Here is another one about intelligence:
My definition goes back to the original Latin words: to *READ* *between *-
lines, or words that is. To understand (reflect?) on the unspoken. A reason
why I am not enthusiastic about AI - a machine (not Lob's universal
computer) does not overstep the combinations of the added limitations.
Intelligence is anticipatory.
JohnM

On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 11:56 AM, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote:

> How can be " *PHYSICAL*" - *'physical'*?
> (and please, don't tell "because we THINK so")
>
> John M
>
>  On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 4:44 PM, Telmo Menezes <te...@telmomenezes.com>wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 3:07 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, February 2, 2013 6:05:53 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Hi Roger,
>>>>
>>>> I don't really understand how people can object to the idea of
>>>> physical/mechanical intelligence now that we live in a world where we're
>>>> surrounded by it. Google searches, computers that can beat the best human
>>>> chess player, autonomous rovers in Mars, face recognition, automatic stock
>>>> traders that are better at it than any human being and so on and so on.
>>>>
>>>
>>> When you don't understand what you are doing, it it easy to do it very
>>> fast. This writer gives a good explanation:
>>> http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/why-minds-are-not-like-computers
>>>
>>
>> Many AI algorithms are intrinsically slow. Most of the examples I've
>> given are made possible by parallelising large amounts of computers. They
>> will never understand in the sense you mean unless they have a 1p, but I
>> don't see how that relates to speed or how speed is relevante here.
>>
>> Also I'm not claiming that intelligence == mind.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>> Every time AI comes up with something that only humans could do, people
>>>> say "oh right, but that's not intelligence - I bet computer will never be
>>>> able to do X". And then they do. And then people say the same thing. It's
>>>> just a bias we have, a need to feel special.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Have you considered that it is a bias you have, to make you feel
>>> special, to be able to say that you are above their bias?
>>>
>>
>> I have and it might be true.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> WIth all due respect to Leibniz, he didn't know computer science.
>>>>
>>>
>>> An argument can be made that Leibniz is the inventor of computer
>>> science, particularly AI.
>>> http://history-computer.com/Dreamers/Leibniz.html
>>>
>>
>> I honestly had no idea and I'm impressed (and ashamed for not knowing).
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Craig
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 10:02 AM, Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net>wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>  Hi socr...@bezeqint.net and Craig, and all,
>>>>>
>>>>> How can intelligence  be physical ? How can meaning be physical ?
>>>>> How can thinking be physical ? How can knowing be physical ?
>>>>> How can life or consciousness or free will be physical ?
>>>>>
>>>>> IMHO You need to consider what is really going on:
>>>>>
>>>>> http://plato.stanford.edu/**entries/leibniz-mind/<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/>
>>>>>
>>>>> One is obliged to admit that *perception* and what depends upon it is
>>>>> *inexplicable on mechanical principles*, that is, by figures and
>>>>> motions. In imagining that there is a machine whose construction would
>>>>> enable it to think, to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive 
>>>>> it
>>>>> enlarged while retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter 
>>>>> into
>>>>> it, just like into a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting
>>>>> within it, find only parts pushing one another, and never anything by 
>>>>> which
>>>>> to explain a perception. Thus it is in the simple substance, and not in 
>>>>> the
>>>>> composite or in the machine, that one must look for perception.
>>>>>
>>>>> Leibniz's argument seems to be this: the visitor of the machine, upon
>>>>> entering it, would observe nothing but the properties of the parts, and 
>>>>> the
>>>>> relations they bear to one another. But no explanation of perception, or
>>>>> consciousness, can possibly be deduced from this conglomerate. No matter
>>>>> how complex the inner workings of this machine, nothing about them reveals
>>>>> that what is being observed are the inner workings of a conscious being.
>>>>> Hence, materialism must be false, for there is no possible way that the
>>>>> purely mechanical principles of materialism can account for the phenomena
>>>>> of consciousness.
