On 11/9/2012 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 09 Nov 2012, at 00:01, Stephen P. King wrote:On 11/8/2012 10:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 08 Nov 2012, at 14:45, Stephen P. King wrote:On 11/8/2012 6:43 AM, Roger Clough wrote:Hi meekerdb So how does Platonia's perfect necessary classes restrain or contain this world of contingency ? Or does it ?Hi Roger,That is exactly my question! How does Platonism show thecontingent to be necessary? As far as I have found, it cannot shownecessity of the contingent. In the rush to define the perfect, allmeans to show the necessity of contingency was thrown out. This iswhy I propose that we define existence as necessary possibility; wehave contingency built into our ontology in that definition. ;-)In which modal logic?Hi Bruno,Why is there a formal modal logic implied in my remarks? I do notthink in a formal math form. I think visually and proprioceptively.Ideas have 'texture' for me. ;-) Good theories have a different'feel' than wrong theories for me. Maybe this is just an intuitiveform of thinking but it has served me well so far.It might suit well your 1p-intuition. Good for you. But you can usethat for public communication.

Dear Bruno,

`Please never forget that I am a philosopher, a 'lover of`

`knowledge'. I have seen a weakness in the tacit ontological assumptions`

`of many philosopher, mathematicians and scientists for a long time as I`

`have done my studies. They consistently neglect the effect of mutual`

`agreement between many entities. I thought that I was just wrong in this`

`presumption until I studied semiotic theory and the work of Peirce.`

`After reading the writings of David Bohm and other scientific`

`contrarians I am convinced that I am correct.`

Necessity and possibility have been controversial notion fromAristotle to Feys and Kripke (say). After Kripke, we can give amathematical meaning, and btw, the first remarkable fact is that thosemodal notion have transfinities of mathematical meaning, but then wecan be more precise.

Yes. I am studying Kripke, Hinttikka and others on this.

You define existence, which is simlple and rather well handled inelementeray logic, by very complex controversial notion. So I can'tunderstand them.

`I am trying to construct a notion of existence that is not`

`contingent on anything, not a theory, not a physical implementation, not`

`on the possibility of measurement or observation. Many philosophers,`

`including that knavish Kant and Schopenhauer and even Satre, have`

`pointed out that the existence of an entity cannot be contingent on`

`anything. Some, like Ayn Rand, tell us that we can only claim that`

`existence exists, but this reduced the concept to a empty tautology. My`

`proposal is that we can think of existence as necessary possibility and`

`thus have a concept that can be ontologically primitive - in that it is`

`not contingent. This allows it to be ontologically neutral in that it`

`has no properties or particularities or distinctions or any other`

`feature that would make it subservient on some special condition.`

Like for "primitive", that you want having objects without properties.This just makes no sense for me.

`This is what my definition of existence requires. To define object`

`in my system you must simultaneously define the means that the`

`properties can be distinguished from all possible properties for that`

`class of objects. In this way we might get closer to an ontology that is`

`not language dependent. I am just taking a page from the Book of Modern`

`Physics where we are told that physical laws and effects much be`

`formulated in a way that does not depend on some special coordinate`

`system or observable basis.`

`That you seem to repeatedly advocate is an ontology that is theory`

`dependent. Just as your notion of truth is theory dependent, so too are`

`the results or implications of comp. This is deeply problematic for me.`

What you say directly contradict Gödel's theorem, which shows, atmany different levels the necessity of the possible.OK, I'll bite your metaphorical bait. What does Gödel's theoremtell us about the necessity of the possible at most ontologicallyfundamental level?We even get that for all (true) sigma_1 sentences (the "atomicevents in the UD execution) p -> []<>p,Can you see that this is just a statement in a particular language?In arithmetic. All the modalities like [] and <> are entirely defined,either directly by an expression in arithmetic, or by appeal to welldefined infinities of arithmetical expressions.

`Yes, all of which is dependent on a particular set of formal`

`theoretical definitions.`

We should be able to refer to the very same ideas using differentlanguages!Perhaps, but then you must give the dictionary.

`I have been trying to do exactly that. Have you seen the`

`definitions that I have already written? For example, I define a`

`"reality" as that which 3 or more observers (that can communicate with`

`each other about) agree to be empty of contradictions. Do you have any`

`idea why I require at least 3 observers? Do you understand that I am not`

`assuming that observers are human or similarly sapient? I am defining an`

`observer as a sheaf of an infinite number of computations (all of which`

`generate bisimilar content of first person experience) that can be`

`located by some other observers as existing persistently in some space`

`(where a space is a set with some additional relational structure).`

Truth is, after all, independent of any particular representation!One thing: that "p -> []<>p" reads to me as "the necessary possibleexistence of p implies the existence of p".?"p -> []<>p" is for, p being any sigma_1 arithmetical proposition: pimplies box diamond p", with the box being defined in the Z1* or X1*logic, and playing the role of observable with "probability 1".

`I miss-wrote my reading above. It would read: "the necessary`

`possibility of p implies the existence of p". I don't see the need to`

`refer to a particular formal model of math.`

As to the idea of atomicity in the UD. I understand a bit how Prattconsiders a logical algebra to be atomic, in that it cannot bereduced to a structure with fewer components and cannot havecomponents added to it without altering its Satisfiability, but I donot know what 'atomicity' means to you.The usual one in logic. Atomic formula are the formula from which webuild the non atomic. In propositional calculus the atomic formula arep, q, r, ... In arithmetic, the atomic formula are (t = s) with t ands beings terms; etc.

