Hi Bruno Marchal 3-view is descriptive truth, 1-view truth is truth by acquaintance.
Descriptive truth is similar to your knowing about Bertrand Russell. Or to know that in principle 1+1 =2. Truth by acquaintance is that you have met Bertrand Russell. Or you accept that 1 +1 = 2. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/4/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-04, 08:07:16 Subject: Re: Does your monad (your 1p) survive artificial changes to the brain ? On 03 Nov 2012, at 11:51, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think the issue of your survival of the doctor's operation or whatever is clouded by the solipsism issue. You might need to elaborate on this. It is ipso facto not solipsist as we have a notion of 3-view and 1-views attributed to relative machine. The 1p is de facto a solipsist experience, but the one who bet on comp bet ipso facto on other persons. It should work, for better or worse, as long as you can affirm you have survived by your subjective (1p) experience. The contrary. It works only as long as you don't affirm you have survived. The fact that you survived will be felt by the 1p as a strong confirmation of comp, but by attributing the comp 1p to the doppelganger, in the duplication experience, the 1p knows that such a personal confirmation does not constitute a public communication. Comp necessitates a recurrent act of faith, somehow. So you are right if you substitute "you can affirm to yourself you are survived by 1p experience". But that's again *is* the comp hypothesis. The fact that you will survive if your brain/body/environment is Turing emulated at some correct substitution level. I do not pretend that comp is true, I make it a bit more precise that usual, through explicit and precise definition of 1p and 3p, to study the "metaphysical/theological/fundamental" consequences. In a nutshell, in soccer terms: Plato 1, Aristotle 0. (I don't pretend it is the end of the match, either. The main point is that comp + classical theory of knowledge and belief is non trivial and empirically testable. More comments are below, but that is the bottom line. MORE COMMENTS: I started looking at your comments on sane04, recalling a comment made by Leibniz, namely the question about what happens to your monad if an arm is amputated ? Right after that, the arm is still alive, I think it can be rejoined. Leibniz said (and I wish I could remember exactly what he said) that your monad--which is actually called "spirit" for a man or monad with intellect-- will stay with your intellect (or 1p), for that it is what defines you, it is your identity. The arm will not share that monad or soul while detached and so will shortly die. Plotinus get in that question. My inspiration comes from the study of amoebas and planarias. It is an important problem, but I think the Dx = T(xx) method solves the solution in the computer science, along with other "fixed point theorems". This raises serious problems with the head/mind transplant conjecture. According to L, I think I can say that it wouldn't work. I beg to differ on this. Your monad would stay with the amputated head, and remain attached to or associated with it. But the head or intellect will die for lack of fresh blood, etc., so the monad will remain attached to a rotting head. Nothing will be rotten. You are copied on the right level, under anesthesia if you prefer, at a very low temperature, and the information scanned is send on a disk. The original body/brain is then destroyed and assumed to be destroyed successfully (it is part of the protocol). From the information kept in the disk, you are reconstituted at the correct level (which exists by the comp hypothesis) and you go out of the hospital, having survived in the usual clinical sense. Your soul is your identity. Yes. It stays with you, even though you change through the years or while asleep during an operation. And even when you die. If your subjective 1p consciousness (your monad) survives, then "you" have survived the doctor's alterations (either with digital hardware or signals) to your brain. Good insight. Yes. The question is not if you will survive with an artificial brain as you will survive anyway. The question is in better keeping the "normal probability" of manifesting your 1p relatively to your fellow in this "branch of the arithmetical emanation". It is a theorem for the universal machines. Once they have the cognitive ability to bet that they can survive a duplication, they can infer that they survive no matter what. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-02, 12:44:33 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:25, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 2:21 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> the you before the duplication or the you after the duplication? > All the you after, are the you before, by definition of comp. OK, but the you before is not the you after. The Helsinki man knows nothing about Moscow or Washington, not even if he still exists after the duplication, He believes he still exist, because he believes, or assumed, comp. but both the Moscow man and the Washington man know all about Helsinki even if they don't know about each other. > what you will live, as a first person. If your mind works deterministically then what you will live to think you see will depend on the external environment. Sure. If your mind does NOT work deterministically then what you will live to think you see will depend on absolutely nothing, in other words it is random. There is no new sort of indeterminacy involved just the boring old sort, and how you expect to draw profound philosophical conclusions from such a flimsy foundation is a mystery. Here 3-determinacy entails, by simple logic. You are the only one in the list (and out of the list) who have a problem (but which one?) with this. I do not draw any philosophical conclusion: but a theorem. The theorem is that the