On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:58, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/31/2012 12:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 30 Oct 2012, at 18:29, Stephen P. King wrote:On 10/30/2012 12:38 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:No? If they do not have something equivalent to concepts, howcan they dream?Yes, the universal numbers can have concept.Dear Bruno,Let's start over. Please plain in detail what is a universalnumber and how it (and not ordinary numbers) have concepts or 1p.I will give more detail on FOAR, soon or later. But let me explainsquickly.Fix your favorite Turing universal system. It can be a programminglanguage, a universal Turing machine, or a sigma_1 complete theory,or even a computer.Dear Bruno,That 'fixing" occurs at our level only. We are free (relatively)to fix our axiomatic objects from the wide variety that have beenproven to exist within the Mathematical universe of concepts or, ifwe are clever, we can invent new concepts and work with them; but wecannot do things in our logic that are self-contradictory unless wemake sure that the contradictions are not allowed to be pathological.

OK. No problem.

Enumerate the programs computing functions fro N to N, (or theequivalent notion according to your chosen system). let us callthose functions: phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, ... (the phi_i)Let B be a fixed bijection from N x N to N. So B(x,y) is a number.The number u is universal if phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y). And theequality means really that either both phi_u(B(x,y)) and phi_x(y)are defined (number) and that they are equal, OR they are bothundefined.In phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y), x is called the program, and y thedata. u is the computer. u i said to emulate the program(machine, ...) x on the input y.OK, but this does not answer my question. What is the ontologicallevel mechanism that distinguishes the u and the x and the y fromeach other?

`The one you have chosen above. But let continue to use elementary`

`arithmetic, as everyone learn it in school. So the answer is:`

`elementary arithmetic.`

What I am trying to explain to you that ontological level objectscannot have any logical mechanism that requires temporarily unlessyou are assuming some form of Becoming as an ontological primitive.Platonism, as far as I know, disallows this.

`Indeed. becoming, like the whole physicalness, emerges from inside. It`

`is 1p (plural).`

Bruno

Comp is the thesis that I can survive with a physical digitalcomputer in place of the physical brain, as far as it emulates meclose enough.Comp gives a special role to computer (physical incarnation of auniversal number). The comp idea is that computer can supportsthinking and consciousness, and makes them capable of manifestationrelatively to other universal structure (physical universes if thatexists, people, etc.). This should answer your question.The lobian machines are only universal numbers, having theknowledge that they are universal.I can prove to any patient human that he/she is Löbian (I cannotprove that he/she is sound or correct, note).The UDA results is that whatever you mean by physical for makingcomp meaningful, that physicalness has to emerge entirely and only,from a 'competition' between all universal numbers. There is noneed to go out of arithmetic, and "worst", there is no possible useof going out of arithmetic, once betting on comp.By arithmetic I mean arithmetical truth, or the standard model ofarithmetic, I don't mean a theory. I mean the whole set of truearithmetical propositions, or of their Gödel numbers.Bruno-- Onward! Stephen --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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