`Atomic formulas are formulas withing a theoretical formalism that`

`are irreducible to formulas with fewer propositions, no?`

that is the truth of p implies the necessity of the possibility of p,I do not see that at all! The truth of p is in its referent, it iswhat p tells us that is True (or false) and I read the implicationarrow in the opposite direction as you.I thought it was typo, above. The you read "->" in the opposite senseof all the logicians. If you dare doing things like that, it will nothelp you to be understood. It is better to use the acceptedconventions, or at least, if you change one, to make that clear andexplicit before all things.

`I fixed my typo. The arrow "->" is reverse for logical implication,`

`no? If x then y, tells me that if Y is a fact of the world then x must`

`be true as well. The logical necessitation of existence flows backwards`

`by the truth of the precedent. If you read Pratt's papers you might have`

`seen a discussion of this.`

Logical necessitation (the logical form of causality) looks at theantecedents and implicated precedents in its derivation. Logic doesnot and must not be considered to "anticipate" a truth. Truth is theend result of the process of logic, not its beginning.This sentence has no meaning. When doing logic, we abstract fromtruth. We let truth come back in the model theory, but then it isdefined mathematically, and of course it is not "the truth".

`Why not? You assume that something exists without any cause and`

`that it also has properties without any cause and that you can have`

`knowledge without any cause wonder why I am asking you to justify that`

`belief. What might cause me to not agree with you? Oh, I am just`

`confused and misinformed (in your opinion). OK.`

with []p = either the box of the universal soul (S4Grz1), or the boxof the intelligible or sensible matter (Z1* and X1*). The modallogics becomes well defined, and allows, in Platonia, all theimperfections that you can dream of (which of course is notnecessarily a good news).All of these claims are coherent only after we assume that weexist and can formulate theories.This is does not make sense. Logicians put all their assumption thetable, and our existence does not figure in them.

`So the existence of "us" that are evaluating the assumptions is`

`never to be explained or even considered. I reject this as inverted`

`solipsism: instead of the belief that "only I exist", you are in effect`

`saying that we must believe that "we do not exist". No thanks. Just like`

`my claim that your equations would not knowable if there where no way to`

`write them on a chalkboard or any other physical medium, so too are the`

`content of any assumptions vacuous without the a priori existence of`

`evaluators of those assumptions.`

`Maybe you imagine that I am proposing that that physical worlds`

`exist independent of observers? But how could this be given that I am`

`demanding that reality, here of a physical world, is observer dependent`

`- not dependent on any one, but dependent on the totality of the`

`observers. Reality is "participatory" and democratic.`

`No one vote can change the total more than by one unit of value,`

`which for a huge number of observers is a trivial quantity. We can get`

`away with the naive idea that "the moon exists independent of me" only`

`because we naively imagine ourselves to be vastly more powerful that any`

`one else that might be concurrently observing the moon.`

Comp floats high up in the Platonic realm on the support of all ofthe minds that believe in it.?

`This is how I can believe in comp. I see comp as an existentially`

`true result but only because many minds (that do the due diligence to`

`come to understand it) can agree that the result follows automatically`

`from its postulates and the defined formal theory of modal logic.`

You said that you are a beginners and want to learn, but you keepshowing that you don't even want to learn logic. It is a technicalsubject.

`Excuse me, is it necessary to know how to write a language in order`

`to understand that language? No! You ignore the consequences of my`

`disability. see http://www.mathematicalbrain.com/pdf/LANDETAL.PDF for`

`detailed analysis. My disability is known as "Dyscalculia`

`<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dyscalculia>" "a specific learning`

`disability involving innate difficulty in learning or comprehending`

`arithmetic. It is akin to dyslexia and includes difficulty in`

`understanding numbers, learning how to manipulate numbers, learning`

`maths facts, and a number of other related symptoms (although there is`

`no exact form of the disability)." You might as well ask Stephen Hawking`

`to dance a pantomine version of his ideas to "prove" that he understand`

`it. I have overcome this disability but learnign to think in a different`

`way, but my disability remains.`

Nobody will criticize a formula in differential geometry with aphilosophical argument. same for logic, especially when applied tophilosophy.

`Bruno. I am not criticizing a formula in differential geometry, I`

`am criticizing a philosophical idea that you are advocating. Your are`

`advocating a form of immaterialism and I am demandign that you explain`

`how you over come its "body problem". The fact that comp has a body`

`problem, even if it is arithmetical, is not a surprise to me. I am more`

`surprised that you admit the problem exists! But you do not seem to want`

`to find a solution. My proposed solution, within math, is that we`

`somehow figure out how to define arithmetic bodies by using the Stone`

`duality, which is a well understood mathematical concept, and some`

`extensions of the concept of universal computers.`

`Philosophically, my proposed solution is to pull back from the full`

`throated endorsement of immaterialism and think about the ways that comp`

`allows us to define physical worlds. Bodies are merely localizations in`

`spaces that have some properties that are persistent for some finite`

`transformations. They could all have identical minds and imagine`

`themselves to be different from each other because the minds "locate"`

`themselves differently with respect to each other. The key idea is that`

`it is a physical world, ontologically primitive or purely an agreement`

`of some collection of 1p, that allows minds to interact with each other`

`and validate their beliefs.`

`We can bet on the Doctor only if we can know for sure that the`

`Doctor is not a liar.`

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