How about Tao? JM On Sun, Jun 2, 2013 at 9:11 AM, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> wrote:
> I have to respond that in Judaism in the high holiday service there is a > prayer praising doubt. > I think that may be unique to Judaism? > Richard > > > On Sun, Jun 2, 2013 at 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> >> Russell wrote: >> *"...When it comes to Bp & p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can >> see it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, >> as opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge. >> * >> >> >> I can see your point, at least for arithmetic, but I am not sure that >> distinction is interesting, at least for awhile. In both case we assert >> some proposition, that we cannot prove. Then with some luck it can be true. >> >> >> >> * But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific knowledge, >> which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof. >> * >> >> >> But the Löbian point is that "proof", even when correct, are falsifiable. >> Why, because we might dream, even of a falsification. >> >> On 01 Jun 2013, at 21:41, John Mikes wrote: >> >> * And that's about where I left it - years ago.* >> *..."* >> Interesting difference between 'scientific' and 'mathematical' >> (see the Nobel Prize distinction) >> >> >> That's one was contingent. >> Nobel was cocufied by a mathematician who would have deserved the price >> (Mittag Leffler I think). Hmm.. Wiki says it is a legend, and may be it is >> just the contingent current Aristotelianism. Some people believe that math >> is not a science, like David Deutsch. That makes no sense for me. Like >> Gauss I think math is the queen of science, and arithmetic is the queen of >> math ... >> >> >> >> - also in falsifiability, that does not automatically escape the agnostic >> questioning about the circumstances of the falsifying and the original >> images. >> >> >> Excellent point. >> >> >> >> Same difficulty as in judging "proof". >> >> >> Formal, first order proof can be verified "mechanically", but they still >> does not necessarily entail truth, as the premises might be inconsistent or >> incorrect. >> >> >> >> "Scientific knowledge" indeed is part of a belief system. In conventional >> sciences we THINK we know, >> >> >> Only the pseudo-religious or pseudo-scientist people think they know. >> >> >> >> in math we assume >> (apologies, Bruno). >> >> >> >> ? >> On the contrary I agree. I thought I insisted a lot on this. Except for >> the non scientific personal (not 3p) consciousness it is always assumption, >> that is why I say that I assume that 0 is a number, that 0 ≠ s(x) for all >> x, etc. >> >> In science there is only assumption. We never know-for-certain anything >> that we could transmit publicly. >> >> Science is born from doubt, lives in doubt and can only augment the >> doubts. >> >> In the ideal world of the correct machines, *all* certainties are madness. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> * >> * >> On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 6:43 PM, Russell Standish >> <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: >>> > You mean unprovable? I get confused because it seems that you >>> > sometimes use Bp to mean "proves p" and sometimes "believes p" >>> > >>> >>> To a mathematician, belief and proof are the same thing. I believe in >>> this theorem because I can prove it. If I can't prove it, then I don't >>> believe it - it is merely a conjecture. >>> >>> In modal logic, the operator B captures both proof and supposedly >>> belief. Obviously it captures a mathematician's notion of belief - >>> whether that extends to a scientists notion of belief, or a >>> Christian's notion is another matter entirely. >>> >>> When it comes to Bp & p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see >>> it captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as >>> opposed to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge. >>> >>> But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific >>> knowledge, which has more to do with falsifiability, than with proof. >>> >>> And that's about where I left it - years ago. >>> >>> Cheers >>> >>> -- >>> >>> >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) >>> Principal, High Performance Coders >>> Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] >>> University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au >>> >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
