On 12/7/2012 6:01 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Fantastic links, specially the latter. I´ll read it.
This is my standpoint now:
First is necessary to define existence. My standpoint is that what
exists is what the mind assumes that exist (because it is relevant) .
Dear Alberto,
But this makes existence subservient on the ability of a mind to
apprehend what might exist. This is requires an explanation of how that
could occur! How can a mind cause something to exist? I see this as
conflating the notion of existence with the notion of definiteness of
properties.
In my philosophy, I take /existence/ as ontological primitive and
completely divorsed of innate properties; it replaces 'substance' as the
neutral 'bearer of of properties'. Existence is eternal, it cannot be
created or destroyed. Properties are that which the mind selects as
actual from the possible. If we demand that an entity's existence
requires a priori properties, then I would stipulate that all possible
properties are implied by bare existence.
In this case, the process is what make the category. That something
is a substance means that there are patterns in the processes that
have a recognizable structure recognized as substantial. A processis
composed of patterns, these patterns are categories or substances.
Yes, Process defines categories. Substances, in my thinking, are
collections of similar bundles of properties.
That is unavoidable, because the mind has no infinite power neither
the brain has a infinite quantity of connections, therefore it has to
reuse functional components, some of which are hard wired. Metaphors
are a sign of this re-usability: I can kill an insect, but a bacteria
can kill me, I can "kill" a program...
I disagree. The mind has infinite power but is contained such that
it can only have extensions that are consistent with precedent. No 'new
idea' or thought can be in logical conflict with previously held truths!
Remember, a mind is not a fixed 'thing'!
In al these processes, the pattern is the same: something that existed
before does not exit now because an active subject has acted to kill
it. the category of killing has certain properties: it is nor
reflexive, has a relation of order etc.
Not in my thinking. Some new properties become known to be the
case, thus a mind can evolve by gaining new knowledge. Existence is
completely passive.
I can philosophize about the notion of killing, abstracted from the
concrete situation . In the same way I can think about love, or
reason, or any other category because they can applied to different
processes but have certain patterns and properties that make them
different one from the other and thus they are substantial. I can
relate one category with other in the abstract, like for example: if
you kill something, you don´t love it.
I try to not base my philosophical mussing on reasonings that are
so emotionally charged. You are in the area of etheics here, not
ontology, IMHO.
The categories may look ambiguous because they may be applied to very
different processes for the sake of reusability and computational
efficiency, (so they have subcategories) but in essence they can be
rigorously defined in terms of category theory.
But this makes categorization a field that the mind of an
individual has a tyrannical rule over. I see categories as democratic,
they are collections of mutual agreement and consent between entities,
not captives to be commanded.
The mere fact that I say I "killed the browser" without any conscious
thinking and the fact that you understand it immediately without
further concern means that categories are in the human mind, and
therefore, configure the reality that we perceive.
Umm, you might be bringing in ideas from semiotics and considering
the problem of the signified. Please watch this:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XdP_dtBvtQo (I presume that you can
understand Spanish)
To say that these abstract things do not exist is the
nominalist-positivist- materialist standpoint that I see deeply flawed
in philosophical, mathematical, computational, experiential and even
materialistic and moral terms.
I am weaving together ideas from both nominalism and universalism
to overcome problems within each one (taken individually).
2012/12/7 Stephen P. King <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
On 12/7/2012 9:02 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
"There are no "substances", there are only processes"
In terms of category theory, this is like
"there are no categoríes, there are only arrows!"
Dear Alberto,
Indeed! Have you studied a bit of N-Category theory
<http://arxiv.org/abs/q-alg/9705009>? Any "object" is constructed
from arrows of another level. What I am claiming is that all of
the properties that we define "substances" as can be shown to be
merely invariances in some collection of transformations. In other
words, there are no primitive substances, there are only
processes. Please read this article on the concept of Substance in
philosophy to see the ideas that I am considering:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/
The discussion of "substantivalism" in physics is particularly
interesting as seen here:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-holearg/
2012/12/7 Stephen P. King <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
On 12/7/2012 7:04 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen,
I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking,
because mind and body
are completely different substances, no matter what your
philosophy or
science, and cannot interact. The failure to solve the "hard
problem"
shows that.
[Roger Clough], [[email protected]]
<mailto:[email protected]]>
12/7/2012
Dear Roger,
There are no "substances", there are only processes.
--
Onward!
Stephen
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
[email protected].
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
