On 12/29/2012 12:29 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Dec 2012, at 17:34, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

There was also a wise italian philosopher centuries ago who
had a major premiss, namely, that the only way to
fully understand something is to construct it.

OK. That is intuitionism, or constructivism. Proving is constructing, for intuitionist. This is a form of solipsism, because we cannot "construct the other". It is quite related to the 1p. It is also related to the fact that Aristotelism is intuitive and Platonism is counter-intuitive. With comp we keep the "solipsism" for the (our) epistemological 1p view, but we justify it from the 3p or 0p view from outside.

Bruno

Hi Bruno,

I am OK with that! It is intuitionistic because, I conjecture, of the fallibility of finite minds: we can only know what we might be able to understand. ;-) In computational terms, we can see this as how one computation can emulate another. Can I emulate a person that has understanding that I do not have on my own? Yes, but very carefully... I like how you don't think of solipsism as something to be avoided at all costs, but instead see it as a default position. I see knowledge in a similar way but from the opposite direction: as individual entities we come to know truths by a relation between internal construction (the 1p) and the external demonstration (3/0p). This relation is what I am describing as a bisimulation! I have adapted the equivalence relation of bisimulation (taken from computer science) and use it as a transformational relation that is the equivalence in some limit. This comes from my philosophical assumption that Becoming is fundamental. Have you had a chance to read any of the material on process philosophy?

--
Onward!

Stephen


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