On Mon, Apr 22, 2013 at 10:42 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 21 Apr 2013, at 18:40, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> On Sun, Apr 21, 2013 at 3:52 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 21 Apr 2013, at 02:14, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> It wasn't a trick question, but it's a valid one when someone invokes >>>> utilitarianism -- a concept that can be dangerous, as History as shown >>>> us a number of times. Science is undoubtfuly useful in providing >>>> plausible theories for how the universe works (provided we understand >>>> a priori assumptions). Also for generating new technologies. It even >>>> helps me in understanding what I am, but only too a degree. The >>>> missing part I don't understand bugs me. I love science too much not >>>> to question it. Because, like you, I loathe religion. >>> >>> >>> >>> Religion is what happens when people put theology out of science. >> >> >> Bruno, I'm still not sure I understand your definition of theology. Is >> it the same as metaphysics? > > > > It will depend on your definition of metaphysics :) > > I would define the theology of a machine, or of a possible person/soul > locally supported by a machine relatively to a (universal) machine by the > set of statements which are true about the machine (and that the machine can > justify or not, believe, or not, observe or not, hope for or not, etc.). > > This is a general definition which is agnostic on many points in debate > between Muslims, and Christians, abramanic believer and atheists, Hinduists > and buddhist, etc. > > It follows Plato's definition of God, as the ultimate truth, or reason why > we are here and now, that we can search (not necessarily something that we > can find or communicate). > > Then it happens that with comp, science has to bactrack to the theology of > Plato, where the physical reality is a product, or projection, or shadow, or > border of something else 'in the comp case: arithmetical truth, and so in > comp arithmetical truth plays the role of God, or the one, or the outer god, > etc. > > You might take a look at my Plotinus paper which suggest a lexicon between > Plotinus and Arithmetic. Plotinus might have appreciated it as Neoplatonism > announces a coming back to Pythagorean ontology. One of the Enneads of > Plotinus, "On Numbers" is a crazily deep analysis of the role of numbers in > theology.
This one? Marchal B., 2007, A Purely Arithmetical, yet Empirically Falsifiable, Interpretation of Plotinus' Theory of Matter > Theology is just the science of "everything", which by definition includes > God and Santa Klaus. A statement saying that such or such God does not exist > is a theological statement. > > It is just my agnosticism which make me use the term in the most general > sense. Then, in the frame of this or that hypothesis, we can get such or > such precisions. I like how you explain it. From a pure "marketing" standpoint, you might avoid a lot of unnecessary intellectual resistance by using a different term. On the other hand, some of your colourful personality would not come through, so who am I to say... > > >>>> There is not scientific evidence whatsoever of this. Nor do I think it >>>> can be. People like António Damásio (my compatriot) and other >>>> neuroscientists confuse a machine's ability to recognise itself with >>>> consciousness. This makes me wonder if some people are zombies. >>> >>> >>> >>> Careful! >>> Some people don't think, but are still conscious, most plausibly. I guess >>> you were joking. >> >> >> I meant the opposite: people who think but are not conscious. I'm >> half-joking. > > > OK (I was half serious) :) > > > > >> >>> You are right about Damásio. he confuses [] p and (([] p & p). >> >> >> Not sure I understand. Doesn't []p => p ? > > > Yes, but only God knows that. > > Precisely (but I will give the detail on FOAR): if B is Gödel's provability > we have that G* proves []p => p, but G does not prove it. You can guess it > as if G prove [] f => f (with f = the propositional constant false, and "=>" > the logical implication), then it would mean that the machine proves ~[] f, > and so the machine would proves its own consistency, contradicting Gödel's > second incompleteness theorem. But G* proves it, and proves that the machine > is correct: []p => p. > > This is capital. It is Gödel's incompleteness which makes provability > obeying the logic of believability, and which gives sense to the Theaetetus' > definition of knowledge for machine. Ok, I need to read more. > > > > > >>>>> I agree on intelligence, but I don't feel less conscious when I'm >>>> >>>> sleepy. Just differently conscious. I'm a bit sleepy right now. >>> >>> >>> >>> That's something amazing with consciousness. It exists in different >>> modes. >>> We are not trained to develop vigilance during sleep, but sleep produces >>> a >>> lot of intriguing altered state of consciousness. >> >> >> Yes, it's so frustrating to not be able to come back with the full >> memories. > > > > For REM dreams and non-REM conscious episode, it is a question of a (lot of) > training, but some plants can help. > For example calea zacatechichi (legal everywhere except in Belgium), I've seen that once mentioned before in the context of lucid dreaming. > or some > coleus plant, or salvia, etc. > For teh salvia experience itself it is more difficult. > The best is to have a > diary, and note the experience quickly after, but usually, you don't recall > a part of the experience. Out there, you can understand why it is better to > not recall it, as it does not make sense hereby: it makes you inconsistent, > a bit like a machine who listen to its own G*. > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
