Hi Bruno Marchal I seem to have been using words sloppily. You can't get away with that with a mathematician :-)
Let me try again. The phenomenol is what "appears" to be out there. And yes, the experience of it is internal. And you said: "I am OK with this, but no need of a black post in comp. We need "just" to relate God-arithmetical-truth, and the machine beliefs. (Bp & p). That works!" I was thinking of Secondness as that black box. With Firstness as the input signal and Thirdness as the output signal. Then you have a typical linear system (if that's the right word). I was suggesting that the box be the convolution function, as in systems theory. [Roger Clough], [[email protected]] 1/16/2013 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-16, 11:02:52 Subject: Re: MWI as an ontological error, it should be TwoAspects Theory On 16 Jan 2013, at 13:24, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Bruno Marchal > > The senses convert the phenomenol space-time "world out there" I don't grasp how something phenomenal can be "out there". > into nonphysical perceived entities which are stored > internally as memories. > > A memory is experienced internally, so no space-time. Space-time is also experienced internally. All experience are "internal". > > Then one might say that 1p is the black box that converts > MY view of the physical into its corresponding > personal nonphysical state. I am OK with this, but no need of a black post in comp. We need "just" to relate God-arithmetical-truth, and the machine beliefs. (Bp & p). That works! Bruno > > > [Roger Clough], [[email protected]] > 1/16/2013 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2013-01-15, 08:47:49 > Subject: Re: MWI as an ontological error, it should be TwoAspects > Theory > > > > > On 13 Jan 2013, at 20:05, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > On Sunday, January 13, 2013 11:57:48 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 12 Jan 2013, at 13:01, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > Hi Roger, > > > How can you have a wave without some notion of spatial/temporal > dimensions? > > > > > I don't see why we cannot have purely mathematical waves (easily > related to lines and circles), > > Lines and circles are spatial geometries. > > > > They can, but usually I take them as deeper than geometry, but then > "geometry" is a word having many interpretation too. > > > > > > > and physical waves, like water wave or tsunami, or sound waves. > A propagating wave is a sort of oscillation contagious to its > neighborhood. > > All of those are spatio-temporal sensory experiences and presences. > > > I don't think that an experience can be spatio-temporal. With comp I > argued that space-time emerges from coherence conditions on "deep > dreams/computations". > It looks like you are working in a theory which assume some > primitive space time. > > > > > > > A purely mathematical wave which is independent of all spatial or > temporal representation can only be a figurative wave. If you have > concretely real substances in 'space' or concretely real experiences > in 'time' then you can have a figurative language which refers to > the wavy qualities which we infer through sense as being correlated > on either side of the public-private range of presentation. This > wavy-ness is an idea, a metaphorical figure which we use to re- > present the commonality which we understand internally but as an > exteriorized, generic symbol. > > > > As you know, with comp, it is the "concrete real substance" which > belong to the (quite useful locally) metaphors. > > > > > > Once we have formalized this synthetic wave figure quantitatively, > we can do all kinds of incredible things with it, just as a painter > uses a certain kind of brushstroke. But the strokeness isn't a thing > itself - it has no power to do anything by itself, it is pure > fiction (albeit fiction which is informative about sense on all > levels of realism, but only from the fictional 3p voyeur perspective). > > > > That is coherent with non-comp, indeed. But I have no faith in > substances. > > > Bruno > > > > > > Craig > > > > > Summing waves gives arbitrary functions (in some functional spaces), > so simple wave can be see as the base in the space of "arbitrary" > functions (for reasonable functional spaces, there are any natural > restrictions here). > > > The whole problem with QM, is that the wave's physical > interpretation is an amplitude of probability, and that we can make > them interfere as if they were physical. But in MWI, the quantum > waves are just the map of the relative accessible physical > realities. An electronic orbital is a map of where you can find an > electron, for an example. > I would say it is something physical (even if it emerges from the > non physical relations between numbers). > > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Jan 12, 2013 at 12:52 PM, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi everything-list, > > I don't believe that Descartes would accept the MWI. > Here's why: > > I think that the ManyWorldsInterpretation of QM is incorrect, > due to the mistaken notion (IMHO) that quantum waves > are physical waves, so that everything is physical and materialistic. > > This seems to deny "quantum weirdness" observed > in the two-slit experiment. Seemingly if both the wave > and the photon are physical, there should be nothing weird > happening. > > My own view is that the weirdness arises because the > waves and the photons are residents of two completely > different but interpenetrating worlds, where: > > 1) the photon is a resident of the physical world, > where by physical I mean (along with Descartes) > "extended in space", > > 2) the quantum wave in nonphysical, being a resident of > the nonphysical world (the world of mind), which has no > extension in space. > > Under these conditions, there is no need > to create an additional physical world, since each > can exist as aspects of the the same world, > one moving in spactime and being physical, the other, like > mind, moving simulataneously in the nonphysical world > beyond spacetime. > > [Roger Clough], [[email protected]] > 1/12/2013 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/lHOj0lxxoIkJ > . > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected] > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected] > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