>>>>>
>>>>> In other writings, Leibniz suggests exactly what characteristic it is
>>>>> of perception and consciousness that the mechanical principles of
>>>>> materialism cannot account for. The following passages, the first from the
>>>>> *New System of Nature* (1695), the second from the *Reply to 
>>>>> Bayle*(1702), are revealing in this regard:
>>>>>
>>>>> Furthermore, by means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which
>>>>> corresponds to what is called the *I* in us; such a thing could not
>>>>> occur in artificial machines, nor in the simple mass of matter, however
>>>>> organized it may be.
>>>>>
>>>>> But in addition to the general principles which establish the monads
>>>>> of which compound things are merely the results, internal experience
>>>>> refutes the Epicurean [i.e. materialist] doctrine. This experience is the
>>>>> consciousness which is in us of this *I* which apperceives things
>>>>> which occur in the body. This perception cannot be explained by figures 
>>>>> and
>>>>> movements.
>>>>>
>>>>> Leibniz's point is that whatever is the subject of perception and
>>>>> consciousness must be truly one, a single “I” properly regarded as *
>>>>> one* conscious being. An aggregate of matter is not truly one and so
>>>>> cannot be regarded as a single *I*, capable of being the subject of a
>>>>> unified mental life. This interpretation fits nicely with Lebniz's
>>>>> oft-repeated definition of perception as “the representation in the simple
>>>>> of the compound, or of that which is outside” (*Principles of Nature
>>>>> and Grace,* sec.2 (1714)). More explicitly, in a letter to Antoine
>>>>> Arnauld of 9 October 1687, Leibniz wrote that “in natural perception and
>>>>> sensation, it is enough for what is divisible and material and dispersed
>>>>> into many entities to be expressed or represented in a single indivisible
>>>>> entity or in a substance which is endowed with genuine unity.” If
>>>>> perception (and hence, consciousness) essentially involves a 
>>>>> representation
>>>>> of a variety of content in a simple, indivisible “I,” then we may 
>>>>> construct
>>>>> Leibniz's argument against materialism as follows: Materialism holds that
>>>>> matter can explain (is identical with, can give rise to) perception. A
>>>>> perception is a state whereby a variety of content is represented in a 
>>>>> true
>>>>> unity. Thus, whatever is not a true unity cannot give rise to perception.
>>>>> Whatever is divisible is not a true unity. Matter is infinitely divisible.
>>>>> Hence, matter cannot form a true unity. Hence, matter cannot explain (be
>>>>> identical with, give rise to) perception. If matter cannot explain (be
>>>>> identical to, give rise to) perception, then materialism is false. Hence,
>>>>> materialism is false.
>>>>>
>>>>> Leibniz rejected materialism on the grounds that it could not, in
>>>>> principle, ever capture the “true unity” of perceptual consciousness, that
>>>>> characteristic of the self which can simultaneously unify a manifoldness 
>>>>> of
>>>>> perceptual content. If this is Leibniz's argument, it is of some 
>>>>> historical
>>>>> interest that it bears striking resemblances to contemporary objections to
>>>>> certain materialist theories of mind. Many contemporary philosophers have
>>>>> objected to some versions of materialism on the basis of thought
>>>>> experiments like Leibniz's: experiments designed to show that qualia and
>>>>> consciousness are bound to elude certain materialist conceptions of the
>>>>> mind (cf. Searle 1980; Nagel 1974; McGinn 1989; Jackson 1982).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>>>>> *From:* socra...@bezeqint.net
>>>>> *Receiver:* Everything List
>>>>> *Time:* 2013-02-02, 01:39:35
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: Science is a religion by itself.
>>>>>
>>>>>   On Feb 1, 7:51爌m, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>> > On Friday, February 1, 2013 12:26:43 PM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
>>>>> >
>>>>> > > 燞i socr...@bezeqint.net <javascript:>
>>>>> >
>>>>> > > Feynman was wrong. 燣ife isn't physics,
>>>>> > > it's intelligence or consciousness, free will.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > If we understand that physics is actually experience, then life,
>>>>> > intelligence, consciousness, free will, qualia, etc are all physics.
>>>>> How
>>>>> > could it really be otherwise?
>>>>> >
>>>>> > Craig
>>>>> ======
>>>>>
>>>>> In the name of reason and common sense:
>>>>> How could it really be otherwise?
>>>>>
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