Here is another one about intelligence: My definition goes back to the original Latin words: to *READ* *between *- lines, or words that is. To understand (reflect?) on the unspoken. A reason why I am not enthusiastic about AI - a machine (not Lob's universal computer) does not overstep the combinations of the added limitations. Intelligence is anticipatory. JohnM
On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 11:56 AM, John Mikes <[email protected]> wrote: > How can be " *PHYSICAL*" - *'physical'*? > (and please, don't tell "because we THINK so") > > John M > > On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 4:44 PM, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]>wrote: > >> >> >> >> On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 3:07 PM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, February 2, 2013 6:05:53 AM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Roger, >>>> >>>> I don't really understand how people can object to the idea of >>>> physical/mechanical intelligence now that we live in a world where we're >>>> surrounded by it. Google searches, computers that can beat the best human >>>> chess player, autonomous rovers in Mars, face recognition, automatic stock >>>> traders that are better at it than any human being and so on and so on. >>>> >>> >>> When you don't understand what you are doing, it it easy to do it very >>> fast. This writer gives a good explanation: >>> http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/why-minds-are-not-like-computers >>> >> >> Many AI algorithms are intrinsically slow. Most of the examples I've >> given are made possible by parallelising large amounts of computers. They >> will never understand in the sense you mean unless they have a 1p, but I >> don't see how that relates to speed or how speed is relevante here. >> >> Also I'm not claiming that intelligence == mind. >> >> >>> >>>> Every time AI comes up with something that only humans could do, people >>>> say "oh right, but that's not intelligence - I bet computer will never be >>>> able to do X". And then they do. And then people say the same thing. It's >>>> just a bias we have, a need to feel special. >>>> >>> >>> Have you considered that it is a bias you have, to make you feel >>> special, to be able to say that you are above their bias? >>> >> >> I have and it might be true. >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> WIth all due respect to Leibniz, he didn't know computer science. >>>> >>> >>> An argument can be made that Leibniz is the inventor of computer >>> science, particularly AI. >>> http://history-computer.com/Dreamers/Leibniz.html >>> >> >> I honestly had no idea and I'm impressed (and ashamed for not knowing). >> >> >>> >>> >>> Craig >>> >>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, Feb 2, 2013 at 10:02 AM, Roger Clough <[email protected]>wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi [email protected] and Craig, and all, >>>>> >>>>> How can intelligence be physical ? How can meaning be physical ? >>>>> How can thinking be physical ? How can knowing be physical ? >>>>> How can life or consciousness or free will be physical ? >>>>> >>>>> IMHO You need to consider what is really going on: >>>>> >>>>> http://plato.stanford.edu/**entries/leibniz-mind/<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/> >>>>> >>>>> One is obliged to admit that *perception* and what depends upon it is >>>>> *inexplicable on mechanical principles*, that is, by figures and >>>>> motions. In imagining that there is a machine whose construction would >>>>> enable it to think, to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive >>>>> it >>>>> enlarged while retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter >>>>> into >>>>> it, just like into a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting >>>>> within it, find only parts pushing one another, and never anything by >>>>> which >>>>> to explain a perception. Thus it is in the simple substance, and not in >>>>> the >>>>> composite or in the machine, that one must look for perception. >>>>> >>>>> Leibniz's argument seems to be this: the visitor of the machine, upon >>>>> entering it, would observe nothing but the properties of the parts, and >>>>> the >>>>> relations they bear to one another. But no explanation of perception, or >>>>> consciousness, can possibly be deduced from this conglomerate. No matter >>>>> how complex the inner workings of this machine, nothing about them reveals >>>>> that what is being observed are the inner workings of a conscious being. >>>>> Hence, materialism must be false, for there is no possible way that the >>>>> purely mechanical principles of materialism can account for the phenomena >>>>> of consciousness. >>>>> >>>>> In other writings, Leibniz suggests exactly what characteristic it is >>>>> of perception and consciousness that the mechanical principles of >>>>> materialism cannot account for. The following passages, the first from the >>>>> *New System of Nature* (1695), the