On 19 Feb 2013, at 22:27, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/19/2013 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Feb 2013, at 17:29, Richard Ruquist wrote:

On Mon, Feb 18, 2013 at 11:12 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 17 Feb 2013, at 18:09, Jason Resch wrote:

Thanks to everyone who replied to this post. So far Stathis and Bruno both
answered that both cases are equivalent.

Is there anyone willing to argue against either:
1. you don't experience torture when your memory of it is wiped, or
2. you don't experience torture when your perfect duplicate is tortured?



Those are interesting questions, but they ask for thought experiences with amnesia, which can quickly, too much quickly, makes you suspicious that personal identity is an illusion. My experience is that when people begin to
grasp this, they can feel quite uneasy.

A related question, that I ask to you, Jason. Would you accept to sleep in my sleep-laboratory. I pay you 100$ or even more. But I tell you in advance that you will live your worst nightmare. I tell you also that I have the
means to make you, in the morning after, completely forgetting that
nightmare.
Are you OK? Are you OK that your son or daughter makes money in that way?
Can this be legal?

Is it equivalent with this: I duplicate you and torture the copy for one
hour, and then I kill that copy (assuming I can)?
Is this not equivalent with a forgotten dream of torture? Are you OK that
your daughter makes money in that way?

Bruno

There used to be a drug administered for childbirth which would allow the mother-to-be- to experience excruciating pain as evidenced by her behavior during the birthing process yet afterwards she would have no
memory of that pain. Doctors found that acceptable and assumed there
was no lasting trauma.

My opinion is that there is lasting trauma that has to be consciously
re-experienced to be resolved. So one may as well experience
childbirth without drugs to begin with. BTW- off-list topic??


Not really, as here we were touching on the question of personal identity, in relation with memory. Now, your question is very difficult, and my thought on it is that woman should have the choice, and that nobody can coerce on her decision. Comp + Theaetetus would lead to the idea that nobody can solve that problem, and that only individual woman can take the decision. The very basic idea is that no one can think at the place of other one, especially about possible pain.

And can you now make a decision for you in the future - since those are in some degree two different people.

Why?

Not with comp where we agree that the one restored in Moscow and the one restore in Washington are the same person, despite being different with each other.




A forgotten pain has still been a lived pain, and this has to be avoided if possible.

Right. Many things happen that we forget - but that doesn't make them unhappen. In the Restorer story there is the assumption that everything can be put back as it was; but that is nomologically impossible.

With comp it is possible in principle, if only through a backup, given the equivalence explained above.

Bruno




Brent



Bruno

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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