How about Tao? JM On Sun, Jun 2, 2013 at 9:11 AM, Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I have to respond that in Judaism in the high holiday service there is a > prayer praising doubt. > I think that may be unique to Judaism? > Richard > > > On Sun, Jun 2, 2013 at 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> >> >> Russell wrote: >> *"...When it comes to Bp & p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can >> see it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, >> as opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge. >> * >> >> >> I can see your point, at least for arithmetic, but I am not sure that >> distinction is interesting, at least for awhile. In both case we assert >> some proposition, that we cannot prove. Then with some luck it can be true. >> >> >> >> * But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific knowledge, >> which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof. >> * >> >> >> But the Löbian point is that "proof", even when correct, are falsifiable. >> Why, because we might dream, even of a falsification. >> >> On 01 Jun 2013, at 21:41, John Mikes wrote: >> >> * And that's about where I left it - years ago.* >> *..."* >> Interesting difference between 'scientific' and 'mathematical' >> (see the Nobel Prize distinction) >> >> >> That's one was contingent. >> Nobel was cocufied by a mathematician who would have deserved the price >> (Mittag Leffler I think). Hmm.. Wiki says it is a legend, and may be it is >> just the contingent current Aristotelianism. Some people believe that math >> is not a science, like David Deutsch. That makes no sense for me. Like >> Gauss I think math is the queen of science, and arithmetic is the queen of >> math ... >> >> >> >> - also in falsifiability, that does not automatically escape the agnostic >> questioning about the circumstances of the falsifying and the original >> images. >> >> >> Excellent point. >> >> >> >> Same difficulty as in judging "proof". >> >> >> Formal, first order proof can be verified "mechanically", but they still >> does not necessarily entail truth, as the premises might be inconsistent or >> incorrect. >> >> >> >> "Scientific knowledge" indeed is part of a belief system. In conventional >> sciences we THINK we know, >> >> >> Only the pseudo-religious or pseudo-scientist people think they know. >> >> >> >> in math we assume >> (apologies, Bruno). >> >> >> >> ? >> On the contrary I agree. I thought I insisted a lot on this. Except for >> the non scientific personal (not 3p) consciousness it is always assumption, >> that is why I say that I assume that 0 is a number, that 0 ≠ s(x) for all >> x, etc. >> >> In science there is only assumption. We never know-for-certain anything >> that we could transmit publicly. >> >> Science is born from doubt, lives in doubt and can only augment the >> doubts. >> >> In the ideal world of the correct machines, *all* certainties are madness. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> * >> * >> On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 6:43 PM, Russell Standish >> <li...@hpcoders.com.au>wrote: >> >>> On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: >>> > You mean unprovable? I get confused because it seems that you >>> > sometimes use Bp to mean "proves p" and sometimes "believes p" >>> > >>> >>> To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing. I believe in >>> this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I don't >>> believe it - it is merely a conjecture. >>> >>> In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly >>> belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief - >>> whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a >>> Christian's notion is another matter entirely. >>> >>> When it comes to Bp & p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see >>> it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as >>> opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge. >>> >>> But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific >>> knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof. >>> >>> And that's about where I left it - years ago. >>> >>> Cheers >>> >>> -- >>> >>> >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) >>> Principal, High Performance Coders >>> Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au >>> University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au >>> >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.