On Mon, Apr 22, 2013 at 10:42 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> On 21 Apr 2013, at 18:40, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Apr 21, 2013 at 3:52 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 21 Apr 2013, at 02:14, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It wasn't a trick question, but it's a valid one when someone invokes
>>>> utilitarianism -- a concept that can be dangerous, as History as shown
>>>> us a number of times. Science is undoubtfuly useful in providing
>>>> plausible theories for how the universe works (provided we understand
>>>> a priori assumptions). Also for generating new technologies. It even
>>>> helps me in understanding what I am, but only too a degree. The
>>>> missing part I don't understand bugs me. I love science too much not
>>>> to question it. Because, like you, I loathe religion.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Religion is what happens when people put theology out of science.
>>
>>
>> Bruno, I'm still not sure I understand your definition of theology. Is
>> it the same as metaphysics?
>
>
>
> It will depend on your definition of metaphysics :)
>
> I would define the theology of a machine, or of a possible person/soul
> locally supported by a machine relatively to a (universal) machine by the
> set of statements which are true about the machine (and that the machine can
> justify or not, believe, or not, observe or not, hope for or not, etc.).
>
> This is a general definition which is agnostic on many points in debate
> between Muslims, and Christians, abramanic believer and atheists, Hinduists
> and buddhist, etc.
>
> It follows Plato's definition of God, as the ultimate truth, or reason why
> we are here and now, that we can search (not necessarily something that we
> can find or communicate).
>
> Then it happens that with comp, science has to bactrack to the theology of
> Plato, where the physical reality is a product, or projection, or shadow, or
> border of something else 'in the comp case: arithmetical truth, and so in
> comp arithmetical truth plays the role of God, or the one, or the outer god,
> etc.
>
> You might take a look at my Plotinus paper which suggest a lexicon between
> Plotinus and Arithmetic. Plotinus might have appreciated it as Neoplatonism
> announces a coming back to Pythagorean ontology. One of the Enneads of
> Plotinus, "On Numbers" is a crazily deep analysis of the role of numbers  in
> theology.

This one?
Marchal B., 2007, A Purely Arithmetical, yet Empirically Falsifiable,
Interpretation of Plotinus' Theory of Matter

> Theology is just the science of "everything", which by definition includes
> God and Santa Klaus. A statement saying that such or such God does not exist
> is a theological statement.
>
> It is just my agnosticism which make me use the term in the most general
> sense. Then, in the frame of this or that hypothesis, we can get such or
> such precisions.

I like how you explain it. From a pure "marketing" standpoint, you
might avoid a lot of unnecessary intellectual resistance by using a
different term. On the other hand, some of your colourful personality
would not come through, so who am I to say...

>
>
>>>> There is not scientific evidence whatsoever of this. Nor do I think it
>>>> can be. People like António Damásio (my compatriot) and other
>>>> neuroscientists confuse a machine's ability to recognise itself with
>>>> consciousness. This makes me wonder if some people are zombies.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Careful!
>>> Some people don't think, but are still conscious, most plausibly. I guess
>>> you were joking.
>>
>>
>> I meant the opposite: people who think but are not conscious. I'm
>> half-joking.
>
>
> OK (I was half serious) :)
>
>
>
>
>>
>>> You are right about Damásio. he confuses [] p and (([] p  &  p).
>>
>>
>> Not sure I understand. Doesn't []p => p ?
>
>
> Yes, but only God knows that.
>
> Precisely (but I will give the detail on FOAR): if B is Gödel's provability
> we have that G* proves []p => p, but G does not prove it. You can guess it
> as if G prove [] f => f (with f = the propositional constant false, and "=>"
> the logical implication), then it would mean that the machine proves ~[] f,
> and so the machine would proves its own consistency, contradicting Gödel's
> second incompleteness theorem. But G* proves it, and proves that the machine
> is correct: []p => p.
>
> This is capital. It is Gödel's incompleteness which makes provability
> obeying the logic of believability, and which gives sense to the Theaetetus'
> definition of knowledge for machine.

Ok, I need to read more.

>
>
>
>
>
>>>>> I agree on intelligence, but I don't feel less conscious when I'm
>>>>
>>>> sleepy. Just differently conscious. I'm a bit sleepy right now.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That's something amazing with consciousness. It exists in different
>>> modes.
>>> We are not trained to develop vigilance during sleep, but sleep produces
>>> a
>>> lot of intriguing altered state of consciousness.
>>
>>
>> Yes, it's so frustrating to not be able to come back with the full
>> memories.
>
>
>
> For REM dreams and non-REM conscious episode, it is a question of a (lot of)
> training, but some plants can help.
> For example calea zacatechichi (legal everywhere except in Belgium),

I've seen that once mentioned before in the context of lucid dreaming.

> or some
> coleus plant, or salvia, etc.
> For teh salvia experience itself it is more difficult.
> The best is to have a
> diary, and note the experience quickly after, but usually, you don't recall
> a part of the experience. Out there, you can understand why it is better to
> not recall it, as it does not make sense hereby: it makes you inconsistent,
> a bit like a machine who listen to its own G*.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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