Thanks Craig, you've articulated quite well a number of difficulties in approaching the hard problem, IMHO. I was reading this article in the SEP and thought of your approach: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nishida-kitaro/
Look especially under his glossing of the idea of 'pure experience.' It reminds me of your MR/PIP and seems quite congenial to it. Whaddaya think? On Monday, September 16, 2013 1:35:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > The Hard Problem of consciousness asks why there is a gap between our > explanation of matter, or biology, or neurology, and our experience in the > first place. What is it there which even suggests to us that there should > be a gap, and why should there be a such thing as experience to stand apart > from the functions of that which we can explain. > > *Materialism only miniaturizes the gap* and relies on a machina ex deus > (intentionally reversed deus ex machina) of ‘complexity’ to save the day. > An interesting question would be, why does dualism seem to be easier to > overlook when we are imagining the body of a neuron, or a collection of > molecules? I submit that it is because miniaturization and complexity > challenge the limitations of our cognitive ability, we find it easy to > conflate that sort of quantitative incomprehensibility with the other > incomprehensibility being considered, namely aesthetic* awareness. What > consciousness does with phenomena which pertain to a distantly scaled > perceptual frame is to under-signify it. It becomes less important, less > real, less worthy of attention. > > *Idealism only fictionalizes the gap*. I argue that idealism makes more > sense on its face than materialism for addressing the Hard Problem, since > material would have no plausible excuse for becoming aware or being > entitled to access an unacknowledged a priori possibility of awareness. > Idealism however, fails at commanding the respect of a sophisticated > perspective since it relies on naive denial of objectivity. Why so many > molecules? Why so many terrible and tragic experiences? Why so much > enduring of suffering and injustice? The thought of an afterlife is too > seductive of a way to wish this all away. The concept of maya, that the > world is a veil of illusion is too facile to satisfy our scientific > curiosity. > > *Dualism multiplies the gap*. Acknowledging the gap is a good first step, > but without a bridge, the gap is diagonalized and stuck in infinite > regress. In order for experience to connect in some way with physics, some > kind of homunculus is invoked, some third force or function interceding on > behalf of the two incommensurable substances. The third force requires a > fourth and fifth force on either side, and so forth, as in a Zeno paradox. > Each homunculus has its own Explanatory Gap. > > *Dual Aspect Monism retreats from the gap*. The concept of material and > experience being two aspects of a continuous whole is the best one so far – > getting very close. The only problem is that it does not explain what this > monism is, or where the aspects come from. It rightfully honors the > importance of opposites and duality, but it does not question what they > actually are. Laws? Information? > > *Panpsychism toys with the gap*.Depending on what kind of panpsychism is > employed, it can miniaturize, multiply, or retreat from the gap. At least > it is committing to closing the gap in a way which does not take human > exceptionalism for granted, but it still does not attempt to integrate > qualia itself with quanta in a detailed way. Tononi’s IIT might be an > exception in that it is detailed, but only from the quantitative end. The > hard problem, which involves justifying the reason for integrated > information being associated with a private ‘experience’ is still only > picked at from a distance. > > *Primordial Identity Pansensitivity,* my candidate for nomination, uses a > different approach than the above. PIP solves the hard problem by putting > the entire universe inside the gap. Consciousness *is* the Explanatory > Gap. Naturally, it follows serendipitously that consciousness is also > itself *explanatory*. The role of consciousness is to make plain – to > bring into aesthetic evidence that which can be made evident. How is that > different from what physics does? What does the universe do other than > generate aesthetic textures and narrative fragments? It is not awareness > which must fit into our physics or our science, our religion or philosophy, > it is the totality of eternity which must gain meaning and evidence through > sensory presentation. > > > > *Is awareness ‘aesthetic’? That we call a substance which causes the loss > of consciousness a *general anesthetic* might be a serendipitous clue. If > so, the term local anesthetic as an agent which deadens sensation is > another hint about our intuitive correlation between discrete sensations > and overall capacity to be ‘awake’. Between sensations (I would call > sub-private) and personal awareness (privacy) would be a spectrum of nested > channels of awareness. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
