Craig
Saibal
>
>>
>> Saibal
>>
>>
>> Citeren Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com <javascript:>>:
>>
>> >
>> >
>> > On Thursday, October 25, 2012 12:57:34 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Good points. The contrast is usually qualia-v-quanta. I think
color
>> can
>> >> be communicated
>> >> and we have an "RGB" language for doing so that makes it more
quanta
>> than
>> >> qualia.
>> >
>> >
>> > That doesn't work. RGB coordinates do not help a blind person
visualize
>> > Red. What we have is a model for the producing optical
stimulation that
>> is
>> > typically associated with color perception. By contrast, a
description
>> of
>> > an object as being at a particular longitude and latitude on
Earth will
>> be
>> > valid for any body which can navigate public space.
>> >
>> >
>> >> So
>> >> extending your point to Schrodinger, if you're a wine
connoisseur you
>> have
>> >> a language for
>> >> communicating the taste of wine. Most of us don't speak it,
but most
>> >> people don't speak
>> >> differential equations either. But those are all things that
can be
>> >> shared. The pain of
>> >> a headache generally can't be perceived by two different
people. But
>> >> there are
>> >> experiments that use small electric shocks to try to produce
objective
>> >> scales of pain. So
>> >> I think you are right that it is a matter of having developed
the
>> >> language; I just don't
>> >> think color is the best example.
>> >>
>> >
>> > This is a total non-starter. You cannot make a brick feel pain
by using
>> the
>> > right language.
>> >
>> > I did a post today on perception which might help
>> > http://s33light.org/post/34304933509
>> >
>> > In short, qualia is a continuum of private and public
significance. The
>> > more a particular phenomenon has to to with position and
distance, the
>> more
>> > public it is. Simple as that.
>> >
>> > Craig
>> >
>> >
>> >>
>> >> Brent
>> >>
>> >> On 10/25/2012 6:11 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>> >> > I agree.
>> >> >
>> >> > is there something that can be perceived that is not
qualia? It�s
>> >> > less qualia the shape and location of a circle in ha sheet
of paper
>> >> > than its color?.The fact that the position and radius of the
circle
>> >> > can be measured and communicated does not change the fact
that they
>> >> > produce a subjective perception. so they are also qualia.
Then the
>> >> > question becomes why some qualia are communicable
(phenomena) and
>> >> > others do not? It may be because shape and position involve
a more
>> >> > basic form of processing and the color processing is more
>> complicated?
>> >> > O is because shape and position processing evolved to be
communicable
>> >> > quantitatively between humans, while color had no evolutionary
>> >> > pressure to be a quantitative and communicable ?
>> >> >
>> >> > If everithig perceived is qualia, then the question is the
opposite.
>> >> > Instead of �what is qualia under a materialist stance?, the
>> question
>> >> > is why some qualia are measurable and comunicable in a
mentalist
>> >> > stance, where every perception is in the mind, including the
>> >> > perception that I have a head with a brain?
>> >> >
>> >> > 2012/10/25 Roger Clough<rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:>>:
>> >> >> Dennett and others on qualia
>> >> >>
>> >> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia#Daniel_Dennett
>> >> >>
>> >> >> 1) Schroedinger on qualia.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> "Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste
of wine,
>> the
>> >> experience of taking a recreational drug,
>> >> >> or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Daniel Dennett
writes
>> that
>> >> qualia is "an unfamiliar term for
>> >> >> something that could not be more familiar to each of us:
the ways
>> >> things seem to us."[1] Erwin Schr�dinger,
>> >> >> the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: "The
>> sensation
>> >> of colour cannot be accounted for by
>> >> >> the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the
>> >> physiologist account for it, if he had fuller
>> >> >> knowledge than he has of the processes in
>> >> >> the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the
optical
>> >> nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so." [2]
>> >> >>
>> >> >> The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes
largely from
>> the
>> >> fact that they are seen as posing a
>> >> >> fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the
mind-body
>> >> problem. Much of the debate over their
>> >> >> importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used,
>> >> >> as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of
certain
>> >> features of qualia. As such,
>> >> >> the nature and existence of qualia are controversial.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> 2) Dennett on qualia
>> >> >>
>> >> >> "In Consciousness Explained (1991) and "Quining
Qualia" (1988),[19]
>> >> Daniel Dennett offers an argument against qualia that attempts
to
>> >> >> show that the above definition breaks down when one tries
to make a
>> >> practical application of it. In a series of thought experiments,
>> >> >> which he calls "intuition pumps," he brings qualia into the
world of
>> >> neurosurgery, clinical psychology, and psychological
experimentation.
>> >> >> His argument attempts to show that, once the concept of
qualia is so
>> >> imported, it turns out that we can either make no use of it in
the
>> >> >> situation in question, or that the questions posed by the
>> introduction
>> >> of qualia are unanswerable precisely because of the special
>> >> >> properties defined for qualia."
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Is this the height of arrogance or what ? Dennett
essentially says
>> >> >> that qualia do not exist because he cannot explain them.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> 3) The Nagel argument. The definition of qualia is not what
they
>> are,
>> >> but what they do..
>> >> >> what role they play ion consciusness. On the same page as
above,
>> >> >>
>> >> >> The "What's it like to be?" argument
>> >> >> Main article: Subjective character of experience
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Although it does not actually mention the word "qualia,"
Thomas
>> Nagel's
>> >> >> paper What Is it Like to Be a Bat?[4] is often cited in
debates over
>> >> qualia.
>> >> >> Nagel argues that consciousness has an essentially subjective
>> >> character, a
>> >> >> what-it-is-like aspect. He states that "an organism has
conscious
>> >> mental states if and only i
>> >> >> if there is something that it is like to be that organism �
>> something
>> >> it is like for the organism."
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Nagel also suggests that the subjective
>> >> >> aspect of the mind may not ever be sufficiently accounted
for by the
>> >> objective methods of
>> >> >> reductionistic science (materialism). He claims that "[i]f we
>> >> acknowledge that a physical theory of mind
>> >> >> must account for the subjective character of experience,
we must
>> >> admit that no presently
>> >> >> available conception gives us a clue how this could be
done."[6]
>> >> Furthermore, he states that
>> >> >> "it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be
>> contemplated
>> >> >> until more thought has been given to the general problem of
>> subjective
>> >> and objective."[6]
>> >> >>
>> >> >> 4) The zombie argument (from the link already given)
>> >> >>
>> >> >> The zombie argument
>> >> >> Main article: Philosophical zombie
>> >> >>
>> >> >> " A similar argument holds that it is conceivable that
there could
>> be
>> >> physical duplicates of people,
>> >> >> called "zombies," without any qualia at all. These
"zombies" would
>> >> demonstrate outward behavior
>> >> >> precisely similar to that of a normal human, but would not
have a
>> >> subjective phenomenology.
>> >> >> It is worth noting that a necessary condition for the
possibility of
>> >> philosophical zombies is that
>> >> >> there be no specific part or parts of the brain that
directly give
>> rise
>> >> to qualia�the zombie can only
>> >> >> exist if subjective consciousness is causally separate from
the
>> >> physical brain."
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:>
>> >> >> 10/25/2012
>> >> >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody
Allen
>> >> >>
>> >> >> --
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>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >
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