On 12/8/2012 7:16 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
You're right, I short-changed Bruno. He is actually
an Idealist like me. And my apologies for calling you a
an atheist/materialist. I seem to have been having a bad day.

Dear Roger,

    It is OK, we all have our 'bad days'. :-)

You and I seem to differ principally, if I understand you corrrectly,
in that you believe in local dermination/causation while
I believe that such causation is (and has to be, because ideas
aren't causal) only apparent.

I am claiming that "local determination/causation' and 'apparent causation' are the same thing! This implies that there is no global or total cause or 'orchestration'.

To go back to my orchestra analogy,
you believe that everything is fine as long as each correctly plays
his score, while I believe that an overall conductor (the supreme
monad) is needed for maintaining coordination and for
composing the score in the first place.

Could you consider that this "overall conductor' is an imaginary entity and not a real entity?

Your local governor appears to be "a set of relations".


L's would also neccesarily include a higher-order governor
(the Conductor) to insure that a pre-established harmony
exists between sets, as well as insuring that each set ansd
its laws are carried out properly. Are synchhronized.

Yes, but I am pointing out that this assumption that "a pre-established harmony exists between sets" is an a priori global partitioning on the percepts and this is explicitly disallowed for mathematical reasons. Do you understand the discussion about NP-Hard problems that I have previously mentioned?

In short, you seem to have no  means of overall synchronizing
the actions of sets.

Exactly. In order to have an overall synchronization of the actions there must be a computation of such and this is an infinite NP-hard problem that simply cannot occur prior to the availability of the resources for the computation. To think otherwise is equivalent to imagining that a physical computer can run without a power source.

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net]>
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

    ----- Receiving the following content -----
    *From:* Stephen P. King <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>
    *Receiver:* everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>
    *Time:* 2012-12-06, 14:02:33
    *Subject:* Re: A truce: if atheism/materialism is an "as if" universe

    On 12/6/2012 9:00 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
    > Hi Stephen P. King
    > OK, after thinking it over, it seems there's two ways of thinking
    > about L's metaphysics.
    > 1) (My way) The Idealist way, that being L's metaphysics as is.
    > 2) (Your way) The atheist/materialist way, that being the usual
    > atheist/materialistc view of the universe --- as long as you
    > realize that strictly speaking this is not correct, but the universe
    > acts "as if" there's no God.

    Dear Roger,

         It is not "atheist/materialist" at all, my way. It is
    in the sense that the potential of the One must be immanent in all of
    the Omniverse, not to be confined to special occasions/locations.

    > I have trouble with this view
    > in speaking of "mental space", but I suppose you can
    > consider mental states to exist "as if" they are real.

         Your thoughts are easily seen to be a "mental space" when one
    understand that a 'space' is just a set plus some structure of

    > L's metaphysics has no conflicts with the phenomenal
    > world (the physical world you see and that of science),
    > but L would say that strictly speaking, the phenomenol world is
    > not real, only its monadic representation is real.

         yes, but Monads offer a very different ontological vision. It is
    not the "atoms in a void" vision at all, and yet allows for the
    appearance of 'atoms in a void' as a mode of perception.

    > I have not yet worked Bruno's view into this scheme, but
    > a first guess is that Bruno's world is 2).

         Actually, Bruno's view is Idealist!




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