How can be " *PHYSICAL*" - *'physical'*? (and please, don't tell "because we THINK so")
John M On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 4:44 PM, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]>wrote: > > > > On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 3:07 PM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>wrote: > >> >> >> On Saturday, February 2, 2013 6:05:53 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: >>> >>> Hi Roger, >>> >>> I don't really understand how people can object to the idea of >>> physical/mechanical intelligence now that we live in a world where we're >>> surrounded by it. Google searches, computers that can beat the best human >>> chess player, autonomous rovers in Mars, face recognition, automatic stock >>> traders that are better at it than any human being and so on and so on. >>> >> >> When you don't understand what you are doing, it it easy to do it very >> fast. This writer gives a good explanation: >> http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/why-minds-are-not-like-computers >> > > Many AI algorithms are intrinsically slow. Most of the examples I've given > are made possible by parallelising large amounts of computers. They will > never understand in the sense you mean unless they have a 1p, but I don't > see how that relates to speed or how speed is relevante here. > > Also I'm not claiming that intelligence == mind. > > >> >>> Every time AI comes up with something that only humans could do, people >>> say "oh right, but that's not intelligence - I bet computer will never be >>> able to do X". And then they do. And then people say the same thing. It's >>> just a bias we have, a need to feel special. >>> >> >> Have you considered that it is a bias you have, to make you feel special, >> to be able to say that you are above their bias? >> > > I have and it might be true. > > >> >> >>> >>> WIth all due respect to Leibniz, he didn't know computer science. >>> >> >> An argument can be made that Leibniz is the inventor of computer science, >> particularly AI. http://history-computer.com/Dreamers/Leibniz.html >> > > I honestly had no idea and I'm impressed (and ashamed for not knowing). > > >> >> >> Craig >> >> >>> >>> On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 10:02 AM, Roger Clough <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> Hi [email protected] and Craig, and all, >>>> >>>> How can intelligence be physical ? How can meaning be physical ? >>>> How can thinking be physical ? How can knowing be physical ? >>>> How can life or consciousness or free will be physical ? >>>> >>>> IMHO You need to consider what is really going on: >>>> >>>> http://plato.stanford.edu/**entries/leibniz-mind/<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/> >>>> >>>> One is obliged to admit that *perception* and what depends upon it is >>>> *inexplicable >>>> on mechanical principles*, that is, by figures and motions. In >>>> imagining that there is a machine whose construction would enable it to >>>> think, to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive it enlarged >>>> while retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter into it, just >>>> like into a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting within it, >>>> find only parts pushing one another, and never anything by which to explain >>>> a perception. Thus it is in the simple substance, and not in the composite >>>> or in the machine, that one must look for perception. >>>> >>>> Leibniz's argument seems to be this: the visitor of the machine, upon >>>> entering it, would observe nothing but the properties of the parts, and the >>>> relations they bear to one another. But no explanation of perception, or >>>> consciousness, can possibly be deduced from this conglomerate. No matter >>>> how complex the inner workings of this machine, nothing about them reveals >>>> that what is being observed are the inner workings of a conscious being. >>>> Hence, materialism must be false, for there is no possible way that the >>>> purely mechanical principles of materialism can account for the phenomena >>>> of consciousness. >>>> >>>> In other writings, Leibniz suggests exactly what characteristic it is >>>> of perception and consciousness that the mechanical principles of >>>> materialism cannot account for. The following passages, the first from the >>>> *New System of Nature* (1695), the second from the *Reply to Bayle*(1702), >>>> are revealing in this regard: >>>> >>>> Furthermore, by means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which >>>> corresponds to what is called the *I* in us; such a thing could not >>>> occur in artificial machines, nor in the simple mass of matter, however >>>> organized it may be. >>>> >>>> But in addition to the general principles which establish the monads of >>>> which compound things are merely the results, internal experience refutes >>>> the Epicurean [i.e. materialist] doctrine. This experience is the >>>> consciousness which is in us of this *I* which apperceives things >>>> which occur in the body. This perception cannot be explained by figures and >>>> movements. >>>> >>>> Leibniz's point is that whatever is the subject of perception and >>>> consciousness must be truly one, a single “I” properly regarded as *one >>>> * conscious being. An aggregate of matter is not truly one and so >>>> cannot be regarded as a single *I*, capable of being the subject of a >>>> unified mental life. This interpretation fits nicely with Lebniz's >>>> oft-repeated definition of perception as “the representation in the simple >>>> of the compound, or of that which is outside” (*Principles of Nature >>>> and Grace,* sec.2 (1714)). More explicitly, in a letter to Antoine >>>> Arnauld of 9 October 1687, Leibniz wrote that “in natural perception and >>>> sensation, it is enough for what is divisible and material and dispersed >>>> into many entities to be expressed or represented in a single indivisible >>>> entity or in a substance which is endowed with genuine unity.” If >>>> perception (and hence, consciousness) essentially involves a representation >>>> of a variety of content in a simple, indivisible “I,” then we may construct >>>> Leibniz's argument against materialism as follows: Materialism holds that >>>> matter can explain (is identical with, can give rise to) perception. A >>>> perception is a state whereby a variety of content is represented in a true >>>> unity. Thus, whatever is not a true unity cannot give rise to perception. >>>> Whatever is divisible is not a true unity. Matter is infinitely divisible. >>>> Hence, matter cannot form a true unity. Hence, matter cannot explain (be >>>> identical with, give rise to) perception. If matter cannot explain (be >>>> identical to, give rise to) perception, then materialism is false. Hence, >>>> materialism is false. >>>> >>>> Leibniz rejected materialism on the grounds that it could not, in >>>> principle, ever capture the “true unity” of perceptual consciousness, that >>>> characteristic of the self which can simultaneously unify a manifoldness of >>>> perceptual content. If this is Leibniz's argument, it is of some historical >>>> interest that it bears striking resemblances to contemporary objections to >>>> certain materialist theories of mind. Many contemporary philosophers have >>>> objected to some versions of materialism on the basis of thought >>>> experiments like Leibniz's: experiments designed to show that qualia and >>>> consciousness are bound to elude certain materialist conceptions of the >>>> mind (cf. Searle 1980; Nagel 1974; McGinn 1989; Jackson 1982). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>>> *From:* [email protected] >>>> *Receiver:* Everything List >>>> *Time:* 2013-02-02, 01:39:35 >>>> *Subject:* Re: Science is a religion by itself. >>>> >>>> On Feb 1, 7:51爌m, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> > On Friday, February 1, 2013 12:26:43 PM UTC-5, rclough wrote: >>>> > >>>> > > 燞i [email protected] <javascript:> >>>> > >>>> > > Feynman was wrong. 燣ife isn't physics, >>>> > > it's intelligence or consciousness, free will. >>>> > >>>> > If we understand that physics is actually experience, then life, >>>> > intelligence, consciousness, free will, qualia, etc are all physics. >>>> How >>>> > could it really be otherwise? >>>> > >>>> > Craig >>>> ====== >>>> >>>> In the name of reason and common sense: >>>> How could it really be otherwise? >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.** >>>> com. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>>> group/everything-list?hl=en.<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.> >>>> For more options, visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out.<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.> >>>> >>>> >>>> ______________________________**______________ >>>> *DreamMail* - New experience in email software www.dreammail.org >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-li...@**googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. >>>> >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>>> . >>>> For more options, visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >>>> . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
