No Roger, The BEC properties are known from laboratory experiment.
For example, light can skip thru a BEC at infinite speed, leaving the BEC as it enters, or light can be stopped and started in a BEC. My opinion is that a BEC is effectively outside of spacetime. I am not alone in that opinion. For example , See: Hu H and Wu M. Thinking outside the box: the essence and implications of quantum entanglement. NeuroQuantology 2006. Richard On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 8:39 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote: > Hi Richard Ruquist > > Didn't you just make that up ? > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 12/8/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Richard Ruquist > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-12-08, 08:20:14 > Subject: Re: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science > > Roger, > > BECs make that interaction possible. > Don't you ever rad my posts? > Richard > > On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 8:11 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote: >> Bruno Marchal said >> >> "They are logically "interacting" though." >> >> Right. Which is only possible if both mind and body (brain) are >> treated as mind, which is what L did with his monads. >> Materialism treats them both as body, which is nonsensical. >> >> So L's solution to the mind/brain problem (Chalmer's >> "Hard Problem") is the only possibly correct one. >> >> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >> 12/8/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Bruno Marchal >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-12-08, 05:01:39 >> Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science >> >> >> On 07 Dec 2012, at 13:04, Roger Clough wrote: >> >> Hi Stephen, >> >> I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because mind and >> body >> are completely different substances, >> >> >> In the plato sense? OK. (hypostase is better than substance in this case, >> as >> subtance is often considered as primary) >> >> >> no matter what your philosophy or >> science, and cannot interact. >> >> >> They are logically "interacting" though. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> The failure to solve the "hard problem" >> shows that. >> >> >> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >> 12/7/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Telmo Menezes >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-12-06, 10:14:29 >> Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science >> >> Hi Stephen, >> >>> >>>> This is the case with modern cognitive science: >>>> 1)牋It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain) >>>> solution to the mind/brain problem in favor爋f treating >>>> both substances as material. >>> >>> >>> A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is >>> outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any mechanism >>> of >>> interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world, >>> thus >>> negating dualism. >>> >>> >>> Dear Telmo, >>> >>> 牋 There is no "problem of interaction" if mind and body are isomorphs of >>> each other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of each other, here. >>> Descartes' substance dualism fails because the poor chap was asking the >>> wrong question. The right question to ask is: How do minds interact with >>> each other? Answer: via bodies. Minds are just the self-representations >>> that >>> bodies can have of themselves. >> >> >> Thanks for the link, I'll read it once I have a bit more time. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely >>> weird about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I >>> don't buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity. >>> Yet, any explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical >>> laws (or vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises. >>> >>> >>> 牋 Once we accept that consciousness is only knowable in a first person >>> sense we will stop asking for third person descriptions/explanations for >>> it. >> >> >> I agree but to me "first person" and "consciousness" are exactly the same >> thing. The deep existential questions remain unanswered... >> >>> >>> -- >>> Onward! >>> >>> Stephen >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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