Hi Stephen P. King OK, after thinking it over, it seems there's two ways of thinking about L's metaphysics.
1) (My way) The Idealist way, that being L's metaphysics as is. 2) (Your way) The atheist/materialist way, that being the usual atheist/materialistc view of the universe --- as long as you realize that strictly speaking this is not correct, but the universe acts "as if" there's no God. I have trouble with this view in speaking of "mental space", but I suppose you can consider mental states to exist "as if" they are real. L's metaphysics has no conflicts with the phenomenol world (the physical world you see and that of science), but L would say that strictly speaking, the phenomenol world is not real, only its monadic representation is real. I have not yet worked Bruno's view into this scheme, but a first guess is that Bruno's world is 2). [Roger Clough], [[email protected]] 12/6/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-05, 19:51:28 Subject: Re: a paper on Leibnizian mathematical ideas On 12/5/2012 1:01 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: L's monads have perception. They sense the entire universe. On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 12:45 PM, Roger Clough <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Stephen P. King > > > God isn't artificially inserted into L's metaphysics, > it's a necessary part, because everything else (the monads) > afre blind and passive. Just as necessary as the One is to Plato's > metaphysics. > > > > Hi Richard, Yes, the monads have an entire universe as its perception. What distinguishes monads from each other is their 'point of view' of a universe. One has to consider the idea of closure for a monad, my conjecture is that the content of perception of a monad must be representable as an complete atomic Boolean algebra. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
