Craig, I've been trying to stay focused studying the past few days (medical exam D: ), but now im procrastinating....
So which of the following are you advancing No implementation of rules could ever perfectly exemplify (or at least to such a degree that no human could every tell it was a mere implementation of rules and not "the real thing") the behavior of: 1) an electron 2) an atom 3) a molecule 4) a macro-molecule 5) an organelle 6) a cell 7) a sponge 8) a nematode 9) a fruit fly 10) a frog 11) a dog 12) a rhesus macaque 13) a human ? On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 11:41 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote: > > > On Monday, September 9, 2013 11:39:31 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: >> >> (Resending complete email - trying to do this on a phone.) >> >> On Tuesday, September 10, 2013, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, September 5, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> My position would suggest that the more mechanistic the conditions of >>>> the test, the more it stacks the test in favor of not being able to tell >>>> the difference. If you want to fool someone into thinking an AI is alive, >>>> get a small group of people who lean toward aspberger's traits and show >>>> them short, unrelated examples in a highly controlled context. >>>> >>> >>> You accept, of course, that people with Aspbergers have feelings even >>> though they don't express them like everyone else? >>> >> > Certainly. I was using the idea of selecting for Aspberger traits as a way > of stacking the deck toward a result that de-emphasizes emotional > discernment of others behavior. > > >> >>> >>>> If you want to really bring out the differences between the two, use a >>>> diverse audience and have them interact freely for a long time in many >>>> different contexts, often without oversight. What you are looking for is >>>> aesthetic cues that may not even be able to be named - intuitions of >>>> something about the AI being off or untrustworthy, continuity gaps, >>>> non-fluidity, etc. It's sort of like taking a video screen out into the >>>> sunlight. You get a better view of what it isn't when you can see more of >>>> what it is. >>>> >>> >> It sounds like you're proposing a variant of the Turing Test. What would >> you say if the diverse audience decided the AI probably had feelings, or >> probably had feelings but different to most people's, like the Aspergers >> case? >> > > Between the two tests, I'm showing the opposite of what is typically > intended by the Turing Test. I am proposing a way to test the extent to > which any given Turing-type test reflects the bias of the interpreter > rather than any intrinsic quality of the target of the test. > > It's hard to say for sure that a positive outcome for the test has any > meaning. It's mainly to prove a negative. Maybe only one person out of ten > million can pick up on the subtle cues that give away the simulation, and > maybe they are too shy to speak up in public. Maybe only dogs can tell its > not a person. My hunch though is that this is academic. I expect that > simulations will always be pretty easy to figure out given enough time and > diversity of audience and interaction. If at some point in time that is no > longer the case, the ability to tell the difference will probably be > available as an app for our own augmented human systems. > > Craig > > >> >>> -- >>> Stathis Papaioannou >>> >> >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/jDy5twbibkQ/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
