On 19 Sep 2013, at 18:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:

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On Thursday, September 19, 2013 10:55:15 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchalwrote:On 18 Sep 2013, at 22:11, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 8:26:35 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > <snip> > > Beyond the ambiguities, comp put the physical universe in the gap, > when the gap is modeled by the logic "*" minus the logic not-"*". > > Why just the physical universe though? Don't you think comp needs to > put itself in the gap too? Here I model the gap by the difference between true and provable, versus true and not provable.That's not the gap I'm talking about though (I didn't know that waseven a gab that was being discussed anywhere, tbh.). The ExplanatoryGap,

Yes, thats the one.

philosophically,

That means nothing for me.

is about what is experienced directly and what is experienced aspresent independently of our direct experience.

You mean memories?

Direct experiences include those which seem true, experiences whichseem provable, and experiences which seem unrelated to either proofor truth but are merely aesthetic, euphoric, qualitative, phenomenaas sources of appreciation. Where does fiction fit into your gap?

`In human imagination or delire, I guess. Not sure seeing any problem`

`here.`

It amazes me at first that physics seems to appear only in the gap, but then it is coherent with the idea that is is a first person plural emergence, and that is confirmed by Everett QM. If we look at the same particles we do get entangled and share the foregoing history. That's why Everett saves computationalism from solipsism.I don't know that we are looking at the right thing in QM. Insteadof particles, or waves which physically exist, we should focus onwhat gives physics the ability to cohere as 'particles' or 'waves'in the first place - what would make laws of nature manifest as'forms', when they don't seem to do that in a pure computation (i.e.The Mandelbrot Set requires a graphic plot to visualize, it doesn'tcreate graphics out of its arithmetic relation).

`Yes it does. Graphic plots just make it easy, and pleasing, for humans`

`to relate with them. The geometry is in the arithmetical relations.`

> > > I mean G* minus G, etc. In fact physics (should) appear in Z* minus > Z, X* minus X. > > G* and G don't show up in a Google search. I've never really > understood what you mean by that, but you're welcome to explain if > you have time. I have done this many times on this list, I know, sorry about that. It hasn't sunk in yet for me.

`OK. There are good books referred in the bibio of the book and papers,`

`in my URL.`

but I will explain it again on FOAR soon, or later. But I can say to words. G is the modal logic of Gödel's beweisbar (provability by PM, or PA, I mean Principia Mathematica, pr Peano Arithmetic, or any Löbian machine). In fact G correspond to the provability proposition that the machine can prove about herself, and G* corresponds to the true, but not provable by the machine, propositions.Ohh, ok. This is the two poles of your version of the Gap (which isnot explanatory at all, but merely provable).

?

`Nothing in the gap is provable. true yes (trivially given that I limit`

`myself on correct machines), but never provable by such machine. G*`

`minus G = what is true but non provable.`

G for a human might be, that they are in a hotel, but G* might bethat they cannot prove which hotel they are in from inside of theroom, but they know that the hotel is in Geneva. Or something likethat.

`The machine can still prove that if she is really in the hostel, then`

`she cannot prove it.`

We're not really talking about the same things then. To me modallogic is only relevant to something which relates to logic, and thatrules out the entire universe of aesthetically experienced physics.

`On the contrary, modal logic is for application of logic to modal`

`aspect of the human reality.`

In my view modal logic has no way to access any kind of experience,

Modal logic is *about* that. It is not simply that. Treatises on planes cannot fly either.

it assumes it from the start. It assumes a condition of 'provable'or 'true' as independent of experience rather than qualities whichare abstracted from aesthetic comparisons.

`But that exists, once you agree that 17 is prime, or not,`

`independently of me and you.`

If I count five fingers, each one becomes an identical digit. If Icount five leaves, it is the same digit of five. If I have just adigit of five however, it does not lead to an imagination of leavesor fingers unless I have experienced those prior to counting.

`Yes, of course. But monkey's fetus seems able to dream of trees before`

`seeing them, and with comp this is rather normal, as seeing is`

`supported by brain activity. Likewise, arithmetic contains all such`

`dreams.`

For example, take the (self) consistency proposition ~B f (I don't prove the false). This is a typically true proposition (trivially for the correct machines) but not provable by the machine. So you have G* proves ~B f, but G does not prove it.Does ~B f need to be proved, or is it just a given that something isconditionally 'truish', where truish = ~B f, true in the sense of ithasn't been disproved? It's not clear to me why ~B f needs G* toprove it.

`It does need G*. G* came after, summarizing infinite conversation that`

`we can have with Peano Arithmetic (say) about Peano Arithmetic. It is`

`just a handy tool for us, notablmy to derive physics from number self-`

`references.`

On the contrary, the sentence ~Bf -> ~B(~B f), which is the modal translation of the second incompleteness theorem, (which says if I am consistent then I cannot prove that I am consistent) *is* a theorem of G, meaning that Löbian machine can prove their own incompleteness.But can it prove that the proof of incompleteness isn't part of itscompleteness on another level?

?

How does it know if it can prove anything? Why do we attribute anexpectation of proof?

`The same question arise in between humans. Why segregate the machine a`

`priori. Kepe in mind that I *assume* computationalism.`

> > > Like I said, beyond ambiguities, what you say fits very often comp, > except when you argue *from* what you say, that comp has to be > false, of course. > > Hehe, I can do what comp can't :) Comp is not a person, and not-comp makes the life of my sun-in-law miserable ... ;)His life can't be miserable, because we can just peg some registerin him to be happy no matter what.

`Oh! You want my sun in law to forget his misery with artificial`

`paradise?`

Again, humans do that too.

He doesn't need a steak, because he's got steak equivalent datatables to eat.

`We don't need steak either, we need only the sensation, and they are`

`indeed provided by some relative arithmetical relations. Brain enacted`

`them, in the relevant situation, but some dreams and drugs can`

`provides them to.`

Bruno

Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

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