that both copy will feel to live in only one place


> so the error you have seen was dues to a confusion between first person and third person.

Somebody is certainly confused but it's not me. The fact is that if we are identical then my first person experience of looking at you is identical to your first person experience of looking at me, and both our actions are identical for a third person looking at both of us. As long as we're identical it's meaningless to talk about 2 conscious beings regardless of how many bodies or brains have been duplicated.

Your confusion stems from saying "you have been duplicated" but then not thinking about what that really means, you haven't realized that a noun (like a brain) has been duplicated but a adjective (like Bruno Marchal) has not been as long as they are identical; you are treating adjectives as if they were nouns and that's bound to cause confusion. You are also confused by the fact that if 2 identical things change in nonidentical ways, such as by forming different memories, then they are no longer identical.

The uncertainty question bears on the personal memories. You attribute me imaginary identifications.

And finally you are confused by the fact that although they are not each other any more after those changes both still have a equal right to call themselves Bruno Marchal. After reading these multiple confusions in one step of your proof I saw no point in reading more, and I still don't.

That is stopping thinking.

> By the way, it is irrational to stop in the middle of a proof.

If one of the steps in a proof contains a blunder then it would be irrational to keep reading it.

I say, with all the definition and the protocol, that P(W) = 1/2. What do you say?

You told me W and M. But when I interview the two John Clarck, none of them has written in his personal diary; I feel to be in W and in M.

> By assuming a physical reality at the start

That seems like a pretty damn good place to make an assumption.

If front of deep conceptual problem, like the mind body problem, it is better to remain neutral on the different possible rational ways to conceive reality.

> But the physical reality can emerge or appear without a physical reality at the start

Maybe maybe not, but even if you're right that wouldn't make it any less real; and maybe physical reality didn't even need to emerge because there was no start.

>> If you change your conscious state then your brain changes, and if I make a change in your brain then your conscious state changes too, so I'd say that it's a good assumption that consciousness is interlinked with a physical object, in fact it's a downright superb assumption.

 > But this is easily shown to be false when we assume comp.

It's not false and I don't need to assume it and I haven't theorized it from armchair philosophy either, I can show it's true experimentally.

Nothing can be shown true experimentally. Things can be disprove experimentally, but in science we cannot do any assertative statement on reality, except negative one.

Even if someone survive with an artificial digital brain, that will still not be a public proof of comp.

And when theory and experiment come into conflict it is the theory that must submit not the experiment.

Of course.

If I insert drugs into your bloodstream it will change the chemistry of your brain, and when that happens your conscious state will also change. Depending on the drug I can make you happy-sad, friendly- angry, frightened-clam, alert-sleepy, dead-alive, you name it.

> If your state appears in a far away galaxies [...]

Then he will be me and he will remain me until differences between that far away galaxy and this one cause us to change in some way, such as by forming different memories; after that he will no longer be me, although we will still both be John K Clark because John K Clark has been duplicated, the machine duplicated the body of him and the environmental differences caused his consciousness to diverge. As I've said before this is a odd situation but in no way paradoxical.

You are the one talking about confusion and seeing paradox.
but don't you think that this other John Clark, in the galaxy far away, will not think "oh, that marchal was right, my future was indeterminate as I have been unable to predict what just happened.

You just stop doing the thought experiences. yes, there is no paradox, just an indeterminacy from the first person point of view.

> You keep defending comp, in your dialog with Craig,

I keep defending my ideas, "comp" is your homemade term not mine, I have no use for it.

> You can attach consciousness to the owner of a brain,

Yes, consciousness is what the brain does.

> but the owner itself must attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic

Then I must remember events that happened in the Precambrian because arithmetic existed even back then, but I don't, I don't remember existing then at all. Now that is a paradox! Therefore one of the assumptions must be wrong, namely that the owner of a brain "must attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic".

Well, sorry but you clearly misunderstand. Then it is normal because you need to go at least to the step seven to get the understanding of why consciousness is attach, not to all states in arithmetic (of course), but to all equivalent computational state belonging to a different computations going through those computations.

You know, when I say P(M) = 1/2, the question is not if that is true or false, but of understanding what is meant by that. And what is meant by that can be given by the frequency interpretation of probability for iterated self-duplication. the many copies knows very well that the number of themselves having gone to W or M, will be *exactly* given by the coefficient of the binome of Newton.

I really failed to see why you stop, or seem to stop, thinking, especially for someone talking in list open on Everett and observers multiplications.



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