On 09 Apr 2013, at 21:19, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 08.04.2013 11:38 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 07 Apr 2013, at 19:20, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 07.04.2013 19:12 meekerdb said the following:
On 4/6/2013 11:54 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 07.04.2013 02:40 Craig Weinberg said the following:
Ok, here's my modified version of Fig 11
http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/33ost_diagram.jpg
I believe that you have understood the paper wrong. The authors
literally believe that the observed 3D world is geometrically
speaking in the brain.
Yes our 3d model of the world is in our minds (not our brains).
It's not "there" geometrically speaking. Geometry and "there"
are part of the model. Dog bites man.
Well, if you look into the paper, you see that authors take it
literally as in neuroscience mind means brain. Mind belongs to
philosophy.
But mind is different from brain. And mind is part of both cognitive
science and theoretical computer science. To identify mind and brain
is possible in some strong non computationalist theories, but such
theories don't yet exist, and are only speculated about. To confuse
mind and brain, is like confusing literature and ink. Neurophilophers
are usually computationalist and weakly materialist, and so are
basically inconsistent.
I guess, this is a way how science develops. Neuroscientists study
brain and they just take a priori from the materialist and
reductionism paradigm that mind must be in the brain.
Which is close to nonsense. Of course it is also very fuzzy. If you
look in the brain, you see neuron, you don't see mind. Leibniz already
knew this, and the pre-christian mechanist too.
After that, they write papers to bring this idea to the logical
conclusion. To this end, they seem to have two options. Either they
should say that the 3D visual world is illusion (I guess, Dennett
goes this way)
This is unclear. You might give a reference. Dennett seems to take
physicalism for granted.
The problem of many is that they just seem unaware that the mind-body
problem is quite severe in the weak materialist framework.
or put phenomenological consciousness into the brain. Let us see
what happens along this way.
The paper in a way is well written. The only flaw (that actually is
irrelevant to the content of the paper) that I have seen in it, is
THE ENTROPY. Biologists like the entropy so much that they use it in
any occasion. For example from the paper:
“Thus, changes in entropy provide an important window into self-
organization: a sudden increase of entropy just before the
emergence of a new structure, followed by brief period of negative
entropy (or negentropy).”
I have seen that this could be traced to Schrödinger’s What is
Life?, reread his chapter on Order, Disorder and Entropy and made my
comments
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2013/04/schrodinger-disorder-and-entropy.html
Not too much problem with this, but Schroedinger's book is also at the
origin of molecular biology, and is full of interesting insight. His
philosophy of mind is inspired by Hinduism, and in my opinion, it is
less wrong than material reductionism.
Bruno
Evgenii
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
