On 08 Dec 2012, at 14:11, Roger Clough wrote:
Bruno Marchal said
"They are logically "interacting" though."
Right. Which is only possible if both mind and body (brain) are
treated as mind, which is what L did with his monads.
Materialism treats them both as body, which is nonsensical.
So L's solution to the mind/brain problem (Chalmer's
"Hard Problem") is the only possibly correct one.
I agree. A part of the mind-body problem comes from the ... invention
of matter (primitive matter). It is an extrapolation coming from our
taking seriously the local appearances, to eat, and to avoid being
eaten. I guess.
Bruno
[Roger Clough], [[email protected]]
12/8/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-08, 05:01:39
Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
On 07 Dec 2012, at 13:04, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen,
I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because mind
and body
are completely different substances,
In the plato sense? OK. (hypostase is better than substance in this
case, as subtance is often considered as primary)
no matter what your philosophy or
science, and cannot interact.
They are logically "interacting" though.
Bruno
The failure to solve the "hard problem"
shows that.
[Roger Clough], [[email protected]]
12/7/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Telmo Menezes
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-06, 10:14:29
Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
Hi Stephen,
This is the case with modern cognitive science:
1)牋It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
solution to the mind/brain problem in favor爋f treating
both substances as material.
A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If
mind is outside the physical world, how does it interact with
body? Any mechanism of interaction you can propose would make mind
part of the physical world, thus negating dualism.
Dear Telmo,
牋 There is no "problem of interaction" if mind and body are
isomorphs of each other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of
each other, here. Descartes' substance dualism fails because the
poor chap was asking the wrong question. The right question to ask
is: How do minds interact with each other? Answer: via bodies.
Minds are just the self-representations that bodies can have of
themselves.
Thanks for the link, I'll read it once I have a bit more time.
I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something
extremely weird about consciousness, that cannot be explained by
current science. I don't buy into the idea that consciousness
emerges from neural activity. Yet, any explanation must place
consciousness inside the real of physical laws (or vice-versa),
otherwise the previous paradox arises.
牋 Once we accept that consciousness is only knowable in a first
person sense we will stop asking for third person descriptions/
explanations for it.
I agree but to me "first person" and "consciousness" are exactly
the same thing. The deep existential questions remain unanswered...
--
Onward!
Stephen
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