Hi Stephen P. King
OK, after thinking it over, it seems there's two ways of thinking
about L's metaphysics.
1) (My way) The Idealist way, that being L's metaphysics as is.
2) (Your way) The atheist/materialist way, that being the usual
atheist/materialistc view of the universe --- as long as you
realize that strictly speaking this is not correct, but the universe
acts "as if" there's no God. I have trouble with this view
in speaking of "mental space", but I suppose you can
consider mental states to exist "as if" they are real.
L's metaphysics has no conflicts with the phenomenol
world (the physical world you see and that of science),
but L would say that strictly speaking, the phenomenol world is
not real, only its monadic representation is real.
I have not yet worked Bruno's view into this scheme, but
a first guess is that Bruno's world is 2).
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Stephen P. King
Time: 2012-12-05, 19:51:28
Subject: Re: a paper on Leibnizian mathematical ideas
On 12/5/2012 1:01 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
L's monads have perception.
They sense the entire universe.
On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 12:45 PM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
> Hi Stephen P. King
> God isn't artificially inserted into L's metaphysics,
> it's a necessary part, because everything else (the monads)
> afre blind and passive. Just as necessary as the One is to Plato's
Yes, the monads have an entire universe as its perception. What
distinguishes monads from each other is their 'point of view' of a universe.
One has to consider the idea of closure for a monad, my conjecture is that the
content of perception of a monad must be representable as an complete atomic
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