On 05 Dec 2012, at 18:47, Roger Clough wrote:



Hi Bruno,

I found the quote I had been searching for:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-mind/
"Kant thought that transcendental arguments were a priori or
yielded the a priori in all three ways. Nonetheless, at the heart of
this method is inference to the best explanation. When introspection
[the empirical, not logical method of synthesis]
fell out of favour about 100 years ago, the alternative approach
[Kant's method of synthesis] adopted was exactly this approach.

Its nonempirical roots in Kant notwithstanding, it is now the major method
used by experimental cognitive scientists.

Other things equally central to Kant's approach to the mind have not been taken up by cognitive science, as we will see near the end, a key part of his doctrine of synthesis and most of what he had to say about consciousness
of self in particular. Far from his model having been superseded
by cognitive science, some important things have not even been
assimilated by it. "

No problem with Kant, but it is difficult. I have conflicting translations. But it is obvious he is coherent with many comp features. It can be said to not pushing his own logic far enough.. Neoplatonists were clearer, imo.


Bruno




[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Roger Clough
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-05, 05:05:38
Subject: On the need for perspective and relations in modelling the mind


Hi Bruno Marchal

Indeed, we can not code for [1p].  But we need not abandon
itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive
theory has done.   We can replace [1p] by its actions -
those of perception,  in which terms are relational (subject: object).
You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective.

That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or
interprant) as a necessary and natural part of its triad of relations.
Your responses seem to leave out such relations.  I cannot find
again the quote I should have bookmarked, but in an argument
for using semiotics on the web, it was said that modern cognitive
theory has abandoned the self in an effort to depersonalize
cognition.  While this is a valid scientific reason, it doesn't work
when living breathing humans are concerned.

IMHO leaving out [1p ] in such a way will forever prevent
computer calculations from emulating the mind.


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-03, 13:03:12
Subject: Re: Semantic vs logical truth




On 03 Dec 2012, at 00:04, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/2/2012 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The 1p truth of the machine is not coded in the machine. Some actual machines knows already that, and can justified that If there are machine (and from outside we can know this to correct) then the 1p- truth is not codable. The 1p truth are more related to the relation between belief and reality (not necessarily physical reality, except for observation and sensation).


Even the simple, and apparently formal Bp & p is NOT codable.
Most truth about machine, including some that they can know, are not codable.
Many things true about us is not codable either.

Let me see if I understand that. I think you are saying that p, i.e. that "p" describes a fact about the world, a meta-level above the coding of a machine.


No, p is for some statement at the base level, like 1+1 = 2.










That the Mars Rover believes it is south of it's landing point is implicit in its state and might be inferred from its behavior, but there is no part of the state corresponding to "I *believe* I am south of my landing point."


Then Mars Rover is not L?ian. But I am not even sure that Mars Rover is Turing universal, or that it exploits its Turing universality.


But PA and ZF can represent "I believe". So we can study the logic of a new 'knowledge" operator defined (at the meta level, for each arithmetical proposition) by Bp & p. For example if p is "1+1=2", it is


Believe"("1+1=2") & 1+1 = 2.


We cannot define such operator in arithmetic. We would need something like Believe"("1+1=2") & True("1+1 = 2"), but True, in general cannot defined in arithmetic. Yet, we can metadefine it and study its logic, which obeys a soprt of temporal intuionistic logic (interpreting the S4Grz logic obtained).










One could include such second-level states (which one might want to communicate to Pasadena) but then that state would be just another first-level state. Right?



Not sure I see what you mean. The meta, available by the machine is in the "I believe". It is the 3-I. The presentation of myself to myself. The 1-I will be the non definable operator above. We connect the believer to the truth. It is easy to do for the sound correct machine.


Bruno









Brent



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