On 12/7/2012 6:01 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Fantastic links, specially the latter. I´ll read it.

This is my standpoint now:

First is necessary to define existence. My standpoint is that what exists is what the mind assumes that exist (because it is relevant) .

Dear Alberto,

But this makes existence subservient on the ability of a mind to apprehend what might exist. This is requires an explanation of how that could occur! How can a mind cause something to exist? I see this as conflating the notion of existence with the notion of definiteness of properties.

In my philosophy, I take /existence/ as ontological primitive and completely divorsed of innate properties; it replaces 'substance' as the neutral 'bearer of of properties'. Existence is eternal, it cannot be created or destroyed. Properties are that which the mind selects as actual from the possible. If we demand that an entity's existence requires a priori properties, then I would stipulate that all possible properties are implied by bare existence.

In this case, the process is what make the category. That something is a substance means that there are patterns in the processes that have a recognizable structure recognized as substantial. A processis composed of patterns, these patterns are categories or substances.

Yes, Process defines categories. Substances, in my thinking, are collections of similar bundles of properties.

That is unavoidable, because the mind has no infinite power neither the brain has a infinite quantity of connections, therefore it has to reuse functional components, some of which are hard wired. Metaphors are a sign of this re-usability: I can kill an insect, but a bacteria can kill me, I can "kill" a program...

I disagree. The mind has infinite power but is contained such that it can only have extensions that are consistent with precedent. No 'new idea' or thought can be in logical conflict with previously held truths! Remember, a mind is not a fixed 'thing'!

In al these processes, the pattern is the same: something that existed before does not exit now because an active subject has acted to kill it. the category of killing has certain properties: it is nor reflexive, has a relation of order etc.

Not in my thinking. Some new properties become known to be the case, thus a mind can evolve by gaining new knowledge. Existence is completely passive.

I can philosophize about the notion of killing, abstracted from the concrete situation . In the same way I can think about love, or reason, or any other category because they can applied to different processes but have certain patterns and properties that make them different one from the other and thus they are substantial. I can relate one category with other in the abstract, like for example: if you kill something, you don´t love it.

I try to not base my philosophical mussing on reasonings that are so emotionally charged. You are in the area of etheics here, not ontology, IMHO.

The categories may look ambiguous because they may be applied to very different processes for the sake of reusability and computational efficiency, (so they have subcategories) but in essence they can be rigorously defined in terms of category theory.

But this makes categorization a field that the mind of an individual has a tyrannical rule over. I see categories as democratic, they are collections of mutual agreement and consent between entities, not captives to be commanded.

The mere fact that I say I "killed the browser" without any conscious thinking and the fact that you understand it immediately without further concern means that categories are in the human mind, and therefore, configure the reality that we perceive.

Umm, you might be bringing in ideas from semiotics and considering the problem of the signified. Please watch this: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XdP_dtBvtQo (I presume that you can understand Spanish)

To say that these abstract things do not exist is the nominalist-positivist- materialist standpoint that I see deeply flawed in philosophical, mathematical, computational, experiential and even materialistic and moral terms.

I am weaving together ideas from both nominalism and universalism to overcome problems within each one (taken individually).

2012/12/7 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>>

    On 12/7/2012 9:02 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
    "There are no "substances", there are only processes"

    In terms of category theory, this is like

    "there are no categoríes, there are only arrows!"

    Dear Alberto,

        Indeed! Have you studied a bit of N-Category theory
    <http://arxiv.org/abs/q-alg/9705009>? Any "object" is constructed
    from arrows of another level. What I am claiming is that all of
    the properties that we define "substances" as can be shown to be
    merely invariances in some collection of transformations. In other
    words, there are no primitive substances, there are only
    processes. Please read this article on the concept of Substance in
    philosophy to see the ideas that I am considering:
        The discussion of "substantivalism" in physics is particularly
    interesting as seen here:

    2012/12/7 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net

        On 12/7/2012 7:04 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
        Hi Stephen,
        I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking,
        because mind and body
        are completely different substances, no matter what your
        philosophy or
        science, and cannot interact. The failure to solve the "hard
        shows that.
        [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
        Dear Roger,

            There are no "substances", there are only processes.



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