On 26 Oct 2012, at 13:01, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Alberto G. Corona
Instead of trying to understand these phenomena under
the materialist function of mind (what they are) it
is IMHO more useful to understand them by what they
do-- create the subjective or mental correlates to
the physical sources. The functional theory of mind
then is the appropriate way to understand the mind.
The usual critics against comp and functionalism is that it makes the
qualia and subjectivity secondary, or epiphenomenal, when it does not
simply eliminate them.
Indeed, explaining why Margaret took her hand out quickly from the
oven in functional terms, means given an explanation by the causal
relationships (nerves communication, information handling, sensory
entry and motor outputs) realisaing a function (preserving and
protecting the hands, here). Such type of explanation makes the
subjective aspect epiphenomenal, like having no real purpose.
But the word "function" is ambiguous, and clearly so in computer
science where it can have an intensional meaning (code, machine,
number) and/or an extensional meaning (input-output, behavior, fixed
point in some structure). When a function is realized in nature or
relatively to a universal number in arithmetic, it can be shown that
he will use both aspect, and the quanta/qualia distinction exploits
this 'ambiguity'. Quanta concerns measurable and sharable quantity,
and qualia concerns measurable but not sharable possible quality.
I tend to avoid the term functionalism. It has a large spectrum of
interpretations, from high level computationalism (Putnam), to some
version of non-comp by using non computable *functions*, recoverable
or not by oracles, or first person indeterminacy. Most are weakening
of comp.
Now comp gives the math do proceed below or above comp, and make
precise the type of weakening or strengthening of comp. Some variants
of comp have equivalent "universal machine" concept, like when you
weaken with the notion of oracles, for example. Other loss the
"universality" notion. In basically all of the them, when you weaken
the ontological, you make more complex the epistemological, and vice
versa.
Are open to do a bit of math?
Bruno
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/26/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-25, 09:11:40
Subject: Re: Dennett and others on qualia
I agree.
is there something that can be perceived that is not qualia? It?
less qualia the shape and location of a circle in ha sheet of paper
than its color?.The fact that the position and radius of the circle
can be measured and communicated does not change the fact that they
produce a subjective perception. so they are also qualia. Then the
question becomes why some qualia are communicable (phenomena) and
others do not? It may be because shape and position involve a more
basic form of processing and the color processing is more complicated?
O is because shape and position processing evolved to be communicable
quantitatively between humans, while color had no evolutionary
pressure to be a quantitative and communicable ?
If everithig perceived is qualia, then the question is the opposite.
Instead of ?hat is qualia under a materialist stance?, the question
is why some qualia are measurable and comunicable in a mentalist
stance, where every perception is in the mind, including the
perception that I have a head with a brain?
2012/10/25 Roger Clough :
Dennett and others on qualia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia#Daniel_Dennett
1) Schroedinger on qualia.
"Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine,
the experience of taking a recreational drug,
or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Daniel Dennett writes
that qualia is "an unfamiliar term for
something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways
things seem to us."[1] Erwin Schr?inger,
the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: "The
sensation of colour cannot be accounted for by
the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the
physiologist account for it, if he had fuller
knowledge than he has of the processes in
the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the optical
nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so." [2]
The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely from
the fact that they are seen as posing a
fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the mind-body
problem. Much of the debate over their
importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used,
as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain
features of qualia. As such,
the nature and existence of qualia are controversial.
2) Dennett on qualia
"In Consciousness Explained (1991) and "Quining Qualia" (1988),[19]
Daniel Dennett offers an argument against qualia that attempts to
show that the above definition breaks down when one tries to make a
practical application of it. In a series of thought experiments,
which he calls "intuition pumps," he brings qualia into the world
of neurosurgery, clinical psychology, and psychological
experimentation.
His argument attempts to show that, once the concept of qualia is
so imported, it turns out that we can either make no use of it in the
situation in question, or that the questions posed by the
introduction of qualia are unanswerable precisely because of the
special
properties defined for qualia."
Is this the height of arrogance or what ? Dennett essentially says
that qualia do not exist because he cannot explain them.
3) The Nagel argument. The definition of qualia is not what they
are, but what they do..
what role they play ion consciusness. On the same page as above,
The "What's it like to be?" argument
Main article: Subjective character of experience
Although it does not actually mention the word "qualia," Thomas
Nagel's
paper What Is it Like to Be a Bat?[4] is often cited in debates
over qualia.
Nagel argues that consciousness has an essentially subjective
character, a
what-it-is-like aspect. He states that "an organism has conscious
mental states if and only i
if there is something that it is like to be that organism ?
something it is like for the organism."
Nagel also suggests that the subjective
aspect of the mind may not ever be sufficiently accounted for by
the objective methods of
reductionistic science (materialism). He claims that "[i]f we
acknowledge that a physical theory of mind
must account for the subjective character of experience, we must
admit that no presently
available conception gives us a clue how this could be done."[6]
Furthermore, he states that
"it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be
contemplated
until more thought has been given to the general problem of
subjective and objective."[6]
4) The zombie argument (from the link already given)
The zombie argument
Main article: Philosophical zombie
" A similar argument holds that it is conceivable that there could
be physical duplicates of people,
called "zombies," without any qualia at all. These "zombies" would
demonstrate outward behavior
precisely similar to that of a normal human, but would not have a
subjective phenomenology.
It is worth noting that a necessary condition for the possibility
of philosophical zombies is that
there be no specific part or parts of the brain that directly give
rise to qualia?he zombie can only
exist if subjective consciousness is causally separate from the
physical brain."
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/25/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
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