physical laws emerges, in a precise and testable way, from arithmetic/computer science. test have already been performed, and you can read the math part which explains all this. > You know by comp that [...] I don't know anything by "comp". Comp is that we can survive with a digital machine replacing the brain. At one time I thought I knew what you meant by the term, I thought so. but then you say consciousness was there before Evolution produced brains and that "the owner [of a brain] itself must attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic". So I was wrong, I don't know what "comp" means. You were just not aware of the logical consequences, and as long as you are stuck in step 3, it is normal you can't get the consequences of comp. >> Before the duplication the you is the Helsinki man, after the duplication >> the you is the Helsinki man and the Washington man and the Moscow man. What >> is the probability the Helsinki man will write in his diary that he sees >> Washington? 0%. > The guy reconstituted in Washington will say: "Gosh I was wrong". That's the problem, you're not clear who "I" is. This is not relevant. the guy in W and the guy in M are both the guy in H, by definition of comp. This is enough to get the 1_indeterminacy. The Washington man made no error because he made no predictions of any sort, only the Helsinki man did that. The Washington man and Helsinki man have identical memories up to the point of duplication but after that they diverge. That is known by the guy in Helsinki. That is why he can make a bet, on what he can possibly live, given that he knows he will remain alive (betting on comp and the default hypothesis, with the given protocol). >> What is the probability the Helsinki man will write in his diary he sees >> Helsinki? 100%. > No. In the protocol that I have described to you many times, the probability > here is 0%, as he is cut and pasted. Not copy and pasted. If the Helsinki man had never seen Helsinki then he's not the Helsinki man, if he has seen that city then he wrote so in his diary. And? > And it is not "he sees" but what will he see. And the protocol assures that > he will only see washington, or Moscow. Who is "he"? The guy in Helsinki, which will be in both M and W, but which will feel being in only once city, as both the W and M guy will concede. And the guy in Helsinki, if he can reason like any L?ian machine, can know that in advance, and that is why he can be aware that he does not know in advance where he will feel. It is simple math. >> What is the probability the Washington man will write in his diary he sees >> Washington? 100%. > The question was asked to the Helsinki man. But you said the Helsinki man was destroyed, if so then he's got a rather severe case of writers block and is writing very little in his diary. The body of the guy in Helsinki is destroyed, but by comp, we have already accept that the guy itself survives. With comp we already know that we can survive an annihilation of the body. >> And if the duplicating process destroys the Helsinki man then the >> probability the Helsinki man will write anything at all in his diary is 0%. > Then comp is false. OK if you say so, its your invention so whatever "comp" means its false; although I am a little surprised that you expect a man who no longer exists to write stuff in his diary. The simple teleprtation kills us, and then a brain substitution kills us too, and this is what I mean by comp is false. > The question is about your first person experience. [...]The question is not > about you, but about the most probable result of an experiment that you can > do. You push on a button, and you localize your directly accessible body. Your? You? John Clark believes that when considering matters of identity if Bruno Marchal stopped using so many pronouns without considering what they refer to then Bruno Marchal's thinking would be less muddled. "you" here refer to the guy in helsinki. After the duplication things get clear when you distiunguish the 1p and the 3p. No difficulty, just an 1p indeterminacy. >As Quentin said, it is implicit in the Everett understanding of QM. In Everett a world does not split until there is a difference between them and neither does consciousness. And the same is true in the thought experiment, Exactly. If Bruno Marchal's body is duplicated and sent to Washington and Moscow but inside identical boxes then Bruno Marchal's consciousness has not been duplicated and will not be until the boxes are opened and different things are observed by the Brunos, at that point they will no longer be each other but both will still be Bruno Marchal Exactly. This contradict what you say above though. And this entails the 1p indeterminacy. >> In most physics experiments, even very advanced ones at CERN, the >> experimenter himself is not duplicated so in the question "What particle do >> you expect to see?" it's clear who "you" is; > Only if you assume that the universe does not contain Boltzman brains, or a > universal dovetailer, It doesn't matter if Boltzman brains exist or not. Of course it does matter. That the point of step 4, 5, 6, 7. But you have to grasp step 3 before. You pretend to have found a blunder, but we keep explaining to you that you are the one conflating the different person points of view. In physics experiments not involving self duplications which "you" is involved is obvious, Yes, but only if there is no universal dovetailer, or if comp is false, so that you can use the physical supervenience thesis. and it can be proven to be correct by observing that when "you" predicts what "you" will see using physical laws the prediction usually proves to be true, so all the yous must have been assigned correctly. But that is what we cannot do if there is a UD, or if the universe is very big, or, after step 8, just if comp is true. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. 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