Bruno Marchal said

"They are logically "interacting" though."

Right. Which is only possible if both mind and body (brain) are 
treated as mind, which is what L did with his monads.
Materialism treats them both as body, which is nonsensical.

So L's solution to the mind/brain problem (Chalmer's
"Hard Problem") is the only possibly correct one.

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/8/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-08, 05:01:39
Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science




On 07 Dec 2012, at 13:04, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Stephen,

I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because mind and body
are completely different substances, 


In the plato sense? OK. (hypostase is better than substance in this case, as 
subtance is often considered as primary)




no matter what your philosophy or
science, and cannot interact. 


They are logically "interacting" though.


Bruno






The failure to solve the "hard problem" 
shows that.


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/7/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Telmo Menezes 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-06, 10:14:29
Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science


Hi Stephen,





This is the case with modern cognitive science:
1)?It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
solution to the mind/brain problem in favor?f treating
both substances as material.


A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is outside 
the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any mechanism of 
interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world, thus 
negating dualism.


Dear Telmo,

? There is no "problem of interaction" if mind and body are isomorphs of each 
other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of each other, here. Descartes' 
substance dualism fails because the poor chap was asking the wrong question. 
The right question to ask is: How do minds interact with each other? Answer: 
via bodies. Minds are just the self-representations that bodies can have of 
themselves.


Thanks for the link, I'll read it once I have a bit more time.





I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely weird 
about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I don't buy 
into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity. Yet, any 
explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical laws (or 
vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises. 



? Once we accept that consciousness is only knowable in a first person sense we 
will stop asking for third person descriptions/explanations for it. 



I agree but to me "first person" and "consciousness" are exactly the same 
thing. The deep existential questions remain unanswered...




-- 
Onward!

Stephen


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.





-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to