> > Rules don't produce anything, just as triangles or steps don't produce > anything
What about something like Conway's Game of Life? Why is it wrong to see the behavior of the game as produced by the rules of the game and initial conditions? To ask what my evidence is is the same as asking what evidence I have that > this emoticon... So are you or are you not making a predictive statement about what can be done using a system of rules? What exactly is it you are saying cannot be done? (Not what cannot be *explained*, but what cannot be done). What are the practical implications? On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 1:20 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote: > > > On Wednesday, September 4, 2013 1:46:14 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote: >> >> Determinism is a logical justification of cause and effect or else it is >>> meaningless... >> >> >> Sure, whatever, I was speaking colloquially, I wasn't using it in a >> technical fashion. >> >> Nobody, including you can see how a set of rules could lead to desire >> >> >> mmhmm, what's your evidence of this? This seems to be an empirical >> statement and arguing seems to be going nowhere. How are you determining if >> a given set of rules exhibits desires? That is, supposing (although >> apparently it is impossible [can you see my eyes rolling?]) someone dropped >> the rules on your lap that produce desire, how would you tell? Are there >> sets of rules that do not produce desire that you are likely to confuse as >> exhibiting desire? Would you deny or accept the claim, "No matter what >> behavior the rules produce, since the behavior emanates from rules, it >> cannot be desire"? And essentially, what would convince you your thesis is >> wrong? >> > > Rules don't produce anything, just as triangles or steps don't produce > anything. They are abstractions we use to analyze experiences after the > fact. To ask what my evidence is is the same as asking what evidence I have > that this emoticon ;) is not actually happy. The evidence is in our shared > understanding (as is all evidence). What would convince you that your > thesis is wrong? > > >> >> Even if that wasn't a misrepresentation of my position, it isn't even a >>> good Straw Man. >> >> >> me: ...therefore there can be no such rules [that could lead something >> that has experiences that seem to have irreducible qualities]. I didn't >> claim that that you thought there were no rules period. >> > > Sorry, I see what you mean. It was more of the same claim twice. Since I > don't believe X can exist, I also don't believe that X can exist (at all). > My view is that since I understand why X doesn't yield Y, I'm not swayed by > the counter argument 'maybe you don't understand X as much as you > think'...which leads us back to 'maybe you don't understand my > understanding as much as you want me to think'... > > Thanks, > Craig > > >> >> >> >> >> On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 7:18 AM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 11:36:29 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote: >>>> >>>> 1) rationality (logic) in this case is to mean founded on justified >>>> principles. This is inherently a normative judgment. the principles that >>>> govern a deterministic system needn't appeal to our psychology as >>>> justified, >>>> >>> >>> Determinism is a logical justification of cause and effect or else it is >>> meaningless. No particular determination need be justified by our >>> expectations, but determinism in general is an expectation of a logic of >>> causality - an airtight logic of perfect correspondence. Rationality is >>> more of a broad term which I would not apply to determinism in the strict >>> sense of a deterministic cosmology. Rationality implies more tolerance of >>> humanistic dimensions like free will. A person can freely choose to act >>> rationally or irrationally, but in a deterministic universe, the logic >>> would be that a person always acts to complete effects set into motion by >>> prior cause. Logic is scripted and automated. Rationality can be >>> responsive. You're welcome to use words in whatever way you like, but I >>> don't want to dwell on word definitions. If by introducing rationality as a >>> logic equivalence you mean to soften determinism, then I think we should >>> stick to the word logic, since the determinism that I argue against has a >>> zero tolerance for soft reasoning. Determinism is a closed shop of locked >>> steps with all novelty being a pseudo-novelty derived from recombination. >>> >>> >>>> this is what i mean by determined doesn't mean logical. none of my >>>> desires seem to me logically justified, but that doesnt imply they are not >>>> deterministic. >>>> >>> >>> The fact that you have desires at all does not make sense in a >>> deterministic universe. It gets confusing if you pull examples from real >>> life. If we are going to talk about the fantasy world of determinism, we >>> should refer only to those things which we can justify as being logically >>> deterministic. >>> >>> >>>> 2) your thesis is essentially, "i cant see how a set of rules could >>>> lead to to desire, >>> >>> >>> No, my thesis is not that I can't see something, it is that I can see >>> something that others may not. Nobody, including you can see how a set of >>> rules could lead to desire. My thesis is that fact, along with many others, >>> suggests that 'rules' are an abstraction which are fictional and derived >>> from experience, whereas desire is a concrete fact from which