On 03 Nov 2012, at 11:58, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
I think in computationalism you only have to be able
to say that the result is arithmetically or algebraically
true. Arithmetic truth is what you seek.
However, I still have yet to know if a particular
computation seems true to your 1p. That would be
1p truth. Does the arithmetic truth pass the 1p test ?
Yes. Good question.
That's the purpose of AUDA. The arithmetical UDA.
It is in the second part of sane04. The "interview of the universal
Up to now, thanks to the Everett/Feynman formulation of QM, comp
succeeds the first tests.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Time: 2012-11-02, 13:23:36
Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 01 Nov 2012, at 22:50, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/1/2012 12:04 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Nov 2012, at 01:18, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/31/2012 12:45 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
can stop reading as you need to assume the numbers (or anything
Turing equivalent) to get them.
So it is OK to assume that which I seek to explain?
You can't explain the numbers without assuming the numbers. This has
been foreseen by Dedekind, and vert well justified by many theorem
in mathematical logic. Below the number, you are lead to version of
ultrafinitism, which is senseless in the comp theory.
I disagree with ultrafinitists, they seem to be the mathematical
equivalent of "flat-earthers'.
*and* having some particular set of values and meanings.
I just assume
x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)
x *0 = 0
x*s(y) = x*y + x
And hope you understand.
I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way to
physically implement them.
Those notion have nothing to do with "physical implementation".
So your thinking about them is not a physical act?
Too much ambiguous. Even staying in comp I can answer "yes" and "no".
Yes, because my human thinking is locally supported by physical
No, because the whole couple mind/physical events is supported by
platonic arithmetical truth.
Implementation and physical will be explained from them. A natural
thing as they are much more complex than the laws above.
Numbers are meaningless in the absence of a means to define them.
Theories do not free-float.
Truth is free floating, and theories lived through truth, they are
truth floating, even when false.
In the absence of some common media, even if it is generated by
sheaves of computations, there simply is no way to understand
Because there is not way to know of them otherwise.
Our knowing as nothing to do with truth. If an asteroid would have
destroy Earth before the Oresme bishop dicovered that the harmonic
series diverge, she would have still diverge, despite no humans
would know it.
Unless you can communicate with me, I have no way of knowing
anything about your ideas. Similarly if there is no physical
implementation of a mathematical statement, there is no meaning to
claims to "truth" of such statements.
To claim, no. To be true is independent of the claim of the apes.
You must accept non-well foundedness for your result to work, but
you seem fixated against that.
Pfft. Nice custom made quip.
You are often escaping answers by inappropriate mathematical
precision, which meaning contradicts your mathematical super-
relativism. It is really 1004+contradiction.
A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said
truthfully to have the same meaning because there are multiple and
separable entities that can have the agreement on the truth value.
In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of
any particular entity capable of "understanding" the statement,
there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or
false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or
false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of
judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness!
You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow.
Do you agree that during the five seconds just after the Big Bang
(assuming that theory) there might not have been any possible
observers. But then the Big Bang has no more sense.
No, I don't. Why? Because that concept of "the five seconds just
after the Big Bang" is an assumption of a special case or pleading.
I might as well postulate the existence of Raindow Dash to act as
the entity to whom the Truth of mathematical statements have
absolute meaning. To be frank, I thing that the Big Bang theory, as
usually explained is a steaming pile of rubbish, as it asks us to
believe that the totality of all that exists sprang into being from
I actually agree, by accident, on this. But this is not relevant for
It is very relevant to mine.
Imagine that we can show that some solution to GR equantion have
universe so poor that life cannot exist in there, would you say that
such universe cannot exist?
If there does not exist a means to "show the solution" there is
I believe that the totality of what exists is eternal, having no
beginning and no end.
I am OK with that. It is close to Platonism. But with comp we can
restrict this to the arithmetical truth (a highly non computable
structure, but still conceivable by universal numbers, relatively).
Well, can we work with that agreement?
Come on, you say that you can escape the consequence of comp, you
have to find the flaw, or to be more cautious in your judgment.
There is no one statement I made on this list which I have not
published before, and there have been a lot of peer-review
(especially that many philosophers hate that work, but they try to
defend the philosophy curriculum against a possible invasion of
science: that is usual and normal).
What we infer from our observations of Hubble expansion is just an
effect that follows, ultimately, from our finiteness.
Including time and space. So we do agree again.
I think Brent is right, and Quentin. You confuse 1+1=2 with human
expression for pointing on that proposition. You obviously needs
human to understand those " "1+1=2" ", but the content of "1+1=2"
has simply no relation at all with the human, or with a physical
No, none of you have yet to be able to understand my counter-
argument. It is not complicated. We cannot assume to have something
when the means for its existence is not allowed. My claim is that
meaningfulness supervenes on the possibility of interaction of
*many* entities and is independent of any *one* (or some lesser
finite subset) of that Many.
But arithmetical truth is full of entities, even full of galaxies
themselves full of self-aware being. That is a fact. But with comp
(and UDA), those entities are saved from zombieness.
Yes, and bundles of arithmetic statements generate many
individual observers that in turn "interact" (which I model via a
combination of cyclic gossiping on graphs and bisimulations) with
each other to define a common physical world which in turn acts to
"implement" the arithmetic. It is a loop, an eternal cyclical
process that never exactly repeats. It is in this infinite loop that
I see your UD.
It is not a loop. It is more like a recurring abyss, like the
I asked you some time ago if you agree with the use of the excluded
middle in arithmetic. It asserts that for any arithmetical
proposition P, even highly non computably verifiable, you can accept
as new arithmetical truth the proposition asserting that P v ~P.
Which intuitive meaning that the proposition is unambiguously either
true, or false, despite you have no idea if it is P or ~P which is
the true one. To accept this means that you accept that such truth
are independent of the means to prove or verify them.
We must us the principle to excluded middle [PEM] to reason, but
this does not make the principle something external and independent
1) the intuitionist can reason without them.
Yes, but their reasonings are severely limited.
You are the one saying that truth is limited to the means of
2) the PEM is a way to assert formally platonism, and I use it only
in arithmetic. And it means that the truth is independent of our
Truth is independent of any particular reasoning, but it is NOT
independent of the reasoning of all entities.
Ambiguous. trivially true with comp as the reasoning of all entities
belongs to the (tiny part of) arithmetical reality.
This is a red herring, Bruno. It is not addressing my claim at all.
Then you have to try to state it more clearly.
I am trying. ;-)
You seem to be stuck on the idea that only one entity can have or
not have some property or power and cannot reason about the
possibility that *many* may be required to solve some problems. A
plurality is not a multiplicity...
This is too vague.
OK, I will try again.
I don't see that one one entity can have or not have some property
or power, nor why I can't reason on the possibility that ?*many*
might be required (on the contrary, there are many notion of many
playing in comp and the emergence of physics. No clue what you mean
Are you familiar with Jaakko Hintikka's ideas? I am using his
concept of game theoretic semantics to derive truth valuations.
I read this. yes. I don't see relevant at all.
I do appreciate his linking of intention and intension, but it is a
bit trivial in the comp theory.
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