On 11 Dec 2012, at 13:17, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

My personal introspection will always have my personal
memory as context, which a computer will not have.

This is weird. Personal computer have already personal memory, even if today they borrow it from their user. But personal memory is easy to implement. Now the 1p is not just memory (even if this is enough in UDA). There is a distinct person quale associated to it.



One can in fact say that I am my memory.

In some approximation.



My
memory is the identity of my 1p and is what my 1p sees.

This is perhaps the most serioous problem of comp.

Frankly .... I can understand people not convinced that a computer can have a quale associated to the memory, but memory and personal memory does not pose any problem in computers. Then I have explained why they have a quale too.

Bruno





[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/11/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-10, 09:29:08
Subject: Re: Introspection (internal 1p) has been dropped by cognitivescience




On 10 Dec 2012, at 13:59, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Russell Standish

Actual introspection is subjective, not objective.
Computers as I understand them can only think objectively.


But now we know better. Computers are champion in introspection, and they have a rich subjective life. Even without comp or CTM, and with just the usual definition of knowledge in analytical philosophy.


Bruno





[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/10/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Russell Standish
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-09, 01:42:47
Subject: Re: Re: Introspection (internal 1p) has been dropped by cognitivescience


On Sat, Dec 08, 2012 at 06:34:56AM -0500, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Russell Standish

He's talking about psychological introspection using
everyday language and concepts. Philosophical
introspection a la Kant for example, is more formal
and precise and uses formal categories.


I don't see a distinction in the topic, or problem being solved - just
a difference in tools used.

Modern AI uses less formal logic these days, and more statistical
modelling (such as in the website I referenced).

Cheers

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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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