abstractions >>> can be derived. >>> >>> My thesis is that there is an important difference between presentations >>> and representations, such that a natural presence has a coherent footprint >>> across multiple levels of sense, which is itself multi-coherent and >>> self-generated. By contrast, a representation, such as a 'rule', >>> 'function', 'process', 'pattern', 'figure', or 'information' is a second >>> order, symbiotic phenomenon within a natural presentation. Representations >>> are not whole and are not grounded in the totality of nature (space, time, >>> matter, energy, significance, entropy, sense, motive) but are rather a >>> facade, like a hologram, which makes sense only from a particular set of >>> externally defined perspectives. >>> >>> >>>> i cant see how a set of rules could lead something that has experiences >>>> that seem to have irreducible qualities, therefore there can be no such >>>> rules." >>> >>> >>> Even if that wasn't a misrepresentation of my position, it isn't even a >>> good Straw Man. Why would the impotence of 'rules' to create natural >>> phenomena mean that there can be no rules? When did I imply that there >>> can't be any rules? >>> >>> >>>> that's fine i suppose, but I'm unable to pretend that your blindness is >>>> some sort of insight. i just think you havent looked hard enough >>>> >>> >>> I can tell from your responses that you haven't looked at my blindness >>> at all, only your own, dressed up to sound like me. >>> >>> Craig >>> >>> >>>> >>>> On Tuesday, September 3, 2013, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 8:57:13 PM UTC-4, Dennis Ochei wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Craig, >>>>>> >>>>>> What UV looks like will depend on how it is transduced into the >>>>>> nervous system. I could add a new opsin into your blue cones and it would >>>>>> appear to be a shade of blue. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Sure, we can look at an infra-red camera too and see IR light as green >>>>> or some other color. That isn't what I'm talking about. I am talking about >>>>> new primary colors. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Or, I could achieve the transduction in such a way that UV doesn't >>>>>> confuse with blue. In which case UV will look different from other colors >>>>>> *in way you cannot describe because you don't have access to how you >>>>>> condition your behavior based of the intensity of UV light. * >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It wouldn't matter if you did have access to how you condition your >>>>> "behavior based on the intensity of the UV light". Color cannot be >>>>> described, it can only be experienced directly. I don't want you to waste >>>>> our time trying to tell me what I already know. >>>>> >>>>> http://multisenserealism.com/**t**hesis/light-revisited/is-**visib** >>>>> le-light-electromagnetic/<http://multisenserealism.com/thesis/light-revisited/is-visible-light-electromagnetic/> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I've told you in a rudimentary form what is required to build a >>>>>> system that has drives and motivations, from parts that are inanimate. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Not at all. You are projecting drives and motivations onto a system >>>>> that is unconsciously serving a function that serves your drives and >>>>> motivations. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Nature has constructed such a device using 302 neurons. It learns, >>>>>> and it has motivations. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The neurons are an expression of the motivations, not the other way >>>>> around. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Is your argument here that if we model the nematode >>>>>> deterministically, its ability to learn and its biological drives will >>>>>> vanish like smoke? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Does a rabbit's taste for carrots vanish just because we model him as >>>>> Bugs Bunny? Yes. Models, cartoons, figures, functions, shapes, >>>>> descriptions, simulations...none of them can have any sense of being or >>>>> feeling. Bugs Bunny is not a rabbit. He is a symbol which reminds our >>>>> psychology of particular themes which overlap with rabbit themes. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Because if so, I'd bet good money that you're wrong. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Sure, I'd love to take that bet. I was going to say $10,000 but I >>>>> don't think that you are going to pay that when you lose. What amount >>>>> sounds good? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Drives are traceable to electrochemical gradients "trying" to >>>>>> resolve themselves, driven by thermodynamic laws. Logic is how the pipes >>>>>> are connected up, desire is the water pump. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I agree that microphysical events correspond to microphenomenal >>>>> experiences, but that does not mean that all that has to happen to scale >>>>> up >>>>> an inanimate object's thermodynamic motives to mammalian quality emotions >>>>> is that it must be configured in the correct shapes. That is an >>>>> assumption, >>>>> and a seductively popular one, but it is 100% wrong. Using the hypothesis >>>>> of sense as the sole universal primitive, we should anticipate that the >>>>> relevant qualifier of sensitivity is not structure but experience. Giving >>>>> your cat a computer will not make him computer literate, and dressing a >>>>> water pump up in human clothes does not cause a human. The clues are all >>>>> around us. No machine or program has every succeeded in being anything but >>>>> completely impersonal and psychologically empty. