On Thursday, October 25, 2012 5:16:47 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
>
> Citeren Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com <javascript:>>: 
>
> > 
> > 
> > On Thursday, October 25, 2012 4:58:33 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote: 
> >> 
> >> You can identify a particular qualia with certain computational states 
> >> of algorithms. All you need to do to (in principle) decide if a system 
> >> is "experiencing the color red" is to see if the right algorithm is 
> >> being executed. 
> >> 
> > 
> > That may not even be the case at all. In people who are blind from 
> birth, 
> > activity in their visual cortex is perceived as tactile experience. 
> > 
> > Craig 
> > 
>
> That then means that the right algorithm isn't executed.
>
 
No, it means that there may in fact be no algorithm that can be executed in 
the brain of a person who is blind from birth which will result in visual 
experience.

I don't think 
one can argue against this, as having a mathematical description of 
Nature implies this. 

This is precisely what I do argue - that no mathematical description of 
Nature is complete and that all perceptual experience is rooted in an 
authenticity which transcends rationality.  Comp isn't true. Nature cannot 
be described in any terms outside of experience itself.

Craig


> Saibal 
> > 
> >> 
> >> Saibal 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> Citeren Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com <javascript:>>: 
> >> 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> > On Thursday, October 25, 2012 12:57:34 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: 
> >> >> 
> >> >> Good points.  The contrast is usually qualia-v-quanta. I think color 
> >> can 
> >> >> be communicated 
> >> >> and we have an "RGB" language for doing so that makes it more quanta 
> >> than 
> >> >> qualia. 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> > That doesn't work. RGB coordinates do not help a blind person 
> visualize 
> >> > Red. What we have is a model for the producing optical stimulation 
> that 
> >> is 
> >> > typically associated with color perception. By contrast, a 
> description 
> >> of 
> >> > an object as being at a particular longitude and latitude on Earth 
> will 
> >> be 
> >> > valid for any body which can navigate public space. 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> >> So 
> >> >> extending your point to Schrodinger, if you're a wine connoisseur 
> you 
> >> have 
> >> >> a language for 
> >> >> communicating the taste of wine.  Most of us don't speak it, but 
> most 
> >> >> people don't speak 
> >> >> differential equations either.  But those are all things that can be 
> >> >> shared.  The pain of 
> >> >> a headache generally can't be perceived by two different people. 
>  But 
> >> >> there are 
> >> >> experiments that use small electric shocks to try to produce 
> objective 
> >> >> scales of pain.  So 
> >> >> I think you are right that it is a matter of having developed the 
> >> >> language; I just don't 
> >> >> think color is the best example. 
> >> >> 
> >> > 
> >> > This is a total non-starter. You cannot make a brick feel pain by 
> using 
> >> the 
> >> > right language. 
> >> > 
> >> > I did a post today on perception which might help 
> >> > http://s33light.org/post/34304933509 
> >> > 
> >> > In short, qualia is a continuum of private and public significance. 
> The 
> >> > more a particular phenomenon has to to with position and distance, 
> the 
> >> more 
> >> > public it is. Simple as that. 
> >> > 
> >> > Craig 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> >> 
> >> >> Brent 
> >> >> 
> >> >> On 10/25/2012 6:11 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 
> >> >> > I agree. 
> >> >> > 
> >> >> > is there something that can be perceived that is not qualia? 
>  It�s 
> >> >> > less qualia  the shape and location of a circle in ha sheet of 
> paper 
> >> >> > than its color?.The fact that the position and radius of the 
> circle 
> >> >> > can be measured and communicated does not change the fact that 
> they 
> >> >> > produce a subjective perception. so they are also qualia. Then the 
> >> >> > question becomes why some qualia are communicable (phenomena) and 
> >> >> > others do not? It may be because shape and position involve a more 
> >> >> > basic form of processing and the color processing is more 
> >> complicated? 
> >> >> > O is because shape and position processing evolved to be 
> communicable 
> >> >> > quantitatively between humans, while color had no evolutionary 
> >> >> > pressure to be a quantitative and communicable ? 
> >> >> > 
> >> >> > If everithig perceived is qualia, then the question is the 
> opposite. 
> >> >> > Instead of �what is qualia under a materialist stance?, the 
> >> question 
> >> >> > is why some qualia are measurable and comunicable in a mentalist 
> >> >> > stance, where every perception is in the mind, including the 
> >> >> > perception that I have a head with a brain? 
> >> >> > 
> >> >> > 2012/10/25 Roger Clough<rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:>>: 
> >> >> >> Dennett and others on qualia 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia#Daniel_Dennett 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> 1) Schroedinger on qualia. 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> "Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of 
> wine, 
> >> the 
> >> >> experience of taking a recreational drug, 
> >> >> >> or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Daniel Dennett writes 
> >> that 
> >> >> qualia is "an unfamiliar term for 
> >> >> >> something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways 
> >> >> things seem to us."[1] Erwin Schr�dinger, 
> >> >> >> the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: "The 
> >> sensation 
> >> >> of colour cannot be accounted for by 
> >> >> >> the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the 
> >> >> physiologist account for it, if he had fuller 
> >> >> >> knowledge than he has of the processes in 
> >> >> >> the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the 
> optical 
> >> >> nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so." [2] 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely from 
> >> the 
> >> >> fact that they are seen as posing a 
> >> >> >> fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the mind-body 
> >> >> problem. Much of the debate over their 
> >> >> >> importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used, 
> >> >> >> as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of 
> certain 
> >> >> features of qualia. As such, 
> >> >> >> the nature and existence of qualia are controversial. 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> 2) Dennett on qualia 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> "In Consciousness Explained (1991) and "Quining Qualia" 
> (1988),[19] 
> >> >> Daniel Dennett offers an argument against qualia that attempts to 
> >> >> >> show that the above definition breaks down when one tries to make 
> a 
> >> >> practical application of it. In a series of thought experiments, 
> >> >> >> which he calls "intuition pumps," he brings qualia into the world 
> of 
> >> >> neurosurgery, clinical psychology, and psychological 
> experimentation. 
> >> >> >> His argument attempts to show that, once the concept of qualia is 
> so 
> >> >> imported, it turns out that we can either make no use of it in the 
> >> >> >> situation in question, or that the questions posed by the 
> >> introduction 
> >> >> of qualia are unanswerable precisely because of the special 
> >> >> >> properties defined for qualia." 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> Is this the height of arrogance or what ? Dennett essentially 
> says 
> >> >> >> that qualia do not exist because he cannot explain them. 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> 3) The Nagel argument. The definition of qualia is not what they 
> >> are, 
> >> >> but what they do.. 
> >> >> >> what role they play ion consciusness. On the same page as above, 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> The "What's it like to be?" argument 
> >> >> >> Main article: Subjective character of experience 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> Although it does not actually mention the word "qualia," Thomas 
> >> Nagel's 
> >> >> >> paper What Is it Like to Be a Bat?[4] is often cited in debates 
> over 
> >> >> qualia. 
> >> >> >> Nagel argues that consciousness has an essentially subjective 
> >> >> character, a 
> >> >> >> what-it-is-like aspect. He states that "an organism has conscious 
> >> >> mental states if and only i 
> >> >> >> if there is something that it is like to be that organism � 
> >> something 
> >> >> it is like for the organism." 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >>   Nagel also suggests that the subjective 
> >> >> >> aspect of the mind may not ever be sufficiently accounted for by 
> the 
> >> >> objective methods of 
> >> >> >> reductionistic science (materialism). He claims that "[i]f we 
> >> >> acknowledge that a physical theory of mind 
> >> >> >>   must account for the subjective character of experience, we 
> must 
> >> >> admit that no presently 
> >> >> >> available conception gives us a clue how this could be done."[6] 
> >> >> Furthermore, he states that 
> >> >> >> "it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be 
> >> contemplated 
> >> >> >> until more thought has been given to the general problem of 
> >> subjective 
> >> >> and objective."[6] 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> 4) The zombie argument (from the link already given) 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> The zombie argument 
> >> >> >> Main article: Philosophical zombie 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> " A similar argument holds that it is conceivable that there 
> could 
> >> be 
> >> >> physical duplicates of people, 
> >> >> >> called "zombies," without any qualia at all. These "zombies" 
> would 
> >> >> demonstrate outward behavior 
> >> >> >> precisely similar to that of a normal human, but would not have a 
> >> >> subjective phenomenology. 
> >> >> >> It is worth noting that a necessary condition for the possibility 
> of 
> >> >> philosophical zombies is that 
> >> >> >> there be no specific part or parts of the brain that directly 
> give 
> >> rise 
> >> >> to qualia�the zombie can only 
> >> >> >> exist if subjective consciousness is causally separate from the 
> >> >> physical brain." 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net <javascript:> 
> >> >> >> 10/25/2012 
> >> >> >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> >> >> >> 
> >> >> >> -- 
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