Craig, I've been trying to stay focused studying the past few days (medical exam D: ), but now im procrastinating....
So which of the following are you advancing No implementation of rules could ever perfectly exemplify (or at least to such a degree that no human could every tell it was a mere implementation of rules and not "the real thing") the behavior of: 1) an electron 2) an atom 3) a molecule 4) a macro-molecule 5) an organelle 6) a cell 7) a sponge 8) a nematode 9) a fruit fly 10) a frog 11) a dog 12) a rhesus macaque 13) a human ? On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 11:41 PM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>wrote: > > > On Monday, September 9, 2013 11:39:31 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: >> >> (Resending complete email - trying to do this on a phone.) >> >> On Tuesday, September 10, 2013, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, September 5, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> My position would suggest that the more mechanistic the conditions of >>>> the test, the more it stacks the test in favor of not being able to tell >>>> the difference. If you want to fool someone into thinking an AI is alive, >>>> get a small group of people who lean toward aspberger's traits and show >>>> them short, unrelated examples in a highly controlled context. >>>> >>> >>> You accept, of course, that people with Aspbergers have feelings even >>> though they don't express them like everyone else? >>> >> > Certainly. I was using the idea of selecting for Aspberger traits as a way > of stacking the deck toward a result that de-emphasizes emotional > discernment of others behavior. > > >> >>> >>>> If you want to really bring out the differences between the two, use a >>>> diverse audience and have them interact freely for a long time in many >>>> different contexts, often without oversight. What you are looking for is >>>> aesthetic cues that may not even be able to be named - intuitions of >>>> something about the AI being off or untrustworthy, continuity gaps, >>>> non-fluidity, etc. It's sort of like taking a video screen out into the >>>> sunlight. You get a better view of what it isn't when you can see more of >>>> what it is. >>>> >>> >> It sounds like you're proposing a variant of the Turing Test. What would >> you say if the diverse audience decided the AI probably had feelings, or >> probably had feelings but different to most people's, like the Aspergers >> case? >> > > Between the two tests, I'm showing the opposite of what is typically > intended by the Turing Test. I am proposing a way to test the extent to > which any given Turing-type test reflects the bias of the interpreter > rather than any intrinsic quality of the target of the test. > > It's hard to say for sure that a positive outcome for the test has any > meaning. It's mainly to prove a negative. Maybe only one person out of ten > million can pick up on the subtle cues that give away the simulation, and > maybe they are too shy to speak up in public. Maybe only dogs can tell its > not a person. My hunch though is that this is academic. I expect that > simulations will always be pretty easy to figure out given enough time and > diversity of audience and interaction. If at some point in time that is no > longer the case, the ability to tell the difference will probably be > available as an app for our own augmented human systems. > > Craig > > >> >>> -- >>> Stathis Papaioannou >>> >> >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/jDy5twbibkQ/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