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Furthermore, deterministic does not equal logical. There is no logic >>>>>> behind why opposites attract, even though this logically leads to like >>>>>> dissolving like. Whatever axioms there are in this universe, they are not >>>>>> logically justified. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Determinism doesn't explain why opposites attract, but given that they >>>>> do in some particular context, determinism is the logic of the >>>>> consequences >>>>> of that attraction. Determinism doesn't address everything, but whatever >>>>> it >>>>> does address is considered to behave according to the logic of the >>>>> precedents which have been established. If determinism was not logical, >>>>> how >>>>> could it claim to determine anything? >>>>> >>>>> Craig >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 3:33 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tuesday, September 3, 2013 3:42:53 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 9/3/2013 12:32 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote: >>>>>>>> > Telmo and Brent, >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > The Humean quote sums it up nicely. You can think of a human as a >>>>>>>> collection of desires >>>>>>>> > and a reasoning process that arbitrates between and attempts to >>>>>>>> realize them. In the >>>>>>>> > process of reasoning, one might bring about new desires, but >>>>>>>> reasoning is always >>>>>>>> > employed by desires one currently has. >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > Just couple days ago I was trying futilely to logically deduce >>>>>>>> what it is that I should >>>>>>>> > want to do, I realized that "logic is the servant of desire," (im >>>>>>>> not quite as eloquent >>>>>>>> > as hume, it seems...) and to find a logically justified want is >>>>>>>> futile. Desire is >>>>>>>> > inherently illogical. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'd say "extralogical". That doesn't mean though that your desires >>>>>>>> aren't caused (by >>>>>>>> evolution, by metabolism,...). Many of them may even be >>>>>>>> predictable - that's how >>>>>>>> advertising agencies make a living. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *Your* desires can be included in your experience by evolution, etc, >>>>>>> provided that desire in general exists as a possibility in the >>>>>>> universe. No >>>>>>> amount of statistical reproduction of inanimate objects or unconscious >>>>>>> machines could cause a desire to appear out of nowhere though. Could it? >>>>>>> Why would it? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Craig >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> > Turns out Hume beat me to this insight by quite a bit, but I >>>>>>>> suppose he had a head start, =p >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > It seems that if we were completely logical, we would simply >>>>>>>> cease to function >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Dostoevsky beat you to that one, "If everything on Earth were >>>>>>>> rational, nothing would >>>>>>>> happen." But he had a head start too. :-) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Brent >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in >>>>>>> the Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/** >>>>>>> to****pic/everything-list/**jDy5twbibk****Q/unsubscribe<https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/jDy5twbibkQ/unsubscribe> >>>>>>> . >>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >>>>>>> everything-li...@**googlegroups.****com. >>>>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. >>>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/**group**** >>>>>>> /everything-list <http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/**grou**** >>>>>>> ps/opt_out <https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out>. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >>>>> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/**to >>>>> **pic/everything-list/**jDy5twbibk**Q/unsubscribe<https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/jDy5twbibkQ/unsubscribe> >>>>> . >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >>>>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**go**oglegroups.com. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**c* >>>>> *om. >>>>> Visit this group at >>>>> http://groups.google.com/**group**/everything-list<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> >>>>> . >>>>> For more options, visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/**grou**ps/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >>> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/** >>> topic/everything-list/**jDy5twbibkQ/unsubscribe<https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/jDy5twbibkQ/unsubscribe> >>> . >>> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >>> everything-li...@**googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. >>> Visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-list<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> >>> . >>> For more options, visit >>> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >>> . >>> >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/jDy5twbibkQ/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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