On 11/8/2012 10:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

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On 08 Nov 2012, at 14:45, Stephen P. King wrote:On 11/8/2012 6:43 AM, Roger Clough wrote:Hi meekerdb So how does Platonia's perfect necessary classes restrain or contain this world of contingency ? Or does it ?Hi Roger,That is exactly my question! How does Platonism show thecontingent to be necessary? As far as I have found, it cannot shownecessity of the contingent. In the rush to define the perfect, allmeans to show the necessity of contingency was thrown out. This iswhy I propose that we define existence as necessary possibility; wehave contingency built into our ontology in that definition. ;-)In which modal logic?

Hi Bruno,

`Why is there a formal modal logic implied in my remarks? I do not`

`think in a formal math form. I think visually and proprioceptively.`

`Ideas have 'texture' for me. ;-) Good theories have a different 'feel'`

`than wrong theories for me. Maybe this is just an intuitive form of`

`thinking but it has served me well so far.`

What you say directly contradict Gödel's theorem, which shows, at manydifferent levels the necessity of the possible.

`OK, I'll bite your metaphorical bait. What does Gödel's theorem`

`tell us about the necessity of the possible at most ontologically`

`fundamental level?`

We even get that for all (true) sigma_1 sentences (the "atomic eventsin the UD execution) p -> []<>p,

`Can you see that this is just a statement in a particular language?`

`We should be able to refer to the very same ideas using different`

`languages! Truth is, after all, independent of any particular`

`representation! One thing: that "p -> []<>p" reads to me as "the`

`necessary possible existence of p implies the existence of p". As to the`

`idea of atomicity in the UD. I understand a bit how Pratt considers a`

`logical algebra to be atomic, in that it cannot be reduced to a`

`structure with fewer components and cannot have components added to it`

`without altering its Satisfiability, but I do not know what 'atomicity'`

`means to you.`

that is the truth of p implies the necessity of the possibility of p,

`I do not see that at all! The truth of p is in its referent, it is`

`what p tells us that is True (or false) and I read the implication arrow`

`in the opposite direction as you. Logical necessitation (the logical`

`form of causality) looks at the antecedents and implicated precedents in`

`its derivation. Logic does not and must not be considered to`

`"anticipate" a truth. Truth is the end result of the process of logic,`

`not its beginning.`

with []p = either the box of the universal soul (S4Grz1), or the boxof the intelligible or sensible matter (Z1* and X1*). The modal logicsbecomes well defined, and allows, in Platonia, all the imperfectionsthat you can dream of (which of course is not necessarily a good news).

`All of these claims are coherent only after we assume that we exist`

`and can formulate theories. Comp floats high up in the Platonic realm on`

`the support of all of the minds that believe in it.`

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