Bruno: how about expanding our closed (mathematical) minds into not only decimal, binary, etc., but also a (hold on fast!) 12/17ary number systems? in that case 17 would be non-primary, divisible by 2,3,4,6 besides the 1. Just playing my mind on math. (You may have an even wider mind). Also zero can be "thought of" in non-human logic as participant in calculations.

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John M PS: no response required indeed. My agnosticism at work. On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 5:06 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 07 Dec 2012, at 14:33, Roger Clough wrote: > > >> Obviously, I meant the natural integers, not the natural numbers, >> whatever they be. >> > > Natural numbers = the non negatiove integers: 0, 1, 2, 3, .... > or 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... > > Bruno > > > > >> >> ----- Have received the following content ----- >> Sender: Roger Clough >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-12-07, 08:18:36 >> Subject: Whoopie ! The natural numbers are indeed monads >> >> >> Hi Bruno Marchal >> >> >> 1) We in fact agree about what 1p is, except IMHO it is the >> Supreme Monad viewing the world THROUGH an individual's >> 1p that I would call the inner God. Or any God. >> >> 2) Previously I dismissed numbers as being monads because I >> thought that all monads had to refer to physical substances. >> >> But natural numbers are different because >> even though they are only mental substances, they're still >> substances, by virtue of the fact that they can't be subdivided. >> So they are of one part each. >> >> Thus the natural numbers are monads, even though they have no >> physical correlates. Sorry I've be so slow to see that. >> >> That reallyiopens doors Then numbers can see each other with 1p. >> >> WHOOPEE ! >> >> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >> 12/7/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Bruno Marchal >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-12-06, 12:44:46 >> Subject: Re: On the need for perspective and relations in modelling the >> mind >> >> >> >> >> On 05 Dec 2012, at 11:05, Roger Clough wrote: >> >> >> Hi Bruno Marchal >> >> Indeed, we can not code for [1p]. But we need not abandon >> itr entirely, as you seem to have done, and as cognitive >> theory has done. >> >> >> On the contrary, I define it is a simple way (the owner of the diary) the >> the self-multiplication thought experiment (UDA). It is enough to >> understand that physics emerge from the way the "numbers see themselves". >> >> >> But in the math part, I define it by using the fact that the >> incompleteness phenomenon redeemed the Theatetus definition. The Bp & p >> definition. It is a bit technical. >> >> >> Don't worry. The 1p is the inner god, the first person, the knower, and >> it plays the key role for consciousness and matter. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> We can replace [1p] by its actions - >> those of perception, in which terms are relational (subject: object). >> You seem to deal with everything from the 3p perspective. >> >> >> That's science. But don't confuse the level. My object of study is the >> 1p, that we can attribute to machine, or person emulated by machines. I >> describe the 3p and the 1ps (singular and plural), and indeed their >> necessary statistical relation at some level. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> That is my argument for using semiotics, which includes 1p (or >> interprant) as a necessary and natural part of its triad of relations. >> Your responses seem to leave out such relations. I cannot find >> again the quote I should have bookmarked, but in an argument >> for using semiotics on the web, it was said that modern cognitive >> theory has abandoned the self in an effort to depersonalize >> cognition. While this is a valid scientific reason, it doesn't work >> when living breathing humans are concerned. >> >> >> I use computer and mathematical logic semantic. That's the advantage of >> comp. You have computer science. >> >> >> >> >> >> IMHO leaving out [1p ] in such a way will forever prevent >> computer calculations from emulating the mind. >> >> >> The 1p is not left out. Eventually comp singles out eight person points >> of view. If you think comp left out the person, you miss the meaning of the >> comp hope, or the comp fear. >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >> 12/5/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Bruno Marchal >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-12-03, 13:03:12 >> Subject: Re: Semantic vs logical truth >> >> >> >> >> On 03 Dec 2012, at 00:04, meekerdb wrote: >> >> >> On 12/2/2012 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> The 1p truth of the machine is not coded in the machine. Some actual >> machines knows already that, and can justified that If there are machine >> (and from outside we can know this to correct) then the 1p-truth is not >> codable. The 1p truth are more related to the relation between belief and >> reality (not necessarily physical reality, except for observation and >> sensation). >> >> >> Even the simple, and apparently formal Bp & p is NOT codable. >> Most truth about machine, including some that they can know, are not >> codable. >> Many things true about us is not codable either. >> >> Let me see if I understand that. I think you are saying that p, i.e. >> that "p" describes a fact about the world, a meta-level above the coding of >> a machine. >> >> >> No, p is for some statement at the base level, like 1+1 = 2. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> That the Mars Rover believes it is south of it's landing point is >> implicit in its state and might be inferred from its behavior, but there is >> no part of the state corresponding to "I *believe* I am south of my landing >> point." >> >> >> Then Mars Rover is not L?ian. But I am not even sure that Mars Rover is >> Turing universal, or that it exploits its Turing universality. >> >> >> But PA and ZF can represent "I believe". So we can study the logic of a >> new 'knowledge" operator defined (at the meta level, for each arithmetical >> proposition) by Bp & p. For example if p is "1+1=2", it is >> >> >> Believe"("1+1=2") & 1+1 = 2. >> >> >> We cannot define such operator in arithmetic. We would need something >> like Believe"("1+1=2") & True("1+1 = 2"), but True, in general cannot >> defined in arithmetic. Yet, we can metadefine it and study its logic, which >> obeys a soprt of temporal intuionistic logic (interpreting the S4Grz logic >> obtained). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> One could include such second-level states (which one might want to >> communicate to Pasadena) but then that state would be just another >> first-level state. Right? >> >> >> >> Not sure I see what you mean. The meta, available by the machine is in >> the "I believe". It is the 3-I. The presentation of myself to myself. The >> 1-I will be the non definable operator above. We connect the believer to >> the truth. It is easy to do for the sound correct machine. >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Brent >> >> >> >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com> >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >> . >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com> >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >> . >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com> >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >> . >> >> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ > **googlegroups.com <everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** > group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> > . > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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