On 10/25/2012 6:11 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
> I agree.
> is there something that can be perceived that is not qualia?
> less qualia the shape and location of a circle in ha sheet of
> than its color?.The fact that the position and radius of the
> can be measured and communicated does not change the fact that
> produce a subjective perception. so they are also qualia. Then the
> question becomes why some qualia are communicable (phenomena) and
> others do not? It may be because shape and position involve a more
> basic form of processing and the color processing is more
> O is because shape and position processing evolved to be
> quantitatively between humans, while color had no evolutionary
> pressure to be a quantitative and communicable ?
> If everithig perceived is qualia, then the question is the
> Instead of ï¿½what is qualia under a materialist stance?, the
> is why some qualia are measurable and comunicable in a mentalist
> stance, where every perception is in the mind, including the
> perception that I have a head with a brain?
>> Dennett and others on qualia
>> 1) Schroedinger on qualia.
>> "Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of
experience of taking a recreational drug,
>> or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Daniel Dennett
qualia is "an unfamiliar term for
>> something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways
things seem to us." Erwin Schrï¿½dinger,
>> the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: "The
of colour cannot be accounted for by
>> the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the
physiologist account for it, if he had fuller
>> knowledge than he has of the processes in
>> the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the
nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so." 
>> The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely
fact that they are seen as posing a
>> fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the mind-body
problem. Much of the debate over their
>> importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used,
>> as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of
features of qualia. As such,
>> the nature and existence of qualia are controversial.
>> 2) Dennett on qualia
>> "In Consciousness Explained (1991) and "Quining Qualia" (1988),
Daniel Dennett offers an argument against qualia that attempts to
>> show that the above definition breaks down when one tries to
practical application of it. In a series of thought experiments,
>> which he calls "intuition pumps," he brings qualia into the
neurosurgery, clinical psychology, and psychological
>> His argument attempts to show that, once the concept of qualia
imported, it turns out that we can either make no use of it in the
>> situation in question, or that the questions posed by the
of qualia are unanswerable precisely because of the special
>> properties defined for qualia."
>> Is this the height of arrogance or what ? Dennett essentially
>> that qualia do not exist because he cannot explain them.
>> 3) The Nagel argument. The definition of qualia is not what
but what they do..
>> what role they play ion consciusness. On the same page as above,
>> The "What's it like to be?" argument
>> Main article: Subjective character of experience
>> Although it does not actually mention the word "qualia," Thomas
>> paper What Is it Like to Be a Bat? is often cited in debates
>> Nagel argues that consciousness has an essentially subjective
>> what-it-is-like aspect. He states that "an organism has conscious
mental states if and only i
>> if there is something that it is like to be that organism ï¿½
it is like for the organism."
>> Nagel also suggests that the subjective
>> aspect of the mind may not ever be sufficiently accounted for
objective methods of
>> reductionistic science (materialism). He claims that "[i]f we
acknowledge that a physical theory of mind
>> must account for the subjective character of experience, we
admit that no presently
>> available conception gives us a clue how this could be done."
Furthermore, he states that
>> "it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be
>> until more thought has been given to the general problem of
>> 4) The zombie argument (from the link already given)
>> The zombie argument
>> Main article: Philosophical zombie
>> " A similar argument holds that it is conceivable that there
physical duplicates of people,
>> called "zombies," without any qualia at all. These "zombies"
demonstrate outward behavior
>> precisely similar to that of a normal human, but would not have a
>> It is worth noting that a necessary condition for the
philosophical zombies is that
>> there be no specific part or parts of the brain that directly
to qualiaï¿½the zombie can only
>> exist if subjective consciousness is causally separate from the
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
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