On 11/3/2012 7:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 02 Nov 2012, at 23:20, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Are you familiar with Jaakko Hintikka's ideas? I am using his concept of game theoretic semantics to derive truth valuations.

I read this. yes. I don't see relevant at all.
I do appreciate his linking of intention and intension, but it is a bit trivial in the comp theory.

Dear Bruno,

Hintikka's idea is to show how truth values can be coherently considered to be the result of a process and not necessarily just some a priori valuation. This makes Truth an emergent valuation, just as I content all definite properties are emergent from mutual agreements between entities.

But how will you define entities?

By relation to equivalence classes, just as you define observers as bundles of computations.

Where and how will the truth of "truth is an emergent valuation" emerge?

    When and where agreement between many observers obtains.

What you say does not make sense for me. But if someone else understand please help Stephen in conveying the idea.

    Any one understand my point?

Properties, in the absence of the possibility of measurement or apprehension of some type, do not exist; they are what the 1p project onto existence. Nothing more.

Existence of what, of who, where, how?

Properties that are not definite are either non-existence (not defined by a theory) or ambiguous or a superposition of all possible properties.

It is very bad philosophy to throw doubt on scientific results just by using non standard unclear philosophical definition in a context where honest scientist have no problem at all, and use what everybody understand to show that there is some problem indeed, and attempt to make a formulation of such problems.

I am defining new philosophical ideas. This is not a reharsh of hidebound doctrine!



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