Roger, BECs make that interaction possible. Don't you ever rad my posts? Richard
On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 8:11 AM, Roger Clough <[email protected]> wrote: > Bruno Marchal said > > "They are logically "interacting" though." > > Right. Which is only possible if both mind and body (brain) are > treated as mind, which is what L did with his monads. > Materialism treats them both as body, which is nonsensical. > > So L's solution to the mind/brain problem (Chalmer's > "Hard Problem") is the only possibly correct one. > > [Roger Clough], [[email protected]] > 12/8/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-12-08, 05:01:39 > Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science > > > On 07 Dec 2012, at 13:04, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi Stephen, > > I think that's just more materialist wishful thinking, because mind and body > are completely different substances, > > > In the plato sense? OK. (hypostase is better than substance in this case, as > subtance is often considered as primary) > > > no matter what your philosophy or > science, and cannot interact. > > > They are logically "interacting" though. > > Bruno > > > > The failure to solve the "hard problem" > shows that. > > > [Roger Clough], [[email protected]] > 12/7/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Telmo Menezes > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-12-06, 10:14:29 > Subject: Re: The two wrong paths of modern cognitive science > > Hi Stephen, > >> >>> This is the case with modern cognitive science: >>> 1)牋It ignored Descartes' two substance (mind and brain) >>> solution to the mind/brain problem in favor爋f treating >>> both substances as material. >> >> >> A common criticism of dualism is the problem of interaction. If mind is >> outside the physical world, how does it interact with body? Any mechanism of >> interaction you can propose would make mind part of the physical world, thus >> negating dualism. >> >> >> Dear Telmo, >> >> 牋 There is no "problem of interaction" if mind and body are isomorphs of >> each other, as Pratt proposes; they are Stone duals of each other, here. >> Descartes' substance dualism fails because the poor chap was asking the >> wrong question. The right question to ask is: How do minds interact with >> each other? Answer: via bodies. Minds are just the self-representations that >> bodies can have of themselves. > > > Thanks for the link, I'll read it once I have a bit more time. >> >> >> >> >> I appreciate and share the sentiment that there is something extremely >> weird about consciousness, that cannot be explained by current science. I >> don't buy into the idea that consciousness emerges from neural activity. >> Yet, any explanation must place consciousness inside the real of physical >> laws (or vice-versa), otherwise the previous paradox arises. >> >> >> 牋 Once we accept that consciousness is only knowable in a first person >> sense we will stop asking for third person descriptions/explanations for it. > > > I agree but to me "first person" and "consciousness" are exactly the same > thing. The deep existential questions remain unanswered... > >> >> -- >> Onward! >> >> Stephen >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
