Roger,

BECs make that interaction possible.
Don't you ever rad my posts?
Richard

On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 8:11 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
> Bruno Marchal said
>
> "They are logically "interacting" though."
>
> Right. Which is only possible if both mind and body (brain) are
> treated as mind, which is what L did with his monads.
> Materialism treats them both as body, which is nonsensical.
>
> So L's solution to the mind/brain problem (Chalmer's
> "Hard Problem") is the only possibly correct one.
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/8/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-08, 05:01:39
> Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
>
>
> On 07 Dec 2012, at 13:04, Roger Clough wrote:
>
> Hi Stephen,
>
> I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because mind and body
> are completely different substances,
>
>
> In the plato sense? OK. (hypostase is better than substance in this case, as
> subtance is often considered as primary)
>
>
> no matter what your philosophy or
> science, and cannot interact.
>
>
> They are logically "interacting" though.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> The failure to solve the "hard problem"
> shows that.
>
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/7/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Telmo Menezes
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-06, 10:14:29
> Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science
>
> Hi Stephen,
>
>>
>>> This is the case with modern cognitive science:
>>> 1)牋It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain)
>>> solution to the mind/brain problem in favor爋f treating
>>> both substances as material.
>>
>>
>> A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is
>> outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any mechanism of
>> interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world, thus
>> negating dualism.
>>
>>
>> Dear Telmo,
>>
>> 牋 There is no "problem of interaction" if mind and body are isomorphs of
>> each other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of each other, here.
>> Descartes' substance dualism fails because the poor chap was asking the
>> wrong question. The right question to ask is: How do minds interact with
>> each other? Answer: via bodies. Minds are just the self-representations that
>> bodies can have of themselves.
>
>
> Thanks for the link, I'll read it once I have a bit more time.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely
>> weird about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I
>> don't buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity.
>> Yet, any explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical
>> laws (or vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises.
>>
>>
>> 牋 Once we accept that consciousness is only knowable in a first person
>> sense we will stop asking for third person descriptions/explanations for it.
>
>
> I agree but to me "first person" and "consciousness" are exactly the same
> thing. The deep existential questions remain unanswered...
>
>>
>> --
>> Onward!
>>
>> Stephen
>>
>>
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