second from the *Reply to >>>>> Bayle*(1702), are revealing in this regard: >>>>> >>>>> Furthermore, by means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which >>>>> corresponds to what is called the *I* in us; such a thing could not >>>>> occur in artificial machines, nor in the simple mass of matter, however >>>>> organized it may be. >>>>> >>>>> But in addition to the general principles which establish the monads >>>>> of which compound things are merely the results, internal experience >>>>> refutes the Epicurean [i.e. materialist] doctrine. This experience is the >>>>> consciousness which is in us of this *I* which apperceives things >>>>> which occur in the body. This perception cannot be explained by figures >>>>> and >>>>> movements. >>>>> >>>>> Leibniz's point is that whatever is the subject of perception and >>>>> consciousness must be truly one, a single “I” properly regarded as * >>>>> one* conscious being. An aggregate of matter is not truly one and so >>>>> cannot be regarded as a single *I*, capable of being the subject of a >>>>> unified mental life. This interpretation fits nicely with Lebniz's >>>>> oft-repeated definition of perception as “the representation in the simple >>>>> of the compound, or of that which is outside” (*Principles of Nature >>>>> and Grace,* sec.2 (1714)). More explicitly, in a letter to Antoine >>>>> Arnauld of 9 October 1687, Leibniz wrote that “in natural perception and >>>>> sensation, it is enough for what is divisible and material and dispersed >>>>> into many entities to be expressed or represented in a single indivisible >>>>> entity or in a substance which is endowed with genuine unity.” If >>>>> perception (and hence, consciousness) essentially involves a >>>>> representation >>>>> of a variety of content in a simple, indivisible “I,” then we may >>>>> construct >>>>> Leibniz's argument against materialism as follows: Materialism holds that >>>>> matter can explain (is identical with, can give rise to) perception. A >>>>> perception is a state whereby a variety of content is represented in a >>>>> true >>>>> unity. Thus, whatever is not a true unity cannot give rise to perception. >>>>> Whatever is divisible is not a true unity. Matter is infinitely divisible. >>>>> Hence, matter cannot form a true unity. Hence, matter cannot explain (be >>>>> identical with, give rise to) perception. If matter cannot explain (be >>>>> identical to, give rise to) perception, then materialism is false. Hence, >>>>> materialism is false. >>>>> >>>>> Leibniz rejected materialism on the grounds that it could not, in >>>>> principle, ever capture the “true unity” of perceptual consciousness, that >>>>> characteristic of the self which can simultaneously unify a manifoldness >>>>> of >>>>> perceptual content. If this is Leibniz's argument, it is of some >>>>> historical >>>>> interest that it bears striking resemblances to contemporary objections to >>>>> certain materialist theories of mind. Many contemporary philosophers have >>>>> objected to some versions of materialism on the basis of thought >>>>> experiments like Leibniz's: experiments designed to show that qualia and >>>>> consciousness are bound to elude certain materialist conceptions of the >>>>> mind (cf. Searle 1980; Nagel 1974; McGinn 1989; Jackson 1982). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>>>> *From:* [email protected] >>>>> *Receiver:* Everything List >>>>> *Time:* 2013-02-02, 01:39:35 >>>>> *Subject:* Re: Science is a religion by itself. >>>>> >>>>> On Feb 1, 7:51爌m, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> > On Friday, February 1, 2013 12:26:43 PM UTC-5, rclough wrote: >>>>> > >>>>> > > 燞i [email protected] <javascript:> >>>>> > >>>>> > > Feynman was wrong. 燣ife isn't physics, >>>>> > > it's intelligence or consciousness, free will. >>>>> > >>>>> > If we understand that physics is actually experience, then life, >>>>> > intelligence, consciousness, free will, qualia, etc are all physics. >>>>> How >>>>> > could it really be otherwise? >>>>> > >>>>> > Craig >>>>> ====== >>>>> >>>>> In the name of reason and common sense: >>>>> How could it really be otherwise? >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.** >>>>> com. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>>>> group/everything-list?hl=en.<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.> >>>>> For more options, visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out.<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ______________________________**______________ >>>>> *DreamMail* - New experience in email software www.dreammail.org >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to everything-li...@**googlegroups.com. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. >>>>> >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>>>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>>>> . >>>>> For more options